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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1. Front-End of Innovation and Ambiguity Aversion 
Innovation allows for firms to gain competitive and strategic advantages, while 
ensuring long-term growth and survival (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995; Chandy and Tellis 
1998). Innovation is also critical in allowing firms to find solution to problems or 
developing new ideas and serves to change both market and competitive landscapes.  As 
a result, scholars have expended great effort in to the study of innovation (e.g. Hauser, 
Tellis and Griffin 2006; Chandy and Tellis 1998; Damanpour 1991; Montoya-Weiss and 
Calantone 1994).  This research activity has attempted to understand various facets of 
innovation: including product innovation, process innovation, how firms organize for 
innovation, the technological dimension of innovation, and the antecedents and 
consequences of innovation etc. 
2	  
	  
Given the importance of product innovation (Cooper 2001; Griffin 1997), there is 
demand to understand how innovation is executed within a firm.  This dissertation is 
interested in the new product development activities that firms engage in.  Based on the 
direction of both extant research and practice, innovation in firms can be divided into 
three major parts; the front-end, new-product development, and commercialization.  
Collectively this is referred to as the new-product development process.  The new-
product development process suggests that new ideas are generated at the front-end, 
further developed during the new-product development stage, and ultimately enter the 
marketplace through commercialization. 
In terms of research intensity, the new-product development and 
commercialization stages have received a majority of the attention (Hauser, Tellis and 
Griffin 2006).  Scholarly work has developed well-respected scientific models that 
explain these stages in addition to making numerous recommendations for best practice.  
However, inquiry into the front-end has been lacking.  The term ‘fuzzy front-end’ of 
innovation was first coined by Reinertsen (1985), and quickly achieved widespread 
acceptance as a term to describe the early, pre-developmental work in the new-product 
development process.  The term fuzzy captures the inherent vagueness associated with the 
front-end of innovation.  Aspects of the early stages of the new-product development 
process are characterized as being difficult to evaluate, lacking accountability, 
challenging to explain and model, and generally lacking understanding. 
It is this aspect of the new-product development process that the current 
dissertation is interested in exploring.  The front-end of innovation can be properly 
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defined as “those activities that come before formal and well-structured new-product 
development portion” (Koen, et al. 2001, p. 49).  One way to contemplate this would be 
to think about the front-end as comprising of all those activities that precede actual design 
and engineering effort.  Routine front-end activities include idea generation, opportunity 
recognition, and concept definition.  When compared to the new-product development 
stage, there are multiple facets that differentiate the front-end.  However the degree of 
uncertainty present in each stage is of particular interest to this dissertation. 
There exists a high degree of uncertainty pertaining to many aspects of the front-
end of innovation (Cooper 2001; Koen, et al. 2001).  Since new ideas and product 
concepts in the front-end are far from launch and early in development terms, firms often 
find it arduous to find relevant information to make well-informed decisions on the scope 
of the project, its financial viability, and ultimate competitiveness etc.  Hence we say that 
there exists a high degree of uncertainty at the front-end. 
How individual project managers react to this uncertainty can have an important 
impact on front-end innovation performance, and since innovation is a sequential process, 
it could also impact firm performance.  To best of my knowledge, this is the first study 
that attempts to understand these relationships.  However, in order to further examine 
these issues, it is important to gain a clearer understanding of uncertainty and how people 
react to it. 
In terms of uncertainty, Knight (1921) first pointed out the fact that there is both 
measurable uncertainty and unmeasurable uncertainty.  He called the former risk and the 
latter was described as ambiguity.  According to Knight (1921), since risk is observable it 
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can be quantified.  Therefore risk is often described in terms of known probabilities while 
ambiguity is described in terms of unknown probabilities.  Research attempting to better 
understand uncertainty, has often been drawn to risk rather than ambiguity because of its 
measurable or observable quality.  Phenomenon involving ambiguity however has been 
less explored.  Regardless, both have been singled out as important parameters in 
decision-making (Trautmann, et al. 2008). 
Ambiguous situations are those where “available information is scanty or 
obviously unreliable or highly conflicting; or where expectations of different individuals 
differ widely; or where expressed confidence in estimates tends to be low” (Ellsberg 
1961, p. 660-61).  This description clearly fits the front-end of innovation.  As mentioned 
previously, the front-end is characterized as having a lot of uncertainty, and to be more 
specific it is dominated by ambiguity rather than risk.  As a result, the front-end stages of 
innovation are likely to include decisions involving ambiguity rather than risk.  
Therefore, it becomes important to understand the role of ambiguity in decision-making. 
Interestingly, it has been found that individual decision-making is different when 
dealing with ambiguity and risk.  Ellsberg (1961) found that people, when given a choice, 
are more likely to choose a riskier bet with known probabilities as opposed to a less risky 
one in which the probabilities are ambiguous.  Ellsberg (1961) exhibited this 
phenomenon in a number of simple experiments, the most famous of which is widely 
referred to as the ‘two-color’ problem.  Given two urns each containing a hundred balls, a 
study participant is told that the first urn contains 50 red and 50 black balls and that the 
second urn contains red and black balls in an unknown proportion.  Ellsberg (1961) 
demonstrated that when a participant is offered a reward depending on the outcome from 
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randomly drawing the balls, participants (while indifferent on betting either red or black 
balls for either urn) were more likely to bet on the first urn (with the known composition) 
rather than the second urn (with the unknown composition).  In other words, study 
participants exhibited a preference for gambles with known (risky) rather than unknown 
(ambiguous) probabilities of winning (Muthukrishnan et al. 2009; Ellsberg 1961). 
This experiment suggests behavior that is inconsistent with expected utility theory 
and is referred to as the Ellsberg’s paradox.  The decision-making phenomenon exhibited 
in Ellsberg’s paradox has become known as ambiguity aversion.   Trautmann et al. (2008, 
p.225) define ambiguity aversion as situations where people “prefer options involving 
clear probabilities (risk) to options involving vague probabilities (ambiguity).”  As such, 
it is a decision-maker’s ambiguity aversion that ought to be studied in terms of its impact 
on the front-end of innovation.  This is exactly what this dissertation sets out to do. 
1.2. Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this dissertation is to study the role and impact of a decision-
maker’s ambiguity aversion on the front-end of innovation.  It is clear that innovation 
plays an important role in firm performance and competitiveness.  With this in mind, 
there have been repeated appeals for further scientific inquiry into the early stages of 
innovation in the firm, referred to as the front-end of innovation.  Currently, we lack a 
clear understanding of front-end decision-making processes.  
Conceptually, the front-end stages of innovation are likely to include decisions 
involving ambiguity rather than risk.  One way to view the innovation process is that 
considerable effort is expended on risk-reduction. That is to say, the innovation/new 
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product development process converts amorphous ideas into tangible products that have a 
maximum chance of success in the commercial marketplace. However, this may lead to a 
preference for advancing product concepts where risk, in terms of clear probabilities, can 
be more easily established. At the same time, those new ideas and product concepts that 
are ambiguous may be discarded or screened out simply because it seems difficult to 
discover the probability estimates associated with their outcome success.   
This is what I have described earlier as ambiguity aversion, and it has been found 
to be an important predictor of decision making under uncertainty.  My goal is to propose 
and test a theoretical model in which ambiguity aversion has a detrimental effect on the 
performance of front-end innovation activities.   
As such the pertinent research questions are: 
1. What leads to a situation where a decision-maker exhibits ambiguity aversion? 
2. Does a decision-maker’s ambiguity aversion impact front-end innovation 
performance?  If so, 
3. Under what circumstances can the impact of ambiguity aversion on the front-end 
of innovation be managed? 
1.3. Proposed Model 
In asking the research questions mentioned previously, I develop a conceptual 
model that attempts to answer them.  As shown in Figure 1-1, the model posits a complex 
relationship between a project leader’s ambiguity aversion and front-end of innovation 
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performance.  All the proposed relationships are based on a comprehensive review of the 
literature. 
Figure 1-1 – The Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
I suggest that there are two important antecedents to a project manager’s level of 
ambiguity aversion.  Fear of negative evaluation, which is the perceived fear of negative 
evaluation by others, post decision, and perceived competence which reflects an 
individual’s willingness to choose an uncertain event dependent on his/her competence 
over the decision context.  Interestingly, and never before conceptualized, I suggest that 
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innovation culture plays an important moderating role between ambiguity aversion and 
its antecedents. 
Ambiguity aversion impacts front-end of innovation via decision-making 
comprehensiveness.  Decision-making comprehensiveness is defined as “the degree to 
which the team is exhaustive as it considers multiple approaches, courses of action, and 
decision criteria in its strategic decision making” (Slotegraaf and Atuahene-Gima 2011, 
p. 97).  While the relationship between decision-making comprehensiveness and 
innovation performance is well established, few have adequately described its 
antecedents.  This dissertation suggests that a project leader’s ambiguity aversion serves 
as an important antecedent to the decision-making comprehensiveness of new product 
teams.  The conceptual model suggests that ambiguity aversion has a negative impact on 
front-end of innovation performance due to a suppression of decision-making 
comprehensiveness.  Innovation culture also has an important impact on innovation 
performance which is mediated by the firm’s capacity to innovate. 
1.4. Theoretical Significance 
The current study attempts to make relevant contributions to the science of 
marketing because it adds not only to our understanding of the front-end of innovation 
but also in regards to important decision-making phenomenon.  It studies the 
underexplored connection between the ambiguity literature and innovation literature.  In 
terms of the front-end of innovation, this study will contribute to theory by providing an 
in depth look at decision-making processes that are involved.  In terms of decision-
making, the study will help clarify our theoretical foundations on decisions involving 
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uncertainty— especially ambiguity.  This dissertation fills an important theoretical gap 
that will ultimately allow for a better understanding of this phenomenon going forward.   
1.5. Managerial Significance 
From a managerial perspective, this dissertation makes important normative 
recommendations that could potentially have widespread significance.  There have been 
repeated calls from industry to provide a better understanding and recommendations for 
activities that make up the front-end of innovation.  The current study heeds this call by 
analyzing the role of ambiguity aversion in such contexts. 
A decision-maker’s aversion to ambiguity could have detrimental effects— 
especially in terms of innovation.  This dissertation will provide managers with a clearer 
understanding of why this is the case.  At the same time, the results of the study should 
help decipher how and when such negative impacts can be controlled or regulated.  These 
findings could potentially be generalized to contexts other than innovation, thus 
increasing its significance to managers.   
1.6. Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is organized into six chapters.  This chapter, the first, provides a 
brief overview of the purpose, conceptual model, and theoretical and practical 
significance of the study.  Chapter II provides a review of the relevant literature from the 
new product development, organizational culture, and risk and uncertainty literatures.  
The section reviewing the literature on risk and uncertainty pays particular attention to 
ambiguity.  Chapter III then sets out the proposed conceptual model and develops eight 
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testable hypotheses.  Chapter IV outlines the research methods for measuring, collecting, 
and analyzing the data.  In this study, date will be collected from new product project 
leaders using survey methods.  Chapter V then presents the results of the analysis 
including the measurement model, the analytical model, and the hypothesis testing.  
Chapter VI then discusses the findings, reconciles these findings with prior research, and 
makes suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter serves as an in depth review of the relevant literature.  The chapter 
has three major sections.  The first reviews the literature relevant to innovation.  Here I 
provide a broad overview of the scholarly work conducted in regards to innovation.  This 
is followed by a discussion of the important antecedents to successful innovation in firms.  
A focus on the front-end of innovation in addition to antecedents considered important to 
positive front-end performance wraps up the section. 
The second section of the literature review is focused on organizational culture.  
This review provides the reader with an overview of extant research on organizational 
culture especially related to the domain of marketing.  I outline the competing values 
framework that serves as a categorization schema for various types of firm cultures.  The 
section concludes with a through discussion on innovation culture.
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The third section of the literature review focuses on ambiguity and ambiguity 
aversion.  The major scope of this dissertation lies in relating the literature on ambiguity 
aversion to activities that are conducted in terms of innovation. This review is critical in 
developing a majority of the propositions outlined in the next chapter.  The section 
initially discusses ambiguity then proceeds to a discussion on ambiguity aversion 
followed by its antecedents.  This is followed by a review comparing ambiguity to risk 
and ambiguity aversion to risk aversion.  The chapter concludes with a brief summary. 
2.2. Literature on Innovation 
The subsequent subsections provide a thorough overview of the literature on 
innovation.  I begin by discussing innovation within a broad context followed by a 
discussion of the antecedents of new-product development.  This is followed by a focused 
review of the extant literature on the front-end of innovation.  Here I make it clear how 
the front-end of innovation differs from the other stages of innovation.  I also discuss the 
various antecedents of front-end of innovation that have been explored in prior literature. 
2.2.1.  Innovation 
Innovation is a fundamental process that helps establish a competitive advantage 
within firms (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995).  Through innovation, firms develop solutions 
to problems or discover new ideas.  Thus, its impact can increase quality, add value, 
lower prices etc.; and thus provide benefits to the firm’s customers.  Innovation also 
drives change.  When firms engage in innovation, it forces markets to change and adapt.  
Market participants that do not adapt will ultimately perish, and those that do will emerge 
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to be successful (Chandy and Tellis 1998).  In addition, I argue, that change, serves as a 
driver of innovation.  Firms innovate in response to changes in consumer preferences and 
lifestyles, to capitalize on newly emergent opportunities or defend against marketplace 
threats (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995). 
As pointed out by multiple scholars, innovation is a focal point and driver of 
competitiveness in the marketplace, and as such, is a key area of research focus 
(Baregheh, Rowley and Sambrook 2009; Hauser, Tellis and Griffin 2006; Chandy and 
Tellis 1998).  As evidenced by the wealth of research, it is clear that innovation is a broad 
topic.  Scholars have focused on various facets of innovation including product 
innovation, process innovation, how firms organize for innovation, the technological 
dimension of innovation, and the antecedents and consequences of innovation etc.  
Below, I examine some of the major definitions of and types associated with innovation. 
Schumpeter (1934, p.65) defines product innovation as the creation of a new good 
which more adequately satisfies existing or previously satisfied needs.”  Similarly, 
Utterback and Abernathy (1975, p.642) define a product innovation as “a new technology 
and or combination of technologies introduced commercially to meet a user or market 
need.”  More often than not, when people think of innovation, they are thinking about 
product innovations.  This can be attributed to the fact that product innovation receives 
the majority of the limelight (compared to other types of innovation) and translates into 
financial and performance related variables.  A good example of a product innovation is 
the MP3 player.  It fits the definitional criteria set forth by Schumpeter and others.  
Product innovation can also be seen in service offerings.  FedEx and UPS innovated to 
provide a better service for their consumers by offering overnight delivery service.   
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Table 2-1 
 
However innovation is not limited to changes in product-related attributes.  
Innovation can occur within activities related to the manufacture of products and 
services, or its distribution, and even in after sales service to name a few.  Such 
innovations are called process innovations.  A process innovation is defined as the 
“implementation of a new or significantly improved production or delivery method” 
Author(s) Stream Definition
Schumpeter (1934) Economics "New combinations of new or existing knowledge, resources, 
equipment"
Thompson (1965) Political 
Science
"the generation, acceptance and implementation of new ideas, 
processes, products, or services"
Mohr (1969) Political 
Science
"the successful introduction into an applied situation of means or 
ends that are new to that situation"
Zaltman et al. 
(1973)
Marketing "Any idea, practice, or material artifact perceived to be new by the 
relevant unit of adoption"
West and Farr 
(1990)
Management "the intentional introduction and application within a role, group or 
organization of ideas, processes, products or procedures, new to the 
relevant unit of adoption, designed to significantly benefit the 
individual, the group, organization or wider society"
Damanpour (1991) Management "Adoption of an internally generated or purchased device, system, 
policy, program, process, product, or service that is new to the 
adopting organization"
Rogers (1995) Marketing "An idea, practice, or object that is perceived as being new by an 
individual or other unit of adoption"
Nohria and Gulati 
(1996)
Management "Any policy, structure, method or process, product or market 
opportunity that the manager of the innovating unit perceived to be 
new"
OECD (2005) Economics "A marketing innovation is the implementation of a new marketing 
method involving significant changes in product design or 
packaging, product placement, product promotion or pricing"
Crawford and Di 
Benedetto (2006)
Management "the process of developing new products"
SELECT DEFINITIONS OF INNOVATION FROM VARIOUS STREAMS OF LITERATURE
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(OECD 2005, p. 32).  Tushman and Nadler (1986, p. 77) define process innovation as 
changes to “the way products and services are made or delivered.”  Often times, with 
process innovation, the product or service may remain unchanged.  However, there may 
be cost efficiencies and other benefits associated with process innovation.  As pointed out 
by Trott (2008), process innovations are key not only in terms of production, distribution 
etc., but also in terms of the managerial decision making processes related to the product 
(such as the new product development process). 
Scholars have also attempted to better understand the degrees (or levels) of 
innovation.  It should be noted that some innovations, be it product- or process-
innovations, are radical or major breakthroughs.  On the other hand, a vast majority of 
innovations are more incremental in nature, often providing smaller benefits.  As pointed 
out by Chandy and Tellis (1998), the degree or level of innovation is based on newness of 
technology along with the added benefit or value provided to the customer.  A radical 
innovation has been defined as those that “involve substantially new technology and 
provide substantially greater customer benefits per dollar, relative to existing products” 
(Chandy and Tellis 1998, p.476). On the opposite end of the spectrum, an incremental 
innovation “involve relatively minor changes in technology and provide relatively low 
incremental customer benefits per dollar” (Chandy and Tellis 1998, p. 476).  Garcia and 
Calantone (2002) have suggested that a simple radical vs. incremental dichotomization 
does not adequately capture the various levels of innovation.  They have suggested a third 
level that explains innovations that fall in between radical and incremental and call it 
“really new innovation.”  Likewise, terms such as drastic innovation (Reinganum 1985), 
revolutionary innovation (Caselli 1999), and disruptive innovation (Govindarajan and 
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Kopalle 2006) have been used to describe various level of innovation in terms of their 
effect on the marketplace. 
Radical innovation, specifically, has received a lot of scholarly attention over the 
past decade (Tellis, Prabhu and Chandy 2009; Sorescu and Spanjol 2008; Sood and Tellis 
2005; Sorescu, Chandy and Prabhu 2003).  Studies have suggested that firms that 
successfully develop radical innovations tend to attain dominant positions in the 
marketplace based on higher profitability and market share (Atuahene-Gima 2005, Tellis 
and Golder 2001).  Failure to produce radical innovations can bring down large 
incumbents (Chandy and Tellis 2000).  As a result, CEOs and managers have begun to 
realize the important role of radical innovation (Yadav, Prabhu and Chandy 2007).  
However, there is a high degree of uncertainty surrounding radical innovation (Leifer et 
al. 2000).  
In light of the importance of innovation, academic scholars have expended 
considerable effort in an attempt to understand how firms should organize themselves in 
order to increase their ability to innovate.  As such, organizational/firm factors such as 
structure and culture (including role of management, project team organization, cross-
functional collaboration etc.) are key to understanding innovation within firms.   
Organizational structure, broadly defined as how the organization puts its various 
work units together to accomplish its goals, provides multiple avenues to enhance 
innovative capability (O’Reilly and Tushman 2004; Dougherty 1999).  While firms tend 
to be good at generating new ideas, the process of seeing them through to 
commercialization is difficult at best, and this difficulty is often blamed on poor structure 
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(O’Reilly and Tushman 2004; Daft 2007).  Terms such as agile, adaptive, risk-taking, 
flexible and ambidextrous are often used to describe organizational structures best suited 
to innovate (Tellis, Prabhu and Chandy 2009; O’Reilly and Tushman 2004; Zien and 
Buckler 1997). Relatedly, scholars have also found that organizational culture plays an 
important role in determining a firm’s innovative capabilities (see sections 2.3.1. and 
2.3.2.). 
As emphasized earlier, innovation is key to firm success.  In particular, product 
innovations seem to be of most importance to the survival and prosperity of the modern 
corporation (Cooper 2001; Griffin 1997).  Therefore, it is important to understand how 
innovation is executed within firms.  Current trends in practice, and recommendations 
from scholarly work, suggest that innovation in firms is divided into three major parts; 
front-end innovation, new-product development and commercialization (collectively 
referred to as the new-product development process, cf. Griffin 1997; Brown and 
Eisenhardt 1995; Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994).  In other words, newly generated 
ideas move through stages that ultimately result in a product offering which is hopefully 
innovative. 
Firms are more successful at generating new ideas, than at seeing them through to 
launch.  In other words, for each single successful new-product launch, failures are many 
(Hauser, Tellis and Griffin 2006).  As a result of this, the new-product development 
process is often characterized as a funnel (refer to Figure 2-1).  New ideas and 
opportunities enter through the mouth of the funnel, and go through various stages such 
as design and engineering, concept testing etc., before finally being launched.  The 
product development funnel aptly shows that not all ideas make it through to launch, 
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many ideas will fail, though some might be recycled and improved.  In addition, 
visualizing the new-product development process in this manner, helps to recognize that, 
firms have a higher likelihood of introducing successful innovative products if they have 
a multitude of projects (product concepts) in the funnel at any given time (Hauser, Tellis 
and Griffin 2006; Cooper 1994). 
Figure 2-1 - Product Development Funnel  
 
In applied practice, the concepts behind the new-product development funnel 
have been developed and adopted (by a vast majority of firms) as the Stage-Gate® 
system.  The Stage-Gate® system, which has been widely adopted among innovative 
firms (Cooper, Edgett and Kleinschmidt 2005), serves as a good tool to describe the new-
product development process in further detail.  The Stage-Gate® system commits all of a 
firms new ideas through a systems of stages and gates (see Figure 2-2).  The stages 
involve a set of prescribed, often cross-functional, and parallel activities that have to be 
performed (Cooper 2001).  While the stages indicate a certain process or set of tasks that 
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has to be performed to the concept, gates are check points that serve as go/kill decision 
points (Cooper 2001).  Gates also serve a quality control function as entrances to 
subsequent stages.  Unless certain pre-specified criteria are met, the product concept 
cannot advance to the next stage (Cooper 2001).  
Figure 2-2 - The Stage-Gate® System  
 
While Stage-Gate® has received wide-spread attention, there are other innovation 
management approaches that have been prescribed as alternative ‘game-plans’ to the 
new-product development process.  One of these is the spiral process (Boehm 1988; 
Garnsey and Wright 1990).  A spiral process for new-product development values speed 
as a key part of the process.  Project teams quickly examine concepts with each 
successive pass, and swiftly pass them through to the next stage of development.  As 
concepts are moved from one stage to the next, the process should attain greater speed.  A 
claimed advantage of the spiral process is that its use lowers costs associated with the 
new-product development process.  Research has found that the spiral process is well 
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suited to firms facing a high degree of technological and market turbulence (Cusumano 
and Yoffie 1998).   
Another alternative model of new-product development suggests overlapping 
stages (Cooper 1994).  As an example, design activities might commence even before an 
idea is completely hashed out.  While the Stage-Gate® model remains the popular choice 
in prescribed ‘game-plans’ for new-product development, Hauser, Tellis and Griffin 
(2006) have advocated further research in alternative innovation management systems 
and processes to new-product development. 
2.2.2. Antecedents to New-Product Development  
In addition to the discussion on new-product development processes, multiple 
studies have attempted to understand and explain the antecedents that predict firm’s 
success at the new-product development process, and innovation in general.  This is 
important, since a firm’s ability to successfully innovate via new-product conception, 
development and launch could decide the fate of the business (Cooper 2001).  More 
specifically, these studies look at both product- and firm-level factors that predict firms’ 
success at developing new novel ideas into a commercially successful and innovative 
product offerings.  Brown and Eisenhardt’s (1995) and Montoya-Weiss and Calantone’s 
(1994) meta-analyses discuss antecedents to successful new-product development. 
Product uniqueness and superiority are primary drivers of new-product 
development success at the product-level (Cooper 2001; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1996).  
However, it should be pointed out, in turn uniqueness and superiority result from 
customer focus and being market driven.  In other words, a strong market orientation in 
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addition to a global/world focus in product development has been found to determine 
success in new-product development (Cooper 2001; Han, Kim and Srivastava 1998; 
Narver, Slater and MacLachlan 2004).     
Antecedents inherent to a successful new-product development process also 
include a strong emphasis on pre-development work (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1996).  
Pre-development work involves all the activities that occur in the fuzzy front-end of 
innovation, that is before actual design and engineering commence.  Such activities 
include preliminary market assessments, technical and financial feasibility studies etc.   
Part of this includes having an early, sharp product definition (Cooper 2001). A clearly 
defined product concept has been shown to be a key indicator of future product success.  
Other process-related antecedents for new-product development success include 
instituting tough go/kill decision points and overall top management support in 
facilitating the new-product development process (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994; 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1996).  
Finally, a third category of new-product development antecedents includes firm-
level factors.  Key among these is having an innovative culture, one that stresses the 
importance of new and innovative products (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994; De 
Brentani and Kleinschmidt 2004; see section 2.3.2. for a wider discussion). As pointed 
out by Dobni (2008), an innovative culture emphasizes creating avenues for employees to 
create and innovate, recognizing their efforts, and defining the role of top management in 
the new-product development process as that of facilitators.  Other firm-level antecedents 
to innovation success include the incorporation of specific strategies that guide a firm’s 
product innovation activities, product team organization, and resource commitment 
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(Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1996). 
2.2.3. Front-End of Innovation  
As pointed out earlier, the innovation process in firms can be divided into three 
parts, the front-end, new-product development, and commercialization.  While there has 
been an abundance of research activity focused on new-product development (see Brown 
and Eisenhardt 1995 and Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994), less attention has been 
focused specifically on the front-end of innovation.   
The term ‘fuzzy front-end’ of innovation was first coined by Reinertsen (1985), 
and quickly achieved widespread acceptance as a term to describe the early, pre-
developmental work in the new-product development process.  The term fuzzy captures 
the inherent vagueness associated with the front-end of innovation.  Aspects of the early 
stages of the NPD process are characterized as being difficult to evaluate, lacking 
accountability, challenging to explain and model, and generally lacking understanding.  
However, more recently there has been a concerted effort to refrain from using the term 
fuzzy (Koen et al. 2002).  Koen et al. (2001) were the first to refer to the early stages of 
innovation as simply the front-end of innovation, suggesting that the term fuzzy had too 
many unwarranted connotations.  While this dissertation uses the term front-end 
innovation, in all regards it is interchangeable with fuzzy front-end. 
In the preceding section, this dissertation provided an overview of the Stage-
Gate® system which is used to describe the new-product development process.  Within 
the Stage-Gate® system, the first three stages are referred to as the front-end of 
innovation (Cooper 2001; Koen et al. 2002).  In Figure 2, the first stage is discovery, 
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characterized as the stage where there is an in-depth focus on the market, consumers’ 
needs, and ultimately responsible for generating new ideas (or product concepts).  The 
second stage in the Stage-Gate® system, called scoping, pertains to activities that are 
centered on performing early market feasibility studies and early technical assessments of 
the project (Cooper 2001).  Both activities are performed to gain insight into the relative 
merits of the respective idea or product concept.  The third stage, involves preparing an 
in-depth business case (Cooper 2001), where a majority of the pre-development work is 
conducted.  This stage includes activities such as performing market research, developing 
a sharp and clear definition of the product, and providing the financial and other 
justification needed to advance the product concept to subsequent stages.   
Describing the front-end of innovation in terms of the Stage-Gate® system is 
simply one approach to doing so.  For example, Koen et al. (2001, p. 49) define the front-
end of innovation as “those activities that come before the formal and well structured 
new-product development portion.”  An alternative definition, based on activities, 
suggests that the front-end “includes product strategy formulation and communication, 
opportunity identification and assessment, idea generation, product definition, project 
planning and executive reviews … (and the front-end) is complete when a business unit 
either commits to the funding and launch of a new product development project, or 
decides not to,” (Khurana and Rosenthal 1998). Regardless of the descriptive approach, 
published research appears to have reached a consensus that front-end innovation 
precedes formal new-product development work such as designing and engineering 
(Koen et al 2001; Khurana and Rosenthal 1998).  
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Table 2-2 
 
As outlined in Table 2-2, there are multiple delineating features between the 
front-end and new-product development.  Of most significance to this dissertation, is the 
fact that, there exists a high degree of uncertainty pertaining to many aspects of the front-
end of innovation (Cooper 2001; Koen et al. 2001).  While on the other hand, activities 
performed in the new-product development stage are often defined as being well 
structured and formal (Koen et al. 2001), which often results in increasing certainty and 
predictability as products proceed through to the launch stage (Brown and Eisenhardt 
1995; Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994).  Since new ideas and product concepts in the 
front-end are far from launch and early in development terms, firms often find it arduous 
to find relevant information to make well-informed decisions on the scope of the project, 
its financial viability, and ultimate competitiveness etc.  As a result, many have 
Front-End of Innovation New-Product Development
Nature of work Experimental, often chaotic.  Difficult to 
plan. Eureka Moments.
Structured, disciplined and goal-oriented 
with a project plan.
Commercialization 
date
Unpredictable or uncertain. High degree of certainty.
Funding Variable. In the beginning phases many 
projects may be "boot legged" while 
others will need funding to proceed.
Budgeted.
Revenue 
expectations
Often uncertain with a great deal of 
speculation.
Predictable with increasing certainty, 
analysis, and documentation as the 
product release date gets closer.
Activity Individuals and teams conducting 
research to minimize risk and optimize 
potential.
Multifunction product and/or process 
development team.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FRONT-END OF INNOVATION AND THE NEW-PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
adapted from Koen et al. 2001
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advocated a more broad-minded and divergent approach to activities comprising the 
front-end of innovation (Koen et al 2001; Khurana and Rosenthal 1998).   
Whereas, with activities that make up the new-product development stage, extant 
research encourages a more sequential and routinized approach (Cooper 2001).  These 
fundamental differences between front-end innovation and the new-product development 
stages call for different managerial decision-making processes for each (Koen et al. 
2001). 
In addition to the general consensus in defining front-end activities as 
immediately preceding formal new-product development activities, another comparison 
in the literature is viewing the front-end via a more holistic approach rather than as a 
number of separate activities.  Khurana and Rosenthal (1998), based on what they 
observed among successfully innovative organizations, were central to advocate a holistic 
view of the front-end of innovation (See Figure 2-3 below).  Their approach captures the 
iterative nature of the front-end (Koen et al. 2001).  Activities like opportunity 
recognition, idea generation and concept generation are undertaken simultaneously and 
are not mutually exclusive to each other.  This is the main distinguishing feature between 
the holistic model of front-end innovation as compared to the Stage-Gate® system, which 
by definition are sequential stages (Koen et al. 2002; Cooper 2001).   
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Figure 2-3 - Holistic Model of Front-End of Innovation 
 
Viewing innovation as a sequential process, moving from front-end activities to 
commercialization via new-product development efforts, early success in the process is 
key to ultimate success at the end.  Early product concepts that have a high degree of 
innovativeness and scope are likely to emerge at launch intact with those attributes.  On 
the other hand, product concepts or ideas that are poorly conceived at the front-end are 
highly likely to manifest at the end of the product development process as failures.  
Therefore, it is imperative to understand the antecedents that predict success at the front-
end of innovation. 
2.2.4. Antecedents to the Front-End of Innovation   
Similar to the earlier discussion on new-product development, a number of 
academics have looked into what factors make for an effective front-end. According to 
Khurana and Rosenthal (1998) having a clear product strategy that helps prioritize key 
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projects early and aids in developing a portfolio of new products to balance risk and 
resources is an important antecedent that leads to success.  Also an early definition of the 
product that is clear and sharp but recognizing that changes to the definition might be 
required later leads to success (Khurana and Rosenthal 1998). Additionally, Khurana and 
Rosenthal (1998) suggest that an organizational structure that emphasizes roles for the 
various individuals involved, that facilitates team work and cross-functional collaboration 
based on effective communications are all key antecedents to success at the front-end of 
innovation.   
Some of the antecedents for effective new-product development (discussed earlier 
and) outlined by Cooper (2001) are more apt for front-end activities.  For example, 
Cooper (2001) points out the importance of thorough up-front or pre-developmental 
work.  By no means should companies approach activities that compromise the front-end 
with a nonchalant attitude, as this would certainly lead to failures.  Following Khurana 
and Rosenthal (1998), Cooper (2001) also points to the importance of having a well-
defined product concept as early as possible.  Such definitions are characterized by 
descriptions of the product, including its features, and the intended audience.   
Other antecedents that lead to front-end innovation success include a high level of 
market orientation (Langerak, Hultink and Robben 2004; Atuahene-Gima and Ko 2001).  
Firms that are market oriented recognize more opportunities and generate better ideas 
resulting in a higher success rate at front-end activities.  Section 2.3.2., points out how the 
role of market orientation, as a culture, impacts innovation in firms.  In a study of front-
end innovation within Japanese firms, Verwon, Herstatt, and Naghira (2008) found that 
reduction of market and technical uncertainty predicted overall success in the front-end.  
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These studies suggest that strategic planning is positively correlated to new-product 
development performance, while pointing out that such planning is especially key at the 
front-end.  
A separate category of antecedents common to successful front-end innovation 
and new-product development can be found in various indirectly linked streams of 
literature.  These antecedents share a common trait in that they all stem from either 
project leader or team characteristics.  An often-cited example of such an antecedent is 
project team (or product-development-team) stability (Slotegraaf and Atuahene-Gima 
2011; Pelled, Eisenhardt and Xin 1999).  Slotegraaf and Atuahene-Gima (2011, p. 97) 
describe project team stability as the “extent to which the core members of a cross-
functional team remain for the duration of the project,” from inception through launch.  It 
has been suggested that team stability encourages collaborative work and open 
discussion, which allows cross-functional teams to break knowledge-barriers that hinder 
the innovation efforts of firms (Slotegraaf and Atuahene-Gima 2011; Dougherty 1992).   
A related factor is collaboration, which leads to increased communication and 
openness among team members (Khurana and Rosenthal 1998; Scott and Bruce 1994; 
Pierce and Delbecq 1977).  Collaboration (via openness and communication) stimulates 
an environment that is conducive to innovation by encouraging creativity, risk-taking 
initiative, and signals to team members that their contributions are highly valued thus 
making them care more about the innovative activities of the firm (Scott and Bruce 1994; 
Eisenberger, Fasolo and Davis-Mastro 1990; Pierce and Delbecq 1977).  However, there 
is also evidence to suggest that in certain situations, conflict can breed innovation 
(Thompson 1965). 
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Another group of antecedents that factor into a firm’s innovation performance 
(both at the front-end and new-product development stages) are related to learning and 
communication both internally and externally.  Internally, it has been pointed out that 
factors, such as team level debate foster positive innovation within firms.  Team level 
debate has been defined as the “deliberate process in which teams discuss, challenge, and 
contest one another’s opinions, ideas, and positions about the project’s strategies, goal 
priorities, and overall objectives” (Slotegraaf and Atuahene-Gima 2011, p. 96). External 
communication is also key, as it helps to generate and then disseminate information based 
on which project leaders and team members could develop further opportunities, better 
ideas etc. (Ancona and Caldwell 1992; Damanpour 1991; Cohen and Levinthal 1990). 
 A final category of antecedents discussed here relates to factors associated with 
decision-making and leadership traits.  Decision-making comprehensiveness is discussed 
extensively as an important indicator of successful innovation (Slotegraaf and Atuahene-
Gima 2011).  Fredrickson (1984, p.445) studied decision-making comprehensiveness 
among top management teams and described it as “the extent to which organizations 
attempt to be exhaustive or inclusive in making and integrating strategic decisions.”  
Multiple studies have discussed its role as an influential process undertaken by managers 
and their teams when making strategic choices (Simons, Pelled and Smith 1999; Miller, 
Burke and Glick 1998).  Slotegraaf and Atuahene-Gima (2011) show that it is a key 
factor that influences innovation.  They expand on Fredrickson’s (1984) definition and 
define it as “the degree to which the team is exhaustive as it considers multiple 
approaches, courses of action, and decision criteria in its strategic decision making” 
(Slotegraaf and Atuahene-Gima 2011, p. 97). 
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Other scholars have studied concepts similar to decision-making 
comprehensiveness.  For example, Damanpour (1991) points out the role of participative 
decision-making based on earlier work by Thompson (1965).  Scott and Bruce (1994) 
discuss the importance of problem solving and the role of leadership in determining 
innovative behavior.  Ultimately, the consensus in the related literature suggests that 
decision-making comprehensiveness is key to successful innovation in firms.  It should 
be noted the team level debate (discussed earlier) and decision-making 
comprehensiveness are two separate variables, it is possible to debate without being 
comprehensive. 
2.3. Literature on Culture 
The following discussions are centered on firm culture.  I first discuss the extant 
literature on organizational culture; especially those works based on the competing values 
framework.  This is then followed by a focused look on attempts to understand 
innovation related culture in organizations.  The discussion here has important 
implications on key moderating relationships found in the conceptual model.  
2.3.1. Organizational Culture and the Competing Values Framework  
Organizational culture is defined as "the pattern of shared values and beliefs that 
help individuals understand organizational functioning and that provide norms for 
behavior in the organization" (Deshpandé, Farley, and Webster 1993, p. 4). 
As pointed out by Deshpandé and Webster (1989), organizational culture (OC) 
has fascinated Marketing scholars (and to a larger extent Management scholars) for 
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decades.  Academics were intrigued by what they viewed as a shared set of beliefs and 
values that was dispersed throughout the organization.  Often times this culture dictated 
how a firm viewed its’ customers and its’ core business functions (Deshpandé and 
Webster 1989).  OC also exhibits variations from firm to firm (Reynolds 1986).  In fact, 
scholars have argued that OC might dictate why some firms are more successful than 
others (Moorman 1995; Deshpandé, Farley and Webster 1993; Deshpandé and Webster 
1989; Reynolds 1986).  
Deshpandé et al. (1993) adopt the Competing Values Framework (CVF) to outline 
a categorization scheme for organizational culture.  The CVF finds its earliest inception 
in the management domain through the works of Quinn (1988) and Quinn and Rohrbaugh 
(1983).  The framework attempts to provide a categorization schema for various 
organizational cultures.  The CVF has found empirical support in a number of marketing 
studies that study OC (White et al. 2003; Srinivasan et al. 2002; Berthon et al. 2001; 
Moorman 1995).  The acceptance of the CVF is because organizational theorists view 
organization culture as broad and multi-faceted, and thus need to make sense of OC by 
grouping various cultural characteristics into types (Yarbrough et al. 2011). 
Based on earlier work (Deshpandé and Webster 1989), Deshpandé et al. (1993) 
define a select number of cultures in a CVF, (see Figure 2-4) that attempts to capture the 
entire gamut of cultural facets linked to organizations.  The four resulting types of culture 
are extrapolated based on two key dimensions: (i) internal versus external orientation and 
(ii) formal versus informal governance (Deshpandé et al. 1993).  Related literature often 
times classifies the latter dimension as flexibility and discretion versus stability and 
control (Cameron and Quinn 1999).    
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As can be seen from Figure 4, Deshpandé et al.’s (1993) CVF posits four distinct 
types of culture.  As mentioned previously, the primary distinction between them is based 
on how each type of culture differs along the dimensions of orientation and governance 
style.  In addition, each has certain characteristics that make them distinct from the other 
types. 
Figure 2-4 – Organizational Culture Types 
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(Adopted from Deshpande et al. 1993) 
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Adhocracy (also known as Creative) Culture is generally explained as one in 
which the firm adopts an external orientation while remaining flexible in terms of 
governance (or structure).  As a result firms with this type of OC are often described as 
highly dynamic and entrepreneurial.  Innovation and creativity are strongly encouraged 
by leaders, while risk-taking is embraced to gain any advantages that might result from it. 
A commitment to autonomy, acquiring new resources, and growth through change are 
what tend to unify the organization (Hartnell et al. 2011). In other words, firms with such 
cultures constantly strive to be on the leading edge and this explains the drive to be 
innovative through creative, adaptive, and risk-taking behaviors (Moorman 1995; 
Deshpandé et al. 1993). 
Clan (also referred to as Collaborative) Culture maintains an emphasis on flexible 
governance while at the same time being internally oriented.  Here, a focus on 
collaboration is evident in that such cultures tend to value affiliation, trust, loyalty and 
tradition, all of which symbolize the firm’s internal orientation.  As such, firms with a 
clan culture are often described as having open channels of communication, emphasizing 
teamwork, developing human resources and striving for higher levels of employee 
involvement and satisfaction (Hartnell et al. 2011; Deshpandé et al. 1993).  Since 
importance is attached to consensus among employees with less emphasis on autonomy 
and creativity, there is generally less room for innovativeness and individual risk-taking 
behavior. 
Hierarchy (or Control) Culture is characterized within the CVF as having formal 
structure combined with an internal orientation that results in a highly structured and 
formal place to work. As pointed out by Cameron and Quinn (1999), the overarching 
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theme is on stability through control.  A premium is placed on values that reflect 
formalization, consistency, process and routines (Moorman 1995; Deshpandé et al. 
1993).  These characteristics highlight the formal governance structures usually 
employed by firms that adopt such a culture.  Hierarchy cultures also seek out 
predictability in outcomes and as a result tend to be more risk averse in their choices. 
Market (also known as Competitive) Culture is classified in the CVF as being 
focused on stability and control while being externally focused.  This culture is 
characterized as striving for increased market share, productivity, growth, market 
superiority etc. through the process of achieving maximum competitiveness and customer 
focus (Hartnell et al. 2011; Deshpandé et al 1993).  As a result, market cultures value 
information gathering, communication, wide ranging competence, planning and goal 
setting, and competition among other factors.  As pointed out by Moorman (1995) such 
cultures are results driven and the there is a long-term emphasis on measurable goals and 
targets.  Therefore, it can be argued that such cultures, while attempting to be innovative, 
will prefer known and predictable results.  Hence, there is less incentive to deal with 
uncertain situations or outcomes. 
It should be made clear however, that while the CVF posits a model of classifying 
various organizational cultures; these cultures are not mutually exclusive (Deshpandé et 
al. 1993; Cameron and Freeman 1991; Quinn 1988).  Firms may exhibit multiple 
characteristics belonging to the various cultural types discussed above.  For example, a 
firm with a clan culture may place emphasis on competitiveness and innovativeness, both 
facets that a clan culture is not associated with.  In this regard, it is widely accepted that 
firms exhibit a dominant or modal culture that emerges over time and takes precedence 
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(Deshpandé et al. 1993). 
It is clear that certain decisions are made under uncertain circumstances (see 
section 2.4.2. for a review of ambiguity aversion).  This uncertainty could present itself as 
a characteristic of the outcome of the choices, or the availability of information to make a 
rational choice, or even in terms of the choices at hand.  In this regard, it is relevant to 
point out that organizational theorists have suggested that OC plays an important role in 
how managers deal with ambiguity. 
Moorman (1995, p. 320) points out that organizational culture can “affect, first, 
the firm's choice of outcomes and, second, the means to achieve these outcomes, 
including organizational structure and processes.”  In other words, Moorman’s (1995) 
argument suggests that OC has a fundamental impact on the type of decisions that 
managers make; especially in terms of choosing between various outcome choices.  
Multiple academics have made similar claims (Cameron and Freeman 1991; Deshpandé 
et al. 1993; Hatch 1993; Quinn and Rohrbaugh 1983; Ruekert, Walker, and Roering 
1985; Webster and Deshpandé 1990).  For example, Cameron and Freeman (1991) 
suggest that managers should consider the role and importance of OC when faced with, 
and potentially dealing with, ambiguity.  
Quinn (1988) points out that OC has a function in how managers choose among 
various outcome choices.  Deshpandé et al. (1993) suggest that OC will have a greater 
impact on business performance especially under conditions of high uncertainty.  In 
addition, organizational culture can factor into various managerial decisions relating to 
the means to achieve a desired outcome (Moorman 1995; Wilkins and Dyer 1988).  
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Ultimately, there is an abundance of scholarly research that points to some relationship 
between OC and how managers deal with ambiguity.  This is often discussed in terms of 
how managers deal with strategic decision choices involving ambiguous outcomes or 
how they influence the structure and processes adopted by the firm in an indirect attempt 
to deal with ambiguity. 
As outlined above, there is strong evidence to suggest that organizational culture 
does have an impact on how managers make decisions.  These influences are heightened 
when managers are faced with ambiguity thus influencing their level of ambiguity 
aversion.  In the next section, a literature review of innovation culture is provided.    
2.3.2. Innovation Culture 
A firm’s organizational culture attains more significance when discussed in 
regards to innovation.  As pointed out earlier, in today’s dynamic and über-competitive 
business environments, innovation has been singled out as essential to a firm’s ability to 
gain a competitive advantage (Quinn 2000; Prahalad and Hamel 1990).  Academics have 
frequently suggested that an innovative culture is essential for any firm seeking to be a 
leader in innovation (Govindarajan and Trimble 2005; Hammer 2004; Christensen and 
Raynor 2003; Senge and Carstedt, 2001).  Hurley and Hult (1998, p.44) have hinted that 
an innovation culture is a “measure of the organization’s orientation toward innovation.”  
Relatedly, Rubera and Kirca (2012) suggest that an innovation culture allows firms to be 
more productive with their resources when innovating.    
Keeping in mind that organizational culture is a multi-faceted concept (as 
described in section 2.3.2.), Dobni (2008) conceived of a definition of innovation culture 
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as multi-dimensional in nature.  This suggestion is influenced by the work of Damanpour 
(1991) and others.  An innovation culture is not limited to a set of behaviors and activities 
(directly related to innovation) and is not simply about product- or process-innovation.  It 
also encompasses aspects such as how project teams are organized, the role mangers play 
in innovation and their attitudes to change and uncertainty, a firm’s intention to innovate 
and how that reflects on its strategy etc. (Damanpour 1991).  However, Damanpour’s 
(1991) conceptualization of innovation culture seems flawed in that the construct’s 
definition is muddled with the construct’s antecedents and outcomes. 
In relation to this need to view innovation culture as multi-faceted, there has been 
extensive discussion about the role of market orientation on innovation (Narver, Slater 
and MacLachlan 2004; Lukas and Ferrell 2000; Han, Kim and Srivastava 1998; Hurley 
and Hult 1998; Kohli and Jaworski 1990).  While Kohli and Jaworski (1990) view market 
orientation as comprising competitor orientation, customer orientation and inter-
functional coordination, it is Narver and Slater’s (1995) view on market orientation that 
applies better in the context of this dissertation.  Market orientation is considered an 
organizational culture and is defined as “the culture that (1) places the highest priority on 
the profitable creation and maintenance of superior customer value while considering the 
interests of other key stakeholders; and (2) provides norms for behavior regarding the 
organizational development of and responsiveness to market information” (Narver and 
Slater 1995, p. 67).  There is a strong consensus that a high level of market orientation 
significantly aids a firm’s ability to be successful at innovation (Marinova 2004; Narver 
and Slater 1995; Kohli, Jaworski and Kumar 1993; Jaworski and Kohli 1993).  Hence, 
scholars sometimes find parallels between innovation culture and market orientation. 
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Keeping this need for a broad conceptualization of innovation culture, Hurley and 
Hult (1998, p. 44) define innovation culture as “openness to new ideas as an aspect of 
firms’ organizational culture.”  However, in an effort to provide a broader 
conceptualization of innovation culture in keeping with the arguments made above, Wang 
and Ahmed (2004, p. 304) define such an innovation culture as “an organization’s overall 
innovative capability of introducing new products to the market, or opening up new 
markets, through combining strategic orientation with innovative behavior and process.”   
Expanding on Wang and Ahmed’s definition, Dobni (2008, p. 540) defines 
innovation culture as “a multi-dimensional context which includes the intention to be 
innovative, the infrastructure to support innovation, operational level behaviors necessary 
to influence a market and value orientation, and the environment to implement 
innovation.”  Dobni’s (2008, p. 543) conceptualization views innovation culture as 
ranging from the “intention to be innovative, to the capacity to introduce some new 
product, service or idea through to the introduction of processes and systems which can 
lead to enhanced business performance.”   
Both Wang and Ahmed (2004) and Dobni’s (2008) definitions recognize the 
multi-dimensional conceptualization of innovation culture advocated in the extant 
literature.  The conceptualizations focus not only on the straightforward behaviors and 
activities related to innovation, but also the underlying intentions, processes and strategy 
involved, including the importance of market orientation.      
It is important to discuss how an innovative culture serves as an important 
antecedent to innovation in firms.  The managerial behavior and decision making that 
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arises from innovation culture seem to impact (i) organizational structure (for e.g. a lesser 
emphasis on formal structure), (ii) the adopted firm-wide processes (such as stressing on 
teamwork, adaptability and flexibility), (iii) the emphasis placed on certain firm-wide 
values (like competitiveness, risk-taking, customer focus), and (iv) the ability to inculcate 
employees with values such as creativity, freedom, openness in communication etc. 
(Hurley and Hult 1998; Tesluk et al. 1997; Chatman and Jehn 1994).    
To expand on some of the points made above, innovation culture plays an 
important role in how firms organize for innovation (Burns and Stalker 1966).  Parallel 
comparisons can be drawn from Deshpandé et al.’s (1993) competing values framework 
(section 2.3.2.), which suggests that firms that have cultures that result in an informal (or 
organic) structure will tend to be more innovative and creative.  Relatedly, Jassawalla and 
Sashittal (2003) point out that an innovative culture will hinder the possibility that a firm 
adopts a rigid or more formal structure.  Hurley and Hult (1998) stress the importance of 
collaboration (via cross-functional teams), teamwork, and flexibility in aiding innovation 
in firms.  Similarly, within the CVF, Deshpandé et al. (1993) suggest that firms 
characterized as having adopted informal governance tend to be more innovative.   
Ultimately, it is widely accepted that in an innovation culture behaviors and 
values that highlight creativity, risk-taking, flexibility, spontaneity etc. are given higher 
priority (Hurley and Hult 1998; Chatman and Jehn 1994; Deshpandé et al. 1993; Burns 
and Stalker 1966).  At the same time, in such a culture, behaviors and values that might 
be detrimental to innovation, including excessive control and rigidity, emphasis on 
tradition and stability, weighting predictability etc. would de-prioritized (Jassawalla and 
Sashittal 2003).   
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This dissertation adopts Hurley and Hult’s (1998) definition of innovation culture 
– “openness to new ideas as an aspect of firms’ organizational culture.” While it can be 
argued that an innovation culture is imperative for any firm that attempts to attain a high 
level of performance in regards to innovation, these relationships have not been fully 
explored in terms of a project leader’s strategic decision making in relation to innovation.  
A conceptual model that explains of how innovation culture impacts managerial decision-
making is discussed in-depth in the next chapter.   
2.4. Literature on Decision-Making and Judgment 
This section details the literature on decision-making and judgment.  Of particular 
interest is the Decision Theory approach to understanding how individuals deal with 
uncertainty.  Specifically, I examine extant literature in both Economics and Psychology 
to gain a key understanding on managerial aversion to ambiguity.  The review also 
contrasts ambiguity aversion to risk aversion.  Key antecedents to ambiguity aversion are 
also discussed.    
2.4.1. Ambiguity 
Published research has attempted to examine various parameters that play a role 
in decision making.  Among them, two in particular have attracted intense attraction 
among decision-making theorists - ambiguity and risk (Trautmann et al. 2008).  Knight 
(1921) first suggested that there is a clear distinction between risk – a situation where 
uncertainty is bound by known probabilities and ambiguity – where uncertainty cannot be 
quantified.  As pointed out by Muthukrishnan (1993, p. 4-5) “decision researchers use the 
terms uncertainty, ambiguity and vagueness to describe the state in which the relevant 
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probabilities of outcomes are unknown or cannot be ascertained with reasonable 
accuracy.”  Essentially there are two types of uncertainty, “measurable uncertainty or 
risk, which can be represented by precise probabilities, and unmeasurable uncertainty, 
which cannot,” called ambiguity (Fox and Tversky 1995, p. 585).    
Ambiguity has been defined as a “quality depending on the amount, type, 
reliability and unanimity of information” (Ellsberg 1961, p. 657).   Einhorn and Hogarth 
(1985, p. 453, 455) while proposing that “ambiguity results from having limited 
knowledge of the process that generates outcomes,” suggest that it “highlights the 
distinction between one’s lack of knowledge of the process that generates outcomes and 
the uncertainty of outcomes conditional on some model of the process.”  Based on 
Einhorn and Hogarth’s (1954) conceptualization, Muthukrishnan (1993, p. 5) defines 
ambiguity as the “uncertainty about uncertainty, where the latter ‘uncertainty’ refers to 
outcome probability.”  Ambiguity has also been conceptualized as “the subjective 
experience of missing information relevant to a prediction” (Frisch and Baron 1988, p. 
152).  Elaborating on Frisch and Baron (1988), Camerer and Weber (1992, p.330) define 
ambiguity as the “uncertainty about probability, created by missing information that is 
relevant and could be known.”  As is evident from the definitions mentioned hereto, 
ambiguity in the context of decision-making cannot be explicated without mention of the 
amount of information available. Ambiguous situations are those where “available 
information is scanty or obviously unreliable or highly conflicting; or where expectations 
of different individuals differ widely; or where expressed confidence in estimates tends to 
be low” (Ellsberg 1961, p. 660-61). 
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Table 2-3 
 
Ellsberg (1961) found that people, when given a choice, are more likely to choose 
a riskier bet with known probabilities as opposed to a less risky one in which the 
probabilities are ambiguous.  Ellsberg (1961) exhibited this phenomenon in a number of 
simple experiments, the most famous of which is widely referred to as the ‘two-color’ 
Author(s) Stream Definition
Knight (1921) Economics "measurable uncertainty, or "risk" proper, as we shall use the term, is so 
far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an 
uncertainty at all. We ... accordingly restrict the term "uncertainty" to 
cases of the non-quantitative type
Ellsberg (1961) Economics “quality depending on the amount, type, reliability and unanimity of 
information.”
Einhorn and 
Hogarth (1985)
Psychology "highlights the distinction between one’s lack of knowledge of the 
process that generates outcomes and the uncertainty of outcomes 
conditional on some model of the process.”
Hoch and Ha 
(1986)
Marketing "the potential for multiple interpretations."
Frisch and Baron 
(1988)
Psychology the subjective experience of missing information relevant to a 
prediction.” 
Kahn and Sarin 
(1988)
Marketing "the second-order uncertainty, or in other words, the probability 
distribution of perceived probabilities."
Camerer and 
Weber (1992)
Economics “uncertainty about probability, created by missing information that is 
relevant and could be known,”
Muthukrishnan 
(1993)
Marketing “uncertainty about uncertainty, where the latter ‘uncertainty’ refers to 
outcome probability,” 
Muthukrishnan 
(1995)
Marketing "non-comparability among competing options in terms of the amount 
and type of decision-relevant information available."
Bleaney & 
Humphrey 
(2006)
Psychology "ambiguity is relevant information that is either not known or not fully 
understood."
Lee and Suk 
(2010)
Marketing "existing on a continuum ranging from novel at one extreme to highly 
familiar at the other."
SELECT DEFINITIONS OF AMBIGUITY FROM VARIOUS STREAMS OF LITERATURE
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problem.  Given two urns each containing a hundred balls, a study participant is told that 
the first urn contains 50 red and 50 black balls and that the second urn contains red and 
black balls in an unknown proportion.  Ellsberg (1961) demonstrated that when a 
participant is offered a reward depending on the outcome from randomly drawing the 
balls, participants (while indifferent on betting either red or black balls for either urn) 
were more likely to bet on the first urn (with the known composition) rather than the 
second urn (with the unknown composition).  In other words, study participants exhibited 
a preference for gambles with known (risky) rather than unknown (ambiguous) 
probabilities of winning (Muthukrishnan et al. 2009; Ellsberg 1961). 
As Ellsberg (1961) points out, his findings are inconsistent with the axioms of 
subjective expected utility theory (Savage 1954). Subjective expected utility theory is an 
extension of expected utility theory.  Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1947) expected 
utility theory deals with outcomes with known probabilities. Subjective expected utility 
theory, on the other hand, looks at outcomes with probabilities that are not objectively 
known (Savage 1954).  In relation to Ellsberg’s ‘two-color’ problem, subjective expected 
utility theory would predict that people are indifferent between urns (Camerer and Weber 
1992; Ellsberg 1961).  However in Ellsberg’s ‘two-color’ problem, people show a clear 
preference for the urn with the known probabilities of red and black balls.  As such 
Ellsberg’s counter intuitive findings in relation to the established axioms of subjective 
expected utility theory have been referred to as Ellsberg’s paradox (Muthukrishnan et al. 
2010; Al-Najjar and Weinstein 2009; Bonanno et al. 2009; Trautmann et al. 2008; Fox 
and Tversky 1995; Camerer and Weber 1992).  
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2.4.2. Ambiguity Aversion 
The phenomenon exhibited in Ellsberg’s paradox has become known as 
ambiguity aversion (Muthukrishnan et al. 2010; Trautmann et al. 2008; Fox and Tversky 
1995; Camerer and Weber 1992; Heath and Tversky 1991).  Fox and Weber (1992) 
suggest that ambiguity aversion is basically an unwillingness to bet on probabilities that 
are vague in nature.  In a similar manner, Heath and Tversky (1991, p.11) suggest that 
ambiguity aversion “implies that people will prefer to bet on a chance event whose 
probability is well defined rather than on their judged probability, which is inevitably 
vague” in nature.  Trautmann et al. (2008, p.225) define ambiguity aversion as situations 
where people “prefer options involving clear probabilities (risk) to options involving 
vague probabilities (ambiguity).”   
It is clear from the various definitions provided here that ambiguity aversion, a 
view this dissertation adopts, is a situation encountered in decision making.  However it 
should be noted that there are those that suggest that the phenomenon of ambiguity is 
meaningless in a decision-making context (de Finetti 1977).  Regardless, as Camerer and 
Weber (1992, p.329) point out, such viewpoints “do not help explain descriptive evidence 
of ambiguity aversion.”   
 How individuals deal with ambiguity aversion has received much attention in the 
literature. Specifically, there have been multiple, descriptive models offered to explain 
judgments under ambiguity (Al-Najjar and Weinstein 2009; Camerer and Weber 1992; 
Einhorn and Hogarth 1985).   
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Table 2-4 
 
For example, Einhorn and Hogarth (1985) employ an anchoring and adjustment 
framework to explain probability assessments.  Einhorn and Hogarth (1985) postulate a 
model where individuals, when faced with ambiguity, make adjustments to initial 
estimates of ambiguity (the anchor) using mental simulations.  Within their framework, 
the adjustment is based on “(a) the amount of ambiguity, which affects the size of the 
simulation, and (b) one's attitude toward ambiguity, which affects the differential 
weighting” of the anchor (Einhorn and Hogarth 1985, p. 433).   
Author(s) Stream Definition
Ellsberg (1961) Economics When given a choice, individuals are more likely to choose a riskier 
bet with known probabilities as opposed to a less risky one in which 
the probabilities are ambiguous - paraphrased
Hofstede and 
Bond (1984)
Psychology "The extent to which people feel threatened by ambiguous situations, 
and have created beliefs and institutions that try to avoid these"
Schmeidler 
(1989)
Economics "A decision maker is Uncertainty Averse if, for each pair of acts f  and 
g, f indifferent to g implies that every convex combination of f and g 
is preferred to f (and to  g)."
Gilboa et al. 
(1989)
Economics "A decision maker is strictly Uncertainty Averse if she prefers any 
convex combination of every two non-comonotonic acts f and g, 
between which she is indifferent, to f and g."
Heath and 
Tversky (1991)
Psychology “implies that people will prefer to bet on a chance event whose 
probability is well defined rather than on their judged probability, 
which is inevitably vague.”
Fox and Weber 
(1992)
Psychology "an unwillingness to bet on probabilities that are vague in nature."
Trautmann et al. 
(2008)
Economics “prefer(ance for) options involving clear probabilities (risk) to options 
involving vague probabilities (ambiguity).” 
SELECT DEFINITIONS OF AMBIGUITY AVERSION FROM VARIOUS STREAMS OF LITERATURE
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An alternative model proposed by Fox and Tversky (1995) suggests that decisions 
that involve uncertainty depend not only on the degree of uncertainty but also its source.  
In this regard, Fox and Tversky (1995) put forth the comparative ignorance hypothesis 
according to which ambiguity aversion is driven by contrast or comparison effects – 
comparing to more familiar events or with more knowledgeable individuals.  They go on 
to suggest that ambiguity aversion is more or less absent without an avenue for such 
comparisons to occur.   
Fox and Weber (2002) extend the work on the comparative ignorance hypothesis 
by outlining various decision contexts that can influence an individual’s willingness to 
make a decision under uncertainty.  They point out that “(1) any feature of the decision 
context that makes a contrasting state of knowledge more salient should exacerbate 
ambiguity aversion; and (2) the absolute degree of ambiguity aversion exhibited depends 
on the decision maker’s relative knowledge concerning the contrasting states that are 
available” (Fox and Weber 2002, p. 492).  Such attributes of the decision contexts 
include situations where uncertain bets are preceded by questions about less familiar 
items, or when diagnostic information about the bet that is indiscernible is provided to the 
individual. 
Ambiguity aversion has also been modeled as a situation arising from the 
perception of missing information (Frisch and Baron 1988).  Frisch and Baron (1988) 
attempt to address whether ambiguity effects are rational, and go on to suggest that how 
individuals perceive missing information relevant to a probability judgment is crucial to 
the subjective experience of ambiguity aversion.   
47	  
	  
There are multiple academics that discount the role of ambiguity aversion as 
described in the various descriptive models above (Nehring 2009; Al-Najjar and 
Weinstein 2009; Heath and Tversky 1991).  One model of ambiguity aversion views it as 
a semi-rational response to ambiguity.  Nehring (2009, p.332) suggests “ambiguity-
averse behavior results from projecting robustness onto the plane of choice 
consistency/preference maximization.”  So in another words, decisions under ambiguity 
aim to achieve robustness rather than avoid the inherent ambiguity.  Here robustness in 
decision making is described as when one “avoids one-sidedness and arbitrariness, if it 
integrates multiple viewpoints and gives all viewpoints “their due” (Nehring 2009, p. 
314). The underlying theme to Nehring’s (2009) work, is that robustness, is the rational 
response to ambiguity not aversion.    
Heath and Tversky (1991) suggest that ambiguity aversion has a minor role in 
decision making under uncertainty.  They offer the competence hypothesis that suggests 
that individuals would prefer betting based on their own personal judgments rather than 
an equally probable chance event.  In other words, a decision maker is more likely to 
prefer betting on an ambiguous ability-based event rather than unambiguous chance-
based event (Klien et al. 2010).  This is especially the case when he/she perceives a high 
degree of competence over the decision domain (Heath and Tversky 1991).   
An illustrated example is useful to put the competence hypothesis in context.  An 
average football fan is more likely to bet on the outcome of a football game rather than an 
unambiguous chance event with the same outcome probability than an average non-fan.  
Even though the outcome of the football game is a priori ambiguous, the football fan 
could possibly feel highly competent in regards to his knowledge of the game, the teams 
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involved, and other related attributes.  Therefore instead of exhibiting ambiguity aversion 
and choosing the unambiguous chance event of equal probability, the fan’s perceived 
competence over the decision domain attenuates his/her ambiguity aversion. 
The competence hypothesis as described suggests important differences in 
decision making under choice.  Heath and Tversky (1991) employ a broad 
conceptualization of competence.  It includes the notion of skills, knowledge, and/or 
understanding of the given decision context.  However, it should be noted that the 
perceived competence should be in the domain of the decision context and the resulting 
outcome.  As such, this conceptualization of competence is highly state dependent.   
There are related constructs to perceived competence that have been widely 
employed in the marketing and management literature.  Self-efficacy is chief among 
them.  Bandura (1986, p. 391) defined perceived self-efficacy as “people's judgments of 
their capabilities to organize and execute courses of action required to attain designated 
types of performances.”  Bandura (1986) clearly points out that self-efficacy is focused 
on one’s judgments of what he/she can do with the skills they possess rather than a mere 
concern for what skills are possessed.  It is also suggested that self-efficacy is especially 
important in “prospective situations that contain many ambiguous, unpredictable, and 
often stressful elements” (Bandura 1981). 
Work on social cognitive theory that deals with self-efficacy often discusses 
competence.  Within social cognitive theory, competence is often described in terms of 
the skills one possesses, and how they are organized and integrated (Bandura 1981).  
Clearly, competence and self-efficacy share certain similarities.  However, as pointed out 
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earlier, self-efficacy has more to do with an individual’s judgments on how their skills 
can be effectively utilized in a given situation.  On the other hand competence can be 
thought of as more of a stock of skills in one’s possession.   
In relation to the competence hypothesis, Heath and Tversky (1991) clearly refer 
to a decision-makers competence in regards to their knowledge, skills and understanding 
given a decision domain.  Not their judgments on how they can utilize their skills, 
knowledge, and understanding.  Therefore there is a clear distinction between the 
perceived competence construct and self-efficacy construct in relation to the competence 
hypothesis.  As such, I define perceived competence as an individual's sense of skill, 
knowledge and understanding over a given decision context.   
Heath and Tversky (1991) point out that an individual’s sense of competence over 
the decision context plays a dominant role on an individual’s sense of ambiguity 
aversion.  As a conjecture, Heath and Tversky (1991) point to the asymmetric assignment 
of credit and blame in their interpretation of their findings on competence hypothesis.  
They suggest, “the balance of credit to blame is most favorable for bets in one’s area of 
expertise, intermediate for chance events, and least favorable for bets in an area where 
one has limited knowledge” (Heath and Tversky 1991, p. 8).  In other words, competent 
individuals take the credit for winning bets while incompetent individuals receive blame 
for losing bets (Heath and Tversky 1991; Camerer and Weber 1992). 
Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) provide a critical review of the ambiguity 
aversion literature and provide some insight that again questions the efficacy of the 
ambiguity aversion construct.  The authors contend that viewing aversion to ambiguity as 
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being a rational behavior is equivalent to admitting that other choices like aversion to 
information or sensitivity to irrelevant sunk costs are rational too.  This, in their opinion 
is too much to accept for most economists.  Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) also add that 
the “seemingly anomalous behavior” seen in the Ellsberg paradox can be explained 
“using standard tools of information economics and game theory” (p. 251).   
While this dissertation only looks at a few descriptive models that attempt to 
explain aversion to ambiguity.  Interested readers should refer to Camerer and Weber 
(1992) for an in depth review of formal models that tackle ambiguity aversion. 
2.4.3. Psychological Traits and other Causes of Ambiguity Aversion 
A lot of focus has gone into understanding why individuals, when faced with 
situations such as Ellsberg’s “two color” problem, exhibit an aversion to ambiguity. 
Psychologists look at the causes of ambiguity aversion in a different manner compared to 
decision theorists and economists. 
Curley, Yates and Abrams (1986) provided a psychological insight into the 
antecedents of ambiguity aversion.  Their work focused on various previous explanations 
of the antecedents of ambiguity aversion, and they set out to test a number of these 
proposed antecedents.  While they tested six total explanations, Curley et al. (1986) found 
one psychological source of ambiguity aversion in particular affected subjects’ judgments 
under situations deemed ambiguous.  They found that ambiguity aversion “appears to 
result from an anticipation by decision makers that their decisions will be evaluated by 
others,” (p. 253). Hence subjects “make the choice perceived to be most justifiable to 
others” (p.230, as a result they make the safer choice/decision.)  Curley et al. (1986) 
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termed this effect other-evaluation.  Their study is also relevant in that they rule out other 
antecedents of ambiguity aversion such as fear of hostile outcome determination process, 
anticipation of future self-evaluation, and interestingly the “general avoidance of 
uncertainty of the type described by risk-aversion measures,” (p.253). 
More recently, academics have tended to refer to what Curley et al. (1986) call 
“other-evaluation,” as fear of negative evaluations (FNE, Trautmann et al. 2008).  FNE is 
defined as the “apprehension and distress arising from concerns about being judged 
disparagingly or hostilely by others” (Carleton et al. 2006, p. 297).  Similarly, Fox and 
Tversky (1998) and others suggest that an anticipated evaluation by others has a relevant 
effect on ambiguity aversion (cf. Trautmann et al. 2008; Fox and Weber 2002).  Adding 
more credence to FNE as a source of aversion to ambiguity, Trautmann et al. (2008) 
found evidence which suggests that aversion to ambiguity can be eliminated if FNE 
among study subjects is removed.  This possibly suggests that ambiguity aversion can 
show up only as long as there is FNE involved.  If “preferences between outcomes are 
private information, so that others cannot judge the goodness of decisions and outcomes” 
ambiguity aversion may not arise at all (Trautmann et al 2008).   
Others have also supported the FNE argument as a psychological source of 
ambiguity aversion (Fox and Weber 2002; Fox and Tversky 1998; Heath and Tversky 
1991).  In line with the competence hypothesis, ambiguity aversion gets enhanced when 
an individual perceives others as being more competent or knowledgeable.  This can be 
related to a situation, where an individual chooses an ambiguous option that ends in a 
negative outcome, thereby subjecting the individual to potential criticism by others (more 
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knowledgeable or competent).  Such evaluations by others, especially negative criticisms, 
are avoided when making risky choices as bad outcomes can be attributed to bad luck. 
Academics have also looked into how differences in perceived informational 
content prior to the outcome process can impact ambiguity aversion.  For example Chow 
and Sarin (2002) show that individuals tend to shy away from ambiguous choices 
especially when an alternative route to decision making, laden with more information, is 
available.  This effect also appears when others have access to the information while the 
individual choosing between ambiguous and risky choices does not have the information 
at hand.  However, ambiguity aversion is reduced or becomes more ‘tolerable’ when it is 
clear that others also lack the information that could lead to a better decision (Chow and 
Sarin 2002).   
As discussed previously, Frisch and Baron (1988) make a similar claim 
suggesting that ambiguity aversion is increased when the perception of missing 
information is high.  Chow and Sarin (2002) suggest that their findings are consistent 
with Fox and Tversky’s (1995) comparative ignorance hypothesis by suggesting that 
comparative ignorance effects are weaker when ‘relevant’ information is not available.  
One can also draw parallels between Chow and Sarin’s (2002) findings, and those 
explicated from the competence hypothesis, where one’s perceived competency in the 
decision making process can impact aversion to ambiguity.   
Source effects can also impact ambiguity aversion.  Taylor (2000, p.118) suggests 
that “the source from which ambiguity arises affects attitudes indirectly by altering the 
set of psychological variables that enter into a consumers’ decision making.”  Essentially, 
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the author submits that when the source of ambiguity is internal (i.e. self-generated by the 
individual) then the individual’s level of knowledge and confidence will drive aversion to 
ambiguity.  So if an individual is extremely knowledgeable about the situation at hand, 
they are likely to be less ambiguity averse because they have confidence in their internal 
approximations of the probability of uncertainty.  On the other hand if the source of 
ambiguity is external (for e.g. provided by a third party) Taylor (2000) suggests that an 
individuals attitude toward risk, both in terms of the decision and the resultant outcome, 
will play a significant role in ambiguity averse behavior.  The overall results suggest that 
internally generated sources of ambiguity tend to lower ambiguity aversion. 
Scholars have had success explaining differences in attitudes towards risk in the 
domain of losses and gains (Prospect Theory; Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  In light of 
this, there has been work that has attempted to explain variations in attitude towards 
ambiguity using the same perspective.  Extant studies in the area fail to explain variations 
in ambiguity aversion using framing that replicates gain and loss domains (Kahn and 
Meyer 1991; Kahn and Sarin 1988).  However, it has to be noted that these studies have 
found that the presence of ambiguity accentuates attitudes toward risk.  In other words, in 
the presence of ambiguity, individuals will seek out clearer probabilities.  
2.4.4. Ambiguity versus Risk  
It ought to be pointed out that research attempting to better understand 
uncertainty, has often been drawn to risk rather than ambiguity. As a consequence, much 
of the underlying debate surrounding ambiguity has risen from work undertaken to 
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comprehend the phenomenon of risk.  (cf. Einhorn and Hogarth 1985; Ellsberg 1969; 
Knight 1921).   
Risk and models attempting to explain it have received wider acceptance in the 
literature, much more so than ambiguity aversion and its accompanying models.  This can 
be attributed to the veracity and simplicity with which risk aversion models explain the 
phenomenon of risky choice behavior (Einhorn and Hogarth 1985).  However as pointed 
out by Ellsberg (1961) an explanation of risk is incomplete without properly examining 
ambiguity.  Einhorn and Hogarth (1985, p. 458) follow in a similar vein when suggesting 
“although the importance of ambiguity for understanding risk has been evident since 
Ellsberg’s original article, its omission from the voluminous literature on risk is 
puzzling.”  The following paragraphs discuss the definition of risk, models that explain it, 
and how extant research has delineated ambiguity from the phenomenon of risk. 
Unlike ambiguity, risk has enjoyed a more clearly defined status in the literature.  
Most researchers base their definitions of risk on Knight’s (1921) viewpoint 
(Pushkarskaya et al. 2010; Holton 2004; Ellsberg 1961).  Knight (1921, p. 233) proposed 
that “between the measurable uncertainty and an unmeasurable one we may use the term 
“risk” to designate the former and the term “uncertainty” for the latter.”  Additionally, 
Knight (1921) suggested the term “objective probability” could be used to describe risk.  
The overall manner in which ‘Knightian’ risk is conceptualized arises from Knight’s 
deep-rooted philosophical view of phenomena as being objectively observable and 
therefore quantifiable. 
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Table 2-5 
 
A simple way to understand Knightian risk would be to view it as constituting 
known outcomes with known probabilities (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947).  
Ellsberg (1961, p. 643) concurs with Knight (1921) and von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1947) while suggesting that risk “may be represented by numerical probabilities.”  Table 
5 below further outlines some of the lines along which various authors have distinguished 
between risk and uncertainty and/or ambiguity. 
As can be seen from Table 5, there is a lot of common ground among decision 
theorists in regards to risk.  This commonality can be directly attributed to the reliance on 
viewing risk from Knight’s perspective.  This has in turn led to the use of similar models 
Author(s) Risk Uncertainty and/or Ambiguity
Knight (1921) Measurable uncertainty Unmeasurable uncertainty
Knight (1921) Objective probabilities Subjective probabilities
von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1947)
Known outcome, known probabilities Known outcome, unknown probabilities  
Ellsberg (1961) Represented via numerical probabilities Cannot be represented via numerical 
probabilities
Einhorn and 
Hogarth (1985)
Utilities and probabilities are not 
independent
Assumption of non independence 
between utilities and probabilities cannot 
be assumed
Kahn and Sarin 
(1988)
Presence of ambiguity accentuates 
attitude towards risk
No evidence to show risk accentuates 
sense of ambiguity
Camerer and Weber 
(1992)
Modeled using both Expected and 
Subjective Expected Utility Theory
Modeled using Subjective Expected 
Utility Theory but treats high levels of 
ambiguity as risk
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN RISK AND UNCERTAINTY/AMBIGUITY
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to explain the phenomenon.  Foremost among these models is Expected Utility theory 
and, later, Subjective Expected Utility theory. 
Expected Utility (EU) was formalized by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) 
and is generally applied to situations represented as gambles or lotteries.  Within EU, a 
lottery (X) is defined as a set of outcomes, xi…xn.  Each of the possible outcomes has an 
associated probability, pi…pn.  Based on this notation, the theory suggests that the 
expected utility of a lottery is 
𝐸𝑈 𝑥 = 𝑝!𝑢 𝑥!!!!! . 
The risk phenomenon is captured in the utility function u( ) that essentially accounts for 
the preference for a particular outcome.  EU theory assumes that the probabilities of 
outcomes are known in advance, and requires individual preferences to adhere to three 
axioms (complete ordering, continuity, and independence) in order for the utility index to 
account for risk. 
However, since outcome probabilities are rarely known a priori, Savage (1954) 
proposed Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory as a work around to EU’s strict 
requirement for probabilities that are objectively known.  As a result, “SEU applies more 
widely than EU” (Camerer and Weber 1992, p. 325).  While the formulaic representation 
of SEU is similar to EU, there are some differences that ought to be pointed out.  SEU 
accounts for difference in the state of nature (state, for short) that could impact the 
consequences associated with a choice or preference.  Since these states do not have 
objective probabilities associated with them, individuals have to make subjective 
probability inferences on the states.  Therefore “preferences over acts reveal both a utility 
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function over acts and a set of personal or subjective probabilities over states” (Weber 
and Camerer 1987, p. 130).  So using the notation outlined above for EU, the SEU of an 
act or choice X is 
𝑆𝐸𝑈 𝑥 = 𝑝(𝑠)𝑢(𝑥!  (𝑠))!!!!,!∈! . 
Here a state is represented as  and represents the probability associated with the state. 
However, there is growing concern in the field of decision theory that traditional 
models that espouse Knight’s viewpoint fail to account for important psychological 
factors that may be at work (Johnson 2004; Camerer and Weber 1992).  The argument is 
centered on the view that, while EU and SEU are good normative models to explain 
decisions involving risk, they lack descriptive ability (Johnson 2004). 
While Knight’s (1921) conceptualization forms the most popular basis for 
defining and modeling risk, there are yet others who have approached the phenomenon 
from differing angles based on the reasons stated above.  For example, Holton (2004, p. 
22) defines risk as “exposure to a proposition of which one is uncertain.”  Holton’s 
(2004) outlook on risk differs from that of Knight’s (1921) and other behavioral 
economists in that he adopts a more general viewpoint, applicable to a wide variety of 
situations and not bound to measurement, probabilistic inferences or the widely used 
subjective expected utility theory.  Holton (2004) also clearly suggests that risk is a 
phenomenon that is encountered by entities that are self-aware, such as humans, and as 
such is only experienced in organizations through the human aspect.   
s p
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Other attempts at modeling risk have been driven by what many consider the 
apparent failure to account for important psychological factors that might influence 
decision making.  Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) has gained wide traction 
as a viable alternative to the EU and SEU paradigm.  Prospect theory shares part of its 
foundation with EU in that it also treats outcomes as having probabilities.  However in 
prospect theory, where probabilities are not considered weights, a separate weighting 
function is employed (Kahneman & Tversky 1979).  This, in addition to relaxing some of 
the assumptions of EU and SEU, have allowed prospect theory to obtain (in some cases) 
greater descriptive validity when explain decision choices involving risk. 
Scholars have also attempted to explain risky decisions employing heuristic 
models. For example Brandstätter, Gigerenzer & Hertwig (2006) put forth the priority 
heuristic where decision choices among risky options are made employing heuristics 
based on a set of priorities that a decision maker might have.  In the case of the priority 
heuristic, these priorities refer to high or low priority information.  Employing the 
priority heuristic, an individual can ignore or discount pieces of information requiring 
less cognitive resources and thus hasten the decision process.   
There are other models that attempt to explain decision behavior involving risk, 
such as those based on rank dependence.  Nevertheless, Knight’s (1921) 
conceptualization of risk and the EU/SEU schools have dominated the literature in 
explaining risk.  However, while this may be sufficient to explain risk, as discussed 
previously in the dissertation, these models fail to adequately explain ambiguity. 
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2.4.5. Ambiguity Aversion versus Risk Aversion  
Similar to the discussion between ambiguity and risk, ambiguity aversion and risk 
aversion differ, often widely, in terms of their definition, explanatory models, and 
accompanying phenomenon.  Rather than looking into a domain-specific risk aversion 
construct, in this dissertation I compare a general view of risk aversion to ambiguity 
aversion.   
It is necessary to provide a brief overview of these two, often conflicting yet 
related, schools of thought dealing with risk aversion.  Scholars have long argued 
whether or not individuals experience risk aversion regardless of the situation, 
circumstance, domain etc. (Matzler, Grabner-Kräuter and Sonja 2008; Mandrik and Bao 
2005). In other words do people exhibit a general aversion to all types of risk be it 
financial, social, and performance-related amongst others.  Weber and Milliman (1997) 
suggest that risk aversion should be examined as a domain specific construct.  Even 
though it is argued that a general cross-situational type of risk aversion is likely, its 
detection could be diluted by a multitude of context specific variables (Weber and 
Milliman 1997).  Such variables include the probability of negative outcomes, the 
likelihood of one’s choice being assessed or judged after the choice and outcome are 
made clear, and the general uncertainty involving possible number of outcomes.  As 
pointed out by Matzler et al. (2008, p. 155) such issues can “be alleviated when risk 
aversion is examined as domain-specific construct.” 
Even within the consumer behavior domain, risk aversion is often viewed as a 
context specific variable.  For example in brand management and related literature, the 
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suggestion that brands can reduce perceived risk (Erdem and Swait 1998; Montgomery 
and Wernerfelt 1992), follows from the underlying view that risk aversion is a domain 
specific phenomenon.  A similar predisposition towards a domain specific risk aversion 
construct can be seen in other consumer behavior streams such as information search 
(e.g. Moorthy, Ratchford, and Talukdar 1997; Gemünden1985; Moore and Lehmann 
1980) and product choice (e.g. Rao and Bergen 1992; Tellis and Gaeth 1990; Shimp and 
Bearden 1982) to outline a few. 
On the other hand, there are many who advocate a ‘general risk aversion’ 
construct.  One that is cross-situational in nature (Mandrik and Bao 2005; Xiao et al. 
2001).  This type of risk aversion would manifest as a trait that exhibits across any type 
of situation that might involve a risky choice.  Some scholars refer to this as a baseline 
level of risk aversion and conceptualize it as a ‘general aversion to risk, regardless of 
domain,’ (Mandrik and Bao 2005).  This broader conceptualization of risk aversion has 
received just as much scholarly attention as the more domain specific variant especially 
in the fields of economics and finance (Xiao et al. 2001).  This dissertation adopts this 
general viewpoint on risk aversion, rather than a more domain specific variant.  Over the 
next few pages, a history of risk aversion, various measurement approaches and a clear 
definition of ‘general’ risk aversion are discussed. 
Peoples’ propensity to make risky decisions has been the focus of scholarly 
inquiry for a considerable period of time.  A majority of the early work can be found in 
the discipline of Economics followed by Psychology.  Early inferences into the risk 
aversion phenomenon arose out of work performed by behavioral decision theorists 
looking into risky choice behavior (cf. Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  As such, the 
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phenomenon was mostly applied to study various economic applications especially under 
the paradigm of EU theory.   
As mentioned earlier in the discussion on EU theory, risk is modeled as a utility 
function, “u( )”  If the function exhibits as a concave curve, an individual is described as 
being risk averse; and if the functions is shown as being convex, then an individual is 
described as being risk seeking.  Keeping this in mind, a risk neutral individual would 
exhibit a linear utility function (Fischer et al. 1986; Miller 1975).  The scholarly dialog 
on EU makes it apparent that risk aversion is essentially an individual’s attitude towards 
risk.  This can be reasoned based on how it is often treated as a difference variable 
between individuals within the EU paradigm (Qualls and Puto 1989).  While adopting the 
interpretation of risk aversion as an attitude, EU theory subsumes that it is constant across 
multiple domains (cf. Mandrik and Bao 2005; Qualls and Puto 1989).  In other words, EU 
theory suggests that risk aversion is not a domain specific construct as discussed earlier, 
rather a cross-situational construct.    
Figure 2-5 - The Graphical Representation of Risk Aversion 
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So in adopting the general risk aversion viewpoint, this dissertation finds it 
imperative to discuss and ultimately select an appropriate definition for the construct.  In 
keeping with the voluminous academic work focused on risk aversion, many have put 
forth definitions (both scientific and not) in an effort to appropriately capture the 
construct.  Table 2-6 below outlines a number of risk aversion definitions that have 
gained traction in the associated literature. 
Table 2-6 
 
As mentioned previously, this dissertation defines ambiguity aversion as the 
“preference for options involving clear probabilities to options involving vague 
probabilities” (Trautmann et al. 2008).  When compared to the definitions of risk 
aversion provided in Table 6 above, there are a number of factors that clearly distinguish 
the two constructs.  First, it is clear that risk aversion captures attitudes on options or 
Author(s) Stream Definition
Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979)
Economics "A person is risk averse if he prefers the certain prospect (x) to any 
risky prospect with expected value x"
Montesano (1988, 
1986)
Economics "the difference between the expected value of the action under 
consideration and its certainty equivalent"
Chew et al. (1987) 
and Yaari (1987)*
Economics "a decreasing preference for an increasing risk"
Qualls and Puto 
(1989)
Marketing a decision maker’ s “preference for a guaranteed outcome over a 
probabilistic one having an equal expected value”
Weber and 
Milliman (1997)
Management "a person's preference for alternatives perceived as less risky"
Mandrik and Bao 
(2005)
Marketing an individual’s "degree of negative attitude toward risk arising from 
outcome uncertainty"
SELECT DEFINITIONS OF RISK AVERSION FROM VARIOUS STREAMS OF LITERATURE
* cf. Montesano (1990)
63	  
	  
choices that are linked to clearly defined probabilities.  Ambiguity aversion however 
captures an individual’s attitude towards those options, outcomes or decision choices 
where the associated probabilities are unknown or vague.  While this distinguishing 
factor has been pointed out previously, there are instances where risk aversion is 
associated to uncertainty.  For example Mandrik and Bao (2005) argue that it is important 
to capture uncertainty as a component of risk aversion, and as a result their definition 
reflects this stance.  While the extant literature seemingly favors risk aversion in studies 
related to decision-making and choice behavior, one can easily ascertain that real world 
choices or outcomes rarely present with clearly established probabilities and hence it is 
imperative to distinguish between the two constructs.   
Second, the definitions outlined in Table 6, and others that attempt to capture the 
cross-situational risk aversion construct, overtly rely on EU theory to form an accurate 
conceptualization of the construct.  This manifests itself in definitions that depend on 
comparing an individual’s predisposition towards prospects that share the same outcome 
value be it certain or expected.  On the other hand, since ambiguity aversion is not 
strongly bound to EU, we do not see definitions that are too reliant on comparing 
outcome values.   
Finally, as mentioned earlier, there are two schools of thought in regards to risk 
aversion; the domain specific point of view and the cross-situational or generalized 
viewpoint. This has resulted in a myriad of construct definitions for risk aversion that 
reflect these interpretations.  While there is still area for further conceptual refinement in 
regards to the ambiguity aversion construct; it is however not afflicted by extremely 
divergent perspectives like risk aversion.  Therefore, the various definitions of ambiguity 
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aversion (many of which have been discussed earlier) present a common underlying 
theme. 
In spite of the fundamental differences between the definitions of risk aversion 
and ambiguity aversion, there is an important commonality.  Both constructs attempt to 
capture the negative valence associated with the phenomenon of uncertainty.  Keep in 
mind that individuals that exhibit risk or ambiguity aversion are inclined to avoid 
risky/ambiguous situations.  As such the construct definitions adopted by this dissertation 
for both risk aversion and ambiguity aversion adequately capture the negativity 
associated with the concepts. 
2.5. Summary  
Chapter II has reviewed three, considerably distinct, streams of literature; 
innovation, organizational culture, and ambiguity aversion.  Throughout the chapter, I 
have attempted to draw connections between the three.  Through the review, it is clear 
that innovation culture and innovation show a strong relationship to each other.  On the 
other hand the review on ambiguity and ambiguity aversion might appear more 
incongruent in connection to innovation and culture.  Nevertheless, it is key to remember 
that there is high degree of uncertainty inherent in the front-end of innovation, thereby 
leading to situations where managers might face decisions with ambiguous outcomes.   
As pointed out during the review of the literature on innovation, the front-end 
stages of innovation are likely to include decisions involving ambiguity rather than risk.  
One way to view the various stages of innovation is that considerable effort is expended 
on risk-reduction. That is to say, the innovation/new product development process 
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converts amorphous ideas into tangible products that have a maximum chance of success 
in the commercial marketplace. However, this may lead to a preference for advancing 
product concepts where risk, in terms of clear probabilities, can be more easily 
established. At the same time, those new ideas and product concepts that are ambiguous 
may be discarded or screened out simply because it seems difficult to discover the 
probability estimates. 
Since published literature suggests that there are clear differences between 
ambiguity and risk, in terms of their antecedents and outcomes, it is of theoretical and 
practical import to study them in the context of innovation.  As mentioned previously, 
this is especially relevant in terms of decisions made at the front-end of innovation which 
generally involve a lot of ambiguity.  My contribution is to improve our understanding of 
innovation by studying ambiguity aversion in a decision-making context. 
Chapter III will attempt to make this connection and posit a conceptual model that 
will define the relationships between a project leader’s ambiguity aversion and its impact 
on innovation. Table 2-7 (below) outlines the key constructs in this dissertation and 
provides their definitions.  
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Table 2-7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Construct Citation Definition
Ambiguity 
Aversion
Trautmann et al. 
(2008)
Preference for options involving clear probabilities to 
options involving vague probabilities
Fear of Negative 
Evaluation
Carleton et al. (2006) Apprehension and distress arising from concerns about being 
judged disparagingly or hostilely by others 
Perceived 
Competence
Heath and Tversky 
(1991) - adapted
An individual's sense of skill, knowledge and understanding 
over a given decision context  
Decision Making 
Comprehensiveness
Slotegraaf and 
Atuahene-Gima 
(2012)
Degree to which the team is exhaustive as it considers 
multiple approaches, courses of action, and decision criteria 
in its strategic decision making
Innovation Culture Hurley and Hult 
(1998)
Openness to new ideas as an aspect of firms’ organizational 
culture
Capacity to 
Innovate
Hurley and Hult 
(1998)
Ability of the organization to adopt or implement new ideas, 
processes, or products successfully
Front-End of 
Innovation 
Performance
Mohan (This 
Dissertation) 
An overall evaluation of the quality of the product concepts 
produced by the front-end of innovation process.
KEY CONSTRUCTS AND DEFINITIONS
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The current chapter is organized into three main sections.  The chapter begins 
with an overview and general discussion of the proposed conceptual model.  Here I 
present the model in Figure 3-1 and briefly outline the proposed relationships.  The 
conceptual model is based on an extensive review of the literature.  Chapter II discusses 
this review of the literature and has identified several areas that show promise in terms of 
serving as potential avenues for further research.  As such the first section ties some of 
the research gaps while presenting the conceptual model. 
While ambiguity and innovation were discussed in Chapter II, the second section 
of this chapter goes further to establish the relationship between the two.  Here the 
manuscript debates the various sources and subjects of ambiguity in innovation. 
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This is intended to assist the reader in drawing connections between the seemingly 
disparate domains.  In addition, this section is vital in providing further credence to the 
relationships that are proposed in the conceptual model.  The third section is divided into 
multiple subsections that provide an in depth examination of the SEVEN hypotheses that 
the conceptual model postulates.  Each relationship within the model is examined in 
greater detail, while I provide the theoretical justifications for each testable hypothesis.  
The chapter concludes with a brief summary. 
3.2. The Research Context  
As previously outlined in Chapter II, innovation is key to firm success.  More and 
more firms are diverting their attention to understand how they can be better at 
innovation (Hauser, Tellis and Griffin 2006).  The front-end of innovation has often been 
singled out as an area where firms could potentially make improvements that could 
theoretically result in better innovation performance (Cooper 2001).  Improvement is 
thought possible because the front-end of innovation is ambiguity laden (see sections 2.3. 
and 3.3. for a detail discussion).  In other words, the front-end of innovation, sometimes 
described as being fuzzy, involves decision choices and situations that are ambiguous in 
nature.  One potential area for gains is to understand the extensiveness and impact of 
ambiguity aversion among project leaders. To the extent that front-end decisions filter out 
ideas or options based on ambiguity, the new product development process may miss 
opportunities, focus on the wrong projects, or even cancel new product ideas/concepts 
that could potentially be very successful for the firm.   
The focus of this dissertation is to propose and test a model that explains and 
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predicts the impact of project leaders’ ambiguity aversion on innovation performance, 
and how that in turn affects firm performance.  The conceptual model in Figure 3-1 draws 
on two antecedents of ambiguity aversion suggested by the literature reviewed in Chapter 
II: 1) fear of negative evaluation and 2) the project leader’s sense of competence over the 
decision context.  Fear of negative evaluation is expected to have a positive relationship 
with ambiguity aversion such that when FNE is high (low), ambiguity aversion is also 
high (low).  The relationship between sense of competence and ambiguity aversion, 
however, is negative. When the project leader’s sense of competence is high (low), 
ambiguity aversion will be low (high).   
Importantly, the proposed model considers the role of the firm’s innovation 
culture in moderating the relationships between fear of negative evaluation and ambiguity 
aversion as well as between sense of competence and ambiguity aversion.  These 
moderated relationships have not been explored so far in either the ambiguity or 
innovation literature.  As detailed further below, I contend that when innovation culture is 
weak, ambiguity aversion will be high because individuals operating within such 
organizational cultures do not embrace uncertainty. On the other hand, I suggest that in 
firms with strong innovation cultures the distinction between risk and ambiguity is of 
fundamental importance, and individuals will be motivated to convert ambiguity into 
risk.  Thus, in the conceptualization I present below in firms with strong innovation 
cultures FNE is positively related to ambiguity aversion while sense of competence is 
negatively related to ambiguity aversion.  Ambiguity aversion then leads to a mediated 
chain of constructs which culminates in firm performance.  These relationships are 
developed and discussed below. 
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3.3. Ambiguity in Innovation  
The innovation process can be divided into three parts: the front-end, new-product 
development, and commercialization.  While there has been no lack of research activity 
focused on new-product development (see Brown and Eisenhardt 1995 and Montoya-
Weiss and Calantone 1994), little attention has been focused on the front-end.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, innovation, especially at the front-end, is 
shrouded in uncertainty.  Brun, Saetre and Gjelsvik (2009) have previously attempted to 
classify the types of ambiguity faced in new-product development.  Their 
conceptualization of ambiguity shares commonalities to how I have previously defined 
ambiguity.  Brun et al. (2009, p. 66) define ambiguity as “the existence of two or more 
interpretations of a single cue.”  To remind the reader, this dissertation adopts a 
simplified version of Muthukrishnan’s (1993) definition of ambiguity, the uncertainty 
about outcome probability.  While at face value the conceptualizations seem unrelated, 
upon further inspection, it becomes clear that Brun et al. (2009) when discussing 
ambiguity are essentially referring to a lack of clarity about outcome probability.  
Therefore, their work classifying the types of ambiguity in the new-product development 
process has direct application to the conceptual model presented in this dissertation.   
Brun et al.’s (2009) main findings suggest that ambiguity in the innovation 
process can be thought of in terms of two dimensions: the sources of ambiguity and 
subjects of ambiguity.  While the subjects of ambiguity refer to what the key participants 
in the innovation process experience ambiguity about, the sources refer to the underlying 
cause of the ambiguity.  The three key sources of ambiguity include multiplicity of the 
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subject, novelty of the subject, and the validity and reliability of available information 
(Brun et al. 2009).  While the first two sources are directly related to the subjects of 
ambiguity, the third is concerned with quality of relevant information. 
Collecting reliable and valid information is one important way to eliminate 
ambiguity during the new product development process.  Validity concerns how 
appropriate the available information is to the innovation.  Reliability deals with the 
consistency of that information.  Since ambiguity aversion is defined herein as the 
“preference for options involving clear probabilities to options involving vague 
probabilities,” the reliability and validity of gathered information lays the foundation for 
fixing the needed probabilities in the mind of the respective project leader(s).   
However, it is difficult for firms to have prior knowledge or information 
regarding whether a new product concept/idea will succeed or not.  Reliable and valid 
information about the future is not available to the project team or its leader.  Therefore, 
as mentioned earlier, we often describe decisions made at the front-end of innovation as 
fuzzy, directly related to the ambiguity surrounding the decisions choices available to the 
project leader and other key participants. To put it succinctly, I view the new product 
development process as a path in which probabilities of new product success/failure are 
made clear and in which the success probabilities are maximized while the failure 
probabilities are minimized.    
To the extent project leaders are ambiguity averse, the inherent ambiguity in the 
front-end of innovation might bias the screening decision toward ideas for which the 
probabilities seem clearer or easily obtainable and away from ideas which appear to be 
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more challenging in terms of fleshing out the probabilities. As a result, it is common to 
see promising projects cancelled while surer ideas (that are often incremental advances) 
proceed through the innovation process (Cooper 2001, Hauser, Tellis and Griffin 2006; 
Brun et al. 2009).  This could be detrimental to the long-term success of the firm and it its 
overall competitiveness in the marketplace.  Therefore, it becomes essential to 
understand, explain, and predict ambiguity aversion so that it can be managed and 
overcome in the new product development process.   
3.4. Research Hypotheses 
The following subsections detail and discuss each of the relationships presented in 
the conceptual model (see Figure 3-1).  I also provide the reasoning behind the proposed 
relationships.  Each subsection ends with a clear statement of the testable hypothesis for 
each relationship discussed. 
3.4.1. Fear of Negative Evaluation and Ambiguity Aversion 
This dissertation defines fear of negative evaluation as the “apprehension and 
distress arising from concerns about being judged disparagingly or hostilely by others” 
(Carleton et al. 2006, p. 297).  As evidenced in the work of Trautmann et al. (2008) and 
others (Curley et al. 1986; Fox and Tversky 1998), FNE has been shown to have a 
significant impact on an individual’s ambiguity aversion.  This effect is described in 
terms of the perceptions an individual has of how others evaluate his/her decision.  If 
there is a possibility of a negative outcome as a result of the choice or decision made by 
the project leader, then he/she may subject to negative evaluations if co-workers become 
aware of the situation.  When making decisions that involve clear probabilities (i.e. risk), 
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decision makers can more easily explain and defend their decision.  However, when 
probabilities are vague it becomes harder to show that the decision was justified and, 
hence, counter the negative evaluations that follow (Fox and Weber 2002; Trautmann et 
al 2008).  Therefore, in the face of ambiguity, individuals exhibit higher ambiguity 
aversion when there is a high FNE. 
In an organizational context, employees experience FNE.  Fear serves as a 
powerful motivating force, and in an organization individuals may be mindful of scrutiny 
from superiors, competing colleagues, and even from those that work under the 
individual.  Since employees are continually motivated to remain and advance at their 
jobs, FNE can become important in the context of decision making.  Since ambiguous 
choices more difficult to defend than decisions with known probabilities, individuals with 
high FNE will be reluctant to engage in behavior involving unknown chances. 
This is true of the innovation process as well.  As mentioned earlier, project 
leaders often face a high level of ambiguity in the front-end of innovation.  This leads to 
situations where they exhibit ambiguity aversion.  For example, if there were clear 
probabilities associated with the outcome of a product concept, and a project leader chose 
to continue development on that particular concept, even if it fails the project leader can 
counter any negative evaluation based on his/her approach to risk-taking.  Such 
individuals will naturally prefer ideas and concepts that appear more concrete and for 
which the future looks more certain. Thus, ideas and concepts that are amorphous, 
opaque, and lack clarity may be more readily eliminated from consideration, despite 
strong underlying merit.  Therefore, FNE tends to drive ambiguity aversion among 
project leaders. As a result:  
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H1:  When fear of negative evaluation is high, the project leader experiences a 
significantly higher level of ambiguity aversion compared to when fear of negative 
evaluation is low. 
 
3.4.2. Perceived Competence and Ambiguity Aversion 
Recall from Chapter II that Heath and Tversky (1991) have suggested that an 
individual’s response to ambiguity is driven by perceived competence.  In regards to this, 
Heath and Tversky (1991, p. 7) state that an individual’s “willingness to bet on an 
uncertain event depends not only on the estimated likelihood of that event and the 
precision of that estimate; it also depends on one’s general knowledge or understanding 
of the relevant context.”   
The competence hypothesis is an important concept that helps explain decision-
making— especially in the face of uncertainty (Heath and Tversky 1991).  The 
underlying explanations of the competence hypothesis can be attributed to “both 
cognitive and motivational” processes (Heath and Tversky 1991, p. 7).  For example, we 
frequently feel more comfortable making choices (betting) on chance events (like the 
outcome of a football game) if we feel more knowledgeable and competent over the 
decision context (like the strength and records of the two teams that are playing).  
This phenomenon becomes all the more apparent in a firm setting.  Just like FNE, 
perceived competence can prove to be a strong motivating influence.  An individual, say 
a project leader, may feel like they have specific areas of expertise wherein they feel 
confident.  This sense of competence over the decision scenario might be a result of past 
experiences, the development of skills that apply closely to the situation, or having access 
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to knowledge bases deemed important to the decision scenario. This perceived self-
competence should facilitate decision making even if that probabilities involved are 
vague, cloudy, and not clearly understood.  On the other hand, when perceived 
competence is low, a project leader would favor choices for which the odds seem well 
known but would be unwilling to deal with ambiguous choices, thereby leading to a high 
level of ambiguity aversion. 
Looking at this from an innovation viewpoint, where there are often multiple 
sources of ambiguity, it is common to see project leaders and key participants in the 
innovation process lean toward projects that they are comfortable with and feel 
competent to manage (Hauser, Tellis, and Griffin 2006).  While at the same time, certain 
projects and ideas may be rejected because of a project leader’s lack of perceived 
competence (cf. Hauser, Tellis, and Griffin 2006; Cooper 2001; Damanpour 1991) 
In other words, an individual’s stance with respect to ambiguity is dependent on 
the individual’s own self-judgment of their competence.  Here, perceived competence 
encompasses an individual’s personal skills, knowledge, understanding, and judgments.  
So when faced with a context in he/she feels competent or knowledgeable an individual 
would be more willing to embrace ambiguous outcomes.  Conversely, if an individual 
perceives low competence, i.e. he/she feels uniformed, ignorant, or unprepared over the 
decision context, then it is likely that they would avoid the ambiguous choice. 
H2:  A project leader’s perceived competence over the decision domain is significantly 
related to his/her level of ambiguity aversion, such that when perceived competence is 
high, ambiguity aversion is low and vice versa. 
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3.4.3. The Moderating Role of Innovation Culture 
While both FNE and perceived competence have been shown to have an 
important bearing on individual decision-making under uncertainty, their impact can be 
made to dissipate under various moderating conditions.  In an organizational context, I 
argue that one such moderating condition is a firm’s innovation culture. 
This dissertation adopts Hurley and Hult’s (1998) definition of innovation culture.  
They define it as the “openness to new ideas as an aspect of firms’ organizational 
culture” (Hurley and Hult 1998, p. 44).  This definition appropriately captures the aspects 
of a firm’s culture that place an emphasis on values, and beliefs focused on innovation.  
In addition to keeping with Deshpandé, Farley, and Webster’s (1993) definition of 
organizational culture in regards to shared values and beliefs, the current definition also 
provides understanding and norms for behavior within the firm.    
As discussed in Chapter II, innovation culture is an important antecedent to 
innovation performance in firms.  As a culture, it can have an important effect on key 
participants in the innovation process, including project leaders.  This is especially the 
case since innovation culture provides a guide or norm for behavior that assists project 
leaders in their decision-making roles.  To remind the reader, an innovation culture places 
a premium on beliefs and behaviors that stress creativity, risk-taking, flexibility, 
spontaneity etc. At the same time such a culture helps to avoid actions and decisions that 
might be harmful to the overall innovative performance of the firm. 
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In this dissertation I attempt to study in greater depth the impact of innovation 
culture on a project leader’s decision making especially in terms of ambiguity aversion.  
Since an innovation culture is expected to have an impact on employee behavior, it could 
potentially impact employee decision-making.  Therefore, it becomes an area of further 
investigation in the current context.  So far, I have pointed out two key antecedents to 
ambiguity aversion, FNE and perceived competence.  Below I conceptualize how 
innovation culture can serve a moderating role between ambiguity aversion and its 
antecedents. 
I have previously proposed a main effect of FNE on ambiguity aversion which 
posits a positive relationship.  However, I argue that this relationship would change based 
on the strength of a firm’s innovation culture.  When firms have a strong innovation 
culture in place, the impact of FNE on a project leader’s ambiguity aversion will exhibit a 
strong positive relationship.  On the other hand, when innovation culture is weak, a 
project leader would exhibit ambiguity aversion regardless of his/her extent of FNE.   
The conceptual reasoning behind this theorizing is simple.  While a strong 
innovation culture will add weight to the reduction of ambiguity aversion when FNE is 
low, it does not have the necessary power to influence individuals that have a high degree 
of FNE.  This is attributable to the fact that fear, a deeply rooted emotion, holds 
considerably more motivational power than an organization’s culture (in this case 
innovation culture).  Therefore, it is difficult to suggest that, no matter how strong an 
innovation culture, it would have no bearing on a project leader’s ambiguity aversion 
when he/she experiences high FNE. 
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The relationship between FNE and ambiguity aversion is more interesting in the 
presence of a weak innovation culture.  Most would expect that in firms with weak or no 
innovation culture, a project leader with low FNE would exhibit little ambiguity aversion.  
After all, that is what the direct effect suggests.  On the contrary, I suggest that under a 
weak innovation culture, a project leader with low FNE would exhibit a higher level of 
ambiguity aversion.  In other words, regardless of whether a project leader experiences 
high or low FNE, he/she would always show high aversion to ambiguity.   
This counter intuitive relationship can be justified on the premise that a project 
leader, low on FNE, has no incentive to embrace uncertainty (be it risk or ambiguity).  
The incentive to embrace ambiguous outcomes comes from having an innovation culture.    
Since an innovation culture is lacking or weak here, one could argue that the firm and its 
culture are opposed to choices involving ambiguous outcomes since there is no emphasis 
on risk-taking and other related pursuits.  Hence, a project leader has no motivation to be 
anything but ambiguity averse.   
In other words, one could say that an innovation culture, by its own nature, 
discriminates against uncertainty.  This means that firms with a weaker innovation 
culture will hold values and beliefs that are less receptive to uncertainty.  Such an 
innovation culture, being organization wide, would permeate into how the organization’s 
employees react and deal with uncertainty.  Therefore a firm characterized as having a 
weak innovation culture, would espouse values and beliefs that are apprehensive to 
ambiguity and risk.  Thereby resulting in a situation where, a project leader for example, 
even if low on FNE, would be high on ambiguity aversion since he/she reflects an 
organizational culture that is uncertainty averse.  As a result: 
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H3:  When innovation culture is weak, there is no clear relationship between fear of 
negative evaluation and ambiguity aversion (although ambiguity aversion should be 
high), on the other hand when innovation culture is strong, there is strong positive 
relationship between fear of negative evaluation and ambiguity aversion. 
 
Figure 3-2 - Interaction of Fear of Negative Evaluation and Innovation Culture 
 
Innovation culture can also have important moderating effects on the relationship 
between a project leader’s perceived competence and his/her level of ambiguity aversion.  
Previously I proposed a negative main effect between perceived competence and 
ambiguity aversion.  This relationship would remain intact in situations when a firm has a 
strong innovation culture.  However in the presence of a weak innovation culture, or a 
lack of it, I contend that a project leader would exhibit high ambiguity aversion 
regardless of his/her perceived competence over the decision context 
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As pointed out in the previous chapter, Heath and Tversky (1991) have suggested 
that competence hypothesis effects can be attributed to the asymmetric attribution of 
credit and blame.  When applied to a strong innovation culture, a decision maker with a 
high degree of perceived competence is more likely to receive credit for bets associated 
with gains.  At the same time, if the choice results in a loss, such an individuals could 
potentially protect themselves from blame by justifying their decision choice on their 
competence or expertise.  On the other hand, as pointed out by Heath and Tversky (1991, 
p. 8), “incompetence or ignorance prevents people from taking credit for success and 
exposes them to blame in case of failure.”  Therefore, a decision maker with low 
competence has a limited chance of receiving credit for gains associated with risk taking 
while concurrently exposing himself to heavy blame and criticism if the decision choice 
involves losses. 
This can be explained based on the values espoused by a strong innovation 
culture.  As pointed out earlier, a strong innovation culture emphasizes risk taking values 
and the gains arising from such pursuits.  In such a culture, a decision maker high on 
competence has much to gain and little to lose.  If they make winning bets (choices) the 
associated credit is all theirs, while at the same time blame arising from losses can be 
shielded by justifying the decision choice on competence or expertise.  Therefore, such a 
decision maker could potentially apply his knowledge and skills to convert unknown 
probabilities into known probabilities.  That is, they can apply their expertise and 
knowledge of the decision domain to convert uncertainty (specifically ambiguity) into 
risk.  As a result, a decision maker with high perceived competence in a strong 
innovation culture is likely to be low on ambiguity aversion.   
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On the other hand, in a similar culture, a decision maker low on perceived 
competence has a lot to lose and little to gain.  That is, if the decision choice results in a 
loss, the decision maker will be subject to blame and cannot shield himself using the 
competence argument.  Similarly, credit for any gains arising from the decision maker’s 
choice would be directed elsewhere since the decision maker’s competence had nothing 
to do with the decision.  In addition, in a strong innovation culture, a decision maker who 
perceives low competence in a decision domain related to uncertainty, including risk, 
would not be able to convert unknown probabilities into risk with confidence (or might 
not have the skill or ability to do so).  Therefore, a decision maker with low perceived 
competence in a strong innovation culture is likely to be high on ambiguity aversion. 
I suggest that the relationship between perceived competence and ambiguity 
aversion is attenuated in a weak innovation culture.  In such a culture, it is likely that 
blame for losses on a risky choice far outweigh the credit if the same choice resulted in 
gains.  This can be attributed to the nature of weak innovation cultures as being 
contemptible to risk taking values.  Such cultures stay away from risky choices at all cost.  
Any decision maker who makes a risky choice is likely to face sanctions regardless of the 
outcome.  A decision maker (with high perceived competence) cannot protect himself 
from blame by justifying his decision based on competence or expertise.  At the same 
time there could potentially be no assignment of credit since the firm does not value risk 
taking.  In other words, it shouldn’t matter how competent a decision maker perceives 
himself to be, there is no incentive to choose a risky option, let alone an ambiguous 
option.    
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Additionally, it is likely that a manager in a weak innovation culture will only 
perceive competence if they make decisions that are highly certain.  In other words, 
taking decisions that are perceived as highly uncertain (as measured by risk or ambiguity) 
is prima facie evidence of incompetence in a weak innovation culture. 
Figure 3-3 - Interaction of Perceived Competence and Innovation Culture 
 
Hence, in a weak innovation culture, the level of perceived competence has no 
bearing on ambiguity aversion and should remain high throughout.  This is again 
attributable to the all-encompassing nature of a firm’s culture (in this case the innovation 
culture).  Since a weak innovation culture would be guarded when faced with uncertainty, 
the employees of the firm would fall in line with the values, norms and beliefs that make 
it illogical for them to opt for uncertainty regardless of their level of perceived 
competence.  Based on this I propose the following hypothesis: 
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H4:  When innovation culture is weak, there is no clear relationship between sense of 
competence and ambiguity aversion (although ambiguity aversion should be high). On 
the other hand when innovation culture is strong, there is a strong negative relationship 
between sense of competence and ambiguity aversion. 
 
3.4.4. Ambiguity Aversion on Decision-Making Comprehensiveness 
Decision-making comprehensiveness was defined in the previous chapter as the 
“degree to which the team is exhaustive as it considers multiple approaches, courses of 
action, and decision criteria in its strategic decision making” (Slotegraaf and Atuahene-
Gima 2011, p. 97). Their research suggests that it is an important team activity that has 
important implications on innovation activities and new product advantage, with 
antecedents including project team stability, project rewards, and task conflict (Slotegraaf 
and Atuahene-Gima 2011; Atuahene-Gima and Li 2004).  Some have suggested that the 
project leader might have an impact on decision-making comprehensiveness within firms 
(Menon et al. 1999; Scott and Bruce 1994).  This dissertation suggests that a project 
leader’s ambiguity aversion serves as an important antecedent to the decision-making 
comprehensiveness of new product teams. 
I conceptualize that there exists a negative relationship between a project leader’s 
ambiguity aversion and the project team’s decision-making comprehensiveness.  In other 
words, when a project leader exhibits a high level of ambiguity aversion, the project team 
will show low levels of decision-making comprehensiveness, and vice versa. 
This proposed relationship is again opposite to what many would expect.  Normal 
convention would suggest that an ambiguity averse manager would potentially seek to 
remove the source of ambiguity by pushing his project team to seek further information 
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in order to obtain clear probabilities.  However, this may not be the case.  Project teams 
may be well aware of their project leader’s tendencies in regards to dealing with choices 
that have ambiguous outcomes.  As a result, when key team participants pick up on their 
leader’s aversion to ambiguity, they are likely to prematurely expunge product concepts 
or ideas that they know have vague probabilities associated with their eventual outcome.  
If, on the other hand, the team is accustomed to a project leader whom they know is not 
ambiguity averse, they are likely to be far more comprehensive in their decision-making.  
This would be the case since there is a higher likelihood that the project leader would 
consider concepts and ideas without clear probabilities.  Therefore they have an incentive 
to be more comprehensive in their decision making in an effort to convert any ambiguity 
into known risk.   
The conceptualization presented here is based on cognitive miser theory.   The 
theory derives from work done in social psychology, especially social cognition (Macrae, 
Milne, and Bodenhausen 1994; Fiske and Taylor 1984; Nisbett and Ross 1980).  As 
pointed out by Moss and DiCaccavo (2005, p.512), the cognitive miser theory is an 
“influential model of schema function,” used by individuals as a heuristic to reduce 
cognitive load.  In the current context, the part of cognitive miser theory that is of 
conceptual use is the theory’s take on individual’s use of cognitive shortcuts; suggesting 
that individuals use various cognitive shortcuts in order to lower information-processing 
load (required for decisions).  Knowing a manager is averse to ambiguity, team members 
can reduce their information-processing load not exhausting their limited cognitive 
resources on gathering and discovering information associated with new ideas and 
concepts that are not likely to gain their project leader’s approval.  This would serve as an 
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example of a cognitive shortcut within the cognitive miser theory approach.  So given the 
theoretical justification and preceding conceptualization we have: 
H5:  The relationship between ambiguity aversion and decision-making 
comprehensiveness is negative. 
 
3.4.5. Decision-Making Comprehensiveness on Front-End of Innovation Performance 
Previous research has drawn empirical conclusions on the relationship between 
decision-making comprehensiveness and firm performance (Atuahene-Gima 2004; 
Menon et al. 1999).  This positive relationship has also been extrapolated and evidenced 
in research looking at new product advantage and firm innovation performance 
(Slotegraaf and Atuahene-Gima 2011).  The current manuscript, keeps with tradition in 
suggesting a positive influence of decision-making comprehensiveness on firm 
innovative performance. 
However, rather than focus directly on overall firm innovation performance I 
focus specifically on the positive effect of decision-making comprehensiveness on front-
end of innovation performance.  As pointed out previously, the front-end of innovation 
involves numerous activities that require extensive research, collaborative work, and 
evaluating and justifying various outcome options.  Consequently, it is imperative that in 
order to be successful at the front end of innovation, there has to be a high degree of 
decision-making comprehensiveness.  If project teams lacked this key activity, there 
could possibly be various systemic failures at the front-end which would inevitably be 
passed on to the subsequent stages of innovation. As a result: 
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H6:  The relationship between decision-making comprehensiveness and front-end of 
innovation performance is positive. 
 
3.4.6. Innovation Culture on Capacity to Innovate 
As a variable, capacity to innovate was first studied by Burns and Stalker (1961).  
This was succeeded by a multitude of scholars, each pointing to the important 
relationship between capacity to innovate and firm performance (Hurley and Hult 1998; 
Hult 1998; Porter 1990).  Capacity to innovate is defined as the “ability of the 
organization to adopt or implement new ideas, processes, or products successfully” 
(Hurley and Hult 1998, p. 44).   
As discussed previously, a firm’s innovation culture provides the social capital 
that is imperative to any business looking to innovate.  But the values and norms that 
characterize an innovation culture, even though widespread throughout the organization, 
do not directly impact firm performance.  In fact, what does take place is a firm’s 
innovation culture interacts with other structural processes to impact overall performance.  
The construct called ‘innovative capacity’ captures this phenomenon. 
So, a firm that values innovation and develops norms that encourage behaviors 
which support innovation and or sanction behaviors that interfere with innovation will be 
highly likely to build skills and abilities that enable innovation.  In other words, an 
innovative culture directly impacts a firm’s innovative capacity 
H7:  The relationship between Innovation Culture and Capacity to Innovate is positive. 
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3.4.7. Capacity to Innovate on Front-End of Innovation Performance 
This relationship has found wide spread empirical support (Hult, Hurley and 
Knight 2004; Hurley and Hult 1998). As such, I offer the following hypothesis which 
suggests that there exists a significant positive relationship between innovation culture 
and capacity to innovate. A strong innovative culture leads to an enhanced capacity to 
innovate (see discussion above, Hurley and Hult 1998).  Within firms, innovative 
capacity refers to a firm’s ability to adopt new ideas, processes, and/or innovations in a 
successful manner.  Without the underlying culture and the resultant capabilities, there is 
nothing to suggest that firm performance will increase simply by pushing out new 
products.  Therefore, extant research is in agreement that firm performance increases as a 
result of innovative capacity (Hult, Hurley and Knight 2004; Hurley and Hult 1998; Hult 
1998; Porter 1990). 
Similarly, scholars have reinforced the positive link between innovative capacity 
and specifically innovation performance (Slotegraaf and Atuahene-Gima 2011; Woodside 
2005; Atuahene-Gima 2004; Carrilat, Jaramillo, and Locander 2004).  However, there 
has been limited attention paid to the role of innovative capacity on the front-end of 
innovation performance.  As pointed out by Hurley and Hult (1998) while drawing 
comparisons with Rogers (1983), innovative capacity serves an important role throughout 
all the stages of the innovation process (front-end, new-product development and 
commercialization).   
It can be reasoned that since capacity to innovate entails a firm level capability to 
adopt new ideas, products, etc., it has a direct bearing on the front-end of innovation 
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performance.  To remind the reader, front-end of innovation entails activities like idea 
generation, concept definition, and project and strategy implementation to name a few.  
These are all activities and skills that stand to benefit from a higher capacity to innovate.  
This suggests that there exists a positive relationship between innovative capacity and 
front-end of innovation performance.  This specific relationship (rather than the link 
between capacity to innovate and firm performance as well as overall innovation 
performance) has not yet been adequately explored.  Therefore: 
H8:  The relationship between Capacity to Innovate and Front-End of Innovation 
Performance is positive. 
 
3.5. Summary 
The front-end of the innovation process is an area in which uncertainty, and in 
particular ambiguity, is rife.  The conceptual model proposed in this chapter views 
ambiguity aversion on the part of the new product project leader as detrimental to the 
overall success of the front-end of innovation process.  Ambiguity aversion is potentially 
harmful because, conceptually, it is a threat to decision-making comprehensiveness.  In 
essence, the usual decision-making rigor of the process may be short-circuited if 
meritorious ideas are rejected prior to the conduct of due diligence. Importantly, the 
conceptual reasoning of the proposed model suggests that this effect may have its greatest 
effect in organizations with strongly innovative cultures. 
This chapter has provided a detailed look at the conceptual model.  The 
relationships that have been identified in the conceptual model are based on the literature 
review provided in Chapter II.  The current chapter has also expanded on the, heretofore, 
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underexplored connection between the ambiguity literature and innovation literature.  
The chapter also proposed multiple testable hypothesis (see Table 2-8 below) and the 
theoretical justifications underlying the relationships presented in the conceptual model.   
The next chapter will provide the reader the research design and methodology and the 
will be employed to test the proposed hypothesis. 
Table 3-1 
 
 
 
Hypothesis Statement
H1 When fear of negative evaluation is high, the project leader experiences a significantly higher 
level of ambiguity aversion compared to when fear of negative evaluation is low.
H2 A project leader’s perceived competence over the decision domain is significantly related to 
his/her level of ambiguity aversion, such that when perceived competence is high, ambiguity 
aversion is low and vice versa.
H3 When innovation culture is weak, there is no clear relationship between fear of negative 
evaluation and ambiguity aversion (although ambiguity aversion should be high), on the other 
hand when innovation culture is strong, there is strong positive relationship between fear of 
negative evaluation and ambiguity aversion.
H4 When innovation culture is weak, there is no clear relationship between sense of competence 
and ambiguity aversion (although ambiguity aversion should be high. On the other hand when 
innovation culture is strong, there is a strong negative relationship between sense of 
competence and ambiguity aversion
H5 The relationship between ambiguity aversion and decision making comprehensiveness is 
negative.
H6 The relationship between decision making comprehensiveness and front-end of innovation 
performance is positive
H7 The relationship between Innovation Culture and Capacity to Innovate is positive
H8 The relationship between Capacity to Innovate and Front-End of Innovation Performance is 
positive
PROPOSED HYPOTHESES
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter is organized into three major sections.  The first section discusses the 
research design employed in this dissertation.  This includes an overview of the 
population, sample frame, the survey approach, and information on key respondents and 
how I intend to tackle non-response bias. 
The second section describes those aspects related to measurement.  This section 
provides a detailed look at the key variables that are employed, including the dependent 
measure, predictor, moderating, and control variables.  The psychometric properties of 
these measures are also discussed. 
The final section provides a brief outlook on the data analysis plan employed in 
this dissertation.  Here, justifications for using the adopted approach are also discussed, in 
addition to the procedures employed, how the hypotheses were tested, and an assessment 
of the psychometric properties of the data set. 
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4.2. Research Design 
This section provides a detailed discussion of the research design employed in this 
dissertation. 
4.2.1. Unit of Analysis 
The key unit of analysis adopted within this dissertation is the individual decision 
maker.  For example, the constructs fear of negative evaluation, sense of competence, and 
ambiguity aversion all are defined and measured at the individual level.  These individual 
level constructs are placed within the organization by the innovation culture moderating 
variable.  Finally, the three individual level constructs are connected to organizational 
processes and outcomes by their relationship to decision-making comprehensiveness and 
the performance of the front-end of innovation across multiple new product development 
projects. Since the goal was to study a decision maker’s level of ambiguity aversion 
across multiple situations, this unit of analysis structure is apt.  Second, since decision-
making comprehensiveness is a key mediating variable in this dissertation and is defined 
in terms of multiple new product development projects, it would be inappropriate to 
employ a unit of analysis focused on a specific project. 
4.2.2. Sample Frame 
This dissertation attempts to study the ambiguity aversion of decision makers and 
its impact on front-end of innovation performance.  This applies to a wide variety of 
contexts across a wide variety of industries.  Therefore, the sampling frame employed in 
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this dissertation would ideally tap into the total population of decision makers involved in 
an innovation context. 
However there was no convenient manner in which such a sampling frame can be 
constructed.  That being said, this dissertation makes every attempt to employ a sample 
frame that is representative of the total population described above.  In an effort to reach 
the appropriate key respondents, I employ the assistance of an online research panel.  
Research panels have had a long history of use in marketing research.  This can be 
mainly attributed to the ease with which a researcher can collect data while easily gaining 
access to the appropriate sample frame.  Online research panels are witnessing more 
widespread adoption in premier marketing journal (e.g. Arora, Henderson and Liu 2011; 
Danaher et al. 2011; Shachar et al. 2011).  
Nevertheless, there are some methodological issues related to online research 
panels that ought to be discussed.  For example, a primary issue of concern was the use of 
non-probability samples.  However, (as pointed out by the AAPOR report) this only 
becomes a major problem when results are being used to make inferences about the total 
population.  In this dissertation, we try to make inferences about theory, so we need not 
worry about it.   Schillewaert and Emulemeester (2005) also report that data quality is not 
significantly impacted because of the non-probability sample used by online research 
panel companies. 
Another issue of concern was related to a number of biases that could creep into 
online research panels.  These include for example practiced bias, where respondents 
might be exposed to many surveys resulting in a higher likelihood of developing insider 
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knowledge.  This could lead to a situation where respondents may be able to discern the 
overall research agenda and start reacting more like trained respondents.  The AAPOR 
report also voices concerns about coverage and non-response errors.  However, as 
discussed later, non-response and coverage issues can be easily tested for.  Ultimately, 
the pros associated with the use of an online research panel outweigh the cons, especially 
since many of the disadvantages can be accounted or controlled for.   
4.2.3. Survey Approach 
To collect data, this dissertation adopts the survey approach. Survey research is an 
important method, or set of procedures, that help researchers collect information. The 
innovation literature is characterized by its use the survey approach as a dominant 
research method.  For example, studies that have measured some of the constructs in this 
dissertation have all employed the survey approach (Slotegraaf and Atuahene-Gima 
2011; Copper 2001; Hurley and Hult 1998; Deshpandé, Farley, and Webster 1993).   
There are various types of information that researcher can collect via the use of 
survey method. Dillman (1978) suggests the following types of information can be may 
be collected through the use of survey research: attitudes, beliefs, behavior, and 
attributes. Since I am interested in these types of information, the survey approach was 
appropriate. Correlational research also has a number of desirable qualities.  For example, 
Deshpandé (1982) points out the ease with which a researcher can reach a geographically 
widespread population at a relatively low cost.  Campbell (1955) suggests that the survey 
approach makes it easier to collect data from selected respondents that are familiar with, 
or experts in, the phenomenon under study.   
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The survey approach used here employs a self-report questionnaire that was 
administered to an online research panel comprised of key informants.  The questionnaire 
is comprised of measures that attempt to capture the constructs of interest (please see 
section 4.3 for a detailed discussion). 
4.2.4. Key Informants 
Since innovation activities within a firm can be managed and undertaken through 
multiple people and approaches (Cooper 2001), accurately defining the key respondent 
was important.  For the purposes of this study, the key respondents are broadly described 
as those individuals within a firm that are directly involved in decision-making behavior 
related to innovation activities.  Since, these individuals can be from various departments 
and could potentially hold multiple differing titles, it can be difficult to narrow the key 
respondents by job title and functional department.  Therefore I adopt a more holistic 
approach.    
For the purposes of this dissertation, I include all the following job titles to 
describe the key respondent - chief innovation officer, director of product management, 
new product manager/leader, new projects manager/leader, innovation manager/leader, 
innovation team manager/leader, product development manager/leader, senior product 
manager, director/manager of research and development. However, this approach raised 
issues with my decision to employ a research panel.  The main issue was the cost 
associated with defining a target demographic with an extremely low rate of incidence in 
the general population. 
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As a result, I had to adopt a more lax description of the key respondent and settled 
on product managers.  However, since not all product managers may be involved in 
innovation related decision-making, I implemented measures to qualify potential key 
respondents for the study.  Based on the recommendations of Kumar, Stern, and 
Anderson (1993), I employ key informant qualification questions within the 
questionnaire that are intended to assess the product managers level of involvement in 
innovation related decision making.   These screening questions are discussed in detail in 
Chapter V.     
4.2.5. Response Rate and Non-Response Bias 
The use of a research panel, often times results in extremely high response rates.  
This is an inherent quality of using such panels.  However, a discussion of response rates 
is essential to any research that employs a survey approach.   
Non-response bias is an important phenomenon that needs to be examined in the 
context of survey research.  Non-response bias refers to the systematic difference 
between the respondents and those that do not respond to the study (Parsuraman 1991).  
Unless it is examined, the results could be tainted, and therefore limits the inferences that 
can be made based on the data.   
There are multiple approaches to test for non-response bias.  This dissertation will 
employ one in particular that has been widely adopted in other research.  Based on the 
recommendations of Armstrong and Overton (1977), the primary test for potential non-
response bias will look for systemic differences between early and late respondents.  A 
chi-square difference test can be employed to check for this when responses are split into 
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groups based on early and late completions.  If the chi-square difference test is non-
significant, we can safely assume that there is no non-response bias in the data.  
However, one should keep in mind that when using an online research panel, such 
differences are likely to be non-significant anyway.    
4.3. Measurement 
The following sub-sections review all the variables included in this study.  Based 
on an extensive review of the literature, the measures were either adopted as is, adapted, 
or newly developed.  I assess each measurement variable in terms of their psychometric 
qualities.  As mentioned previously, in some instances this dissertation has developed and 
adopted completely new measures.  The necessary justifications for doing so are 
discussed where necessary.   Both independent and dependent measures are 
operationalized using multi-item measures based on the recommendations of Bagozzi et 
al. (1991) and Churchill (1979).   
4.3.1. Dependent Variable 
Front-end of innovation performance is the dependent variable in this dissertation.  
It is defined as the overall evaluation of the quality of the product concepts produced by 
the front-end of innovation process. This represents the firm’s overall performance in its 
front-end activities.  However, extant research has not adequately attempted to develop a 
multi-item measure for this variable.  In fact, the norm in innovation research has been to 
adopt objective measures of innovation performance (e.g. Hurley and Hult 1998).  While 
this is effortlessly implemented in research studying innovation as a whole, or in research 
looking at latter end stages, it is not very effective in front-end innovation research.   The 
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only related subjective measures that have seen widespread acceptance are those that seek 
to ascertain new-product advantage (Slotegraaf and Atuahene-Gima 2011).  
Based on the lack of well-developed multi-item measure for front-end innovation 
performance, this dissertation attempts to test and validate a completely new measure.  
However, since developing a completely new measure for the dependent variable in this 
dissertation could prove risky, a multiple scale approach was used.  Published research 
has sometimes used subjective scales in addition to attribute and quantitative scales when 
looking at key variables that could all at once be measured based on a subjective, 
attribute, or quantitative approach (Verhorn, Herstatt and Naghira 2008).   
Therefore, I develop three new measures for front-end of innovation performance.  
As shown in Tables 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3, there is a subjective scale, an attribute based scale, 
and a quantitatively oriented scale respectively.  All scales employ seven-point likert type 
items.  The items were chosen based on the scale development techniques suggested by 
Churchill (1979) and Gerbing and Anderson (1988).  All scales will be subject to 
standard psychometric analysis in order to determine the scales properties. 
 
 
 
 
 
99	  
	  
Table 4-1 
 
 
 
Table 4-2 
 
 
Item Statement
1 The front-end results of new product projects I’ve led have been really good.
2 Front-end idea screening is considered a strength here.
3 Front-end concept development processes are considered a strength here.
4 When I think about our NPD processes, the front-end activities are excellent.
5 In our front-end process, we excel at producing solid product concepts for future development.
Original Scale
Please select the appropriate response in the context of your innovation activities especially its early stages 
(also referred to as the front-end of innovation).
FRONT-END OF INNOVATION SCALE (SUBJECTIVE VERSION)
Item Statement
1 Product strategies that result from our front-end process are clear.
2 Our front-end idea screening produces sharp product definitions.
3 Product concepts that we recommend for further development are financially feasible.
4 A high percentage of our recommended concepts get funded for product development.
5 In our front-end process, we excel at producing clear product definitions.
Original Scale
Please select the appropriate response in the context of your innovation activities especially its early stages 
(also referred to as the front-end of innovation).
FRONT-END OF INNOVATION SCALE (ATTRIBUTE VERSION)
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Table 4-3 
 
4.3.2. Predictor Variables 
Fear of negative evaluation was measured using a four item multi-item measure 
(see Table 4-4).  The scale was originally developed by Rodebaugh et al. (2004) and is 
called the brief fear of negative evaluation scale.   
The brief fear of negative evaluation scale has been widely adopted in a variety of 
psychological studies and its psychometric properties have been largely confirmed as 
adequate to good (Orsillo 2001).  For the purposes of the current study, the original scale 
has been modified slightly to better fit the context of innovation.  In addition, the scale 
has been shortened to keep the overall survey instrument short in length.  The eight items 
that were dropped from the original scale were screened out once it was determined that 
they either shared considerable similarities with other items, or had little relevance in the 
current context.     
Item Statement
1 How many new ideas were generated in your front-end process during the last 3/6/12/18 months?
2 How many ideas emerged from your front-end processes ready for development in the last 3/6/12/18 months?
3 What percentage of product concepts produced by your front-end process actually received funding during the last 3/6/12/18 months?
4 What percentage of product concepts produced by your front-end process during the last 3/6/12/18 months?
5 What percentage of your product concepts were abandoned or discarded during the past 3/6/12/18 months?
Original Scale
FRONT-END OF INNOVATION SCALE (QUANTITATIVE VERSION)
101	  
	  
Table 4-4 
 
Though an extant scale has been adopted to measure FNE, this dissertation once 
again attempts to develop a new scale in keeping with the definition of FNE used herein; 
the “apprehension and distress arising from concerns about being judged disparagingly or 
hostilely by others” (Carleton et al. 2006), and the context of the current study (see Table 
4-5).   
The same procedures, as mentioned earlier, for the development of the new front-
end of performance scale were used here again.  Upon data collection, the new scale will 
be assessed via exploratory and confirmatory analysis to ascertain its psychometric 
properties. 
 
 
 
 
Item Statement
1 I am afraid that others will criticize decisions I have made
2 I worry a lot about what my supervisors would think of my decision.
3 I worry a lot about what my co-workers would think of my decision.
4 These decisions are open to criticism by others.
Rodebaugh et al. (2004) (adapted)
FEAR OF NEGATIVE EVALUATION SCALE
When I make decisions on new product ideas:
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Table 4-5 
 
This dissertation defines perceived competence as an “individual’s sense of skill, 
knowledge and understanding over a given decision context” (adapted from Heath and 
Tversky 1991).  This dissertation develops a new five-item scale to measure a decision-
makers sense of competence (see Table 4-6).  There exist other scales in the literature, 
most notably the perceived competence scale (PCS) used in research employing self-
determination theory (e.g. Williams and Deci (1996).  However its psychometric 
properties are poor and unreliable, and the scale items themselves poorly fit the current 
study.   
Therefore, a new scale to measure perceived competence of the decision-maker 
was developed.  All items were generated using the same scale development procedures 
mentioned previously.  The new scale will have to be subject to through psychometric 
testing upon data collection.  However, it should be noted that the new scale employs 
items that fit better with the overall theme of the current study. 
 
Item Statement
1 I worry that the innovation related decisions I make might lead to ridicule within the company.
2 In our innovation process, out-of-the-box decisions may be negatively received
3 To gain positive feedback, innovation decisions must be based on accepted criteria.
4 To avoid negative feedback by others in the firm, I usually approve the most defensible innovation ideas.
Original Scale
ALTERNATIVE FEAR OF NEGATIVE EVALUATION SCALE
When I make decisions on new product ideas:
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Table 4-6 
 
For the ambiguity aversion construct, this dissertation adopts a completely new 
measure.  It is comprised of five seven-point likert type items.  There exists a well known 
tolerance of ambiguity scale developed by Budner (1962).  This scale was refined most 
recently by McLain (2009).  However the tolerance for ambiguity scale is a poor fit for 
this dissertation in a number of important areas.  First, it is developed on a psychological 
conceptualization of ambiguity which is different from the conceptualization adopted in 
this dissertation.  This dissertation draws its conceptualization of ambiguity based on the 
works of Knight (1921) and Ellsberg (1961), where the theoretical underpinnings are 
based on utility theory and decision theory.   
Second, aversion and tolerance to ambiguity are actually two different concepts 
altogether.  This dissertation defines ambiguity aversion as the “preference for options 
involving clear probabilities to options involving vague probabilities” (Trautmann et al. 
Item Statement
1 I have many years of experience in innovation.
2 I am very knowledgeable about new product development.
3 I consider innovation an area in which I know what I am doing.
4 I have developed expertise in managing innovation.
5 I have developed expertise in managing product development.
Original Scale
PERCEIVED COMPETENCE SCALE
On the following questions please select your level of expertise, knowledge, or experience.
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2008).  Tolerance for ambiguity is best defined as “an orientation, ranging from aversion 
to attraction, toward stimuli that are complex, unfamiliar, and insoluble” (McLain 2009).   
Based on this reasoning, I decided that a new measure had to be developed.  In 
selecting a pool of items to develop the new measure, extreme care was given to ensure 
that the measures matched up well with conceptualization of ambiguity aversion adopted 
in this dissertation.  As a result a number of items from McLain’s (2009) tolerance for 
ambiguity scale that related with our conceptualization were adopted and slightly 
modified for better contextual fit.  Table 4-7 provides a concise overview of the newly 
developed multi-item scale.  Being a newly developed measure, its psychometric 
properties are yet to be examined via exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. 
Table 4-7 
 
The final predictor variable is decision-making comprehensiveness.  It is defined 
as the “degree to which the team is exhaustive as it considers multiple approaches, 
courses of action, and decision criteria in its strategic decision making” (Slotegraaf and 
Item Statement
1 When it comes to uncertain outcomes, I need to know the odds for and against.
2 Problems that must be considered from multiple viewpoints are a little threatening.
3 I enjoy tackling problems that are ambiguous. (R)
4 Before I can make a decision, understanding the probable outcomes must come first.
5 I would rather avoid solving a problem that must be viewed from several different perspectives.
Adapted Scale
AMBIGUITY AVERSION SCALE
In relation to innovation activities:
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Atuahene-Gima 2011, p. 97).  I adopt an existing measure of decision-making 
comprehensiveness.  The scale comprises of four 7-point likert style items.  Published 
research shows the scale to have high composite reliability and other admirable 
psychometric properties (Slotegraaf and Atuahene-Gima 2011).  Table 4-8 provides an 
over view of the decision-making comprehensiveness scale. 
Table 4-8 
 
4.3.3. Moderator Variables 
The main moderating variable in the conceptual model is innovation culture.  This 
dissertation defines innovation culture as the “openness to new ideas as an aspect of 
firms’ organizational culture” (Hurley and Hult 1998, p. 44).   
In operationalizing innovation culture, Hurley and Hult (1998) use a measure 
developed by Burke (1969) that attempts to measure an individual’s perception of group 
culture.  However, I do not use Burke’s (1969) scale. While Burke’s (1969) scale has 
items intended to assess innovativeness, it also comprises four other dimensions of 
Item Statement
1 Develop many alternative courses of action.
2 Use multiple criteria for eliminating possible courses of action.
3 Engage in extensive and in-depth analysis of all available strategic options
4 Thoroughly examine multiple explanations for problems and opportunities.
Slotegraaf and Atuahene-Gima (2011)
When I've been the decision maker of a new-product development team, we:
DECISION-MAKING COMPREHENSIVENESS SCALE
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culture (such as power sharing) that are irrelevant to the current study.  Therefore it was 
decided to search for other measures that are a better fit to the conceptualization of 
innovation culture adopted in this dissertation. 
Multiple scholars have attempted to develop multi-item measures for innovation 
culture (Dobni 2008; Ahmed and Wang 2004).  I adopt a four-item measure of innovation 
culture from Dobni (2008).  The scale uses likert type items.  This measure was adopted 
based on the good psychometric properties exhibited by the scale (α > .70); all factor 
loadings greater than .70) in addition to its good fit with my conceptualization of the 
innovation culture construct. 
Table 4-9 
 
Capacity to innovate is defined as the “ability of the organization to adopt or 
implement new ideas, processes, or products successfully” (Hurley and Hult 1998, p. 44).  
In their work, Hurley and Hult (1998) adopt an objective measure of capacity to innovate.  
They operationalize the construct in terms of “the number of new ideas that had been 
Item Statement
1 Innovation is an underlying culture and not just a word.
2 Our senior managers are able to effectively cascade the innovation message throughout the organization.
3 Innovation is a core value.
4 We have an innovation vision that is aligned with projects, platforms, or initiatives.
Dobni (2008)
INNOVATION CULTURE SCALE
In my company:
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adopted by the organization and recognized by a formal suggestion award program” 
(Hurley and Hult 1998, p. 48).  This approach is not as feasible for the purposes of this 
dissertation. 
In order to measure capacity to innovate, a completely new scale was developed.  
It consists of four likert type items.  The items were chosen and refined based on the 
same recommendations used for other new scales in this dissertation.  Table 4-10 
provides a summary of the items.  As with other new scales, thorough exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses need to be performed in order to assess its psychometric 
properties. 
Table 4-10 
 
4.3.4. Control Variables 
A number of key control variables are incorporated in the instrument.  This was 
done in order to control for extraneous effects that might have an undue influence on the 
data and the conceptual model.  The variables that are controlled in this study include, 
Item Statement
1 We find it easy to adopt new processes.
2 We definitely work at creating new ways to work.
3 Our skills translate into new innovations that benefit customers.
4 Innovation requires dynamic capabilities that we possess.
Original Scale
CAPACITY TO INNOVATE SCALE
In my company:
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firm size, managerial traits (like experience and education), and environmental factors 
(including market turbulence and technological turbulence).  Each of these are discussed 
in succession.   
It is possible when using online research panels to end up with data from a wide 
variety of firms in terms of size.  Innovation could possibly have different roles in 
different sized firms.  Therefore, I decided to control for firm size.  Firm size was 
measured using the number of employees and annual sales as indicators (see Table 4-11).  
This is common practice in the marketing literature (Gammoh et al. 2006).   
Individual manager traits are also controlled in the current study for multiple 
reasons.  First, such measures serve to screen individuals who are not key decision-
makers in the innovation context.  This is important since the current study uses an online 
research panel to collect data.  Second, there is likely to be differences in terms of 
managerial tenure and competency in terms of how individual managers deal with 
ambiguity.  While this is not the primary research agenda in this study, it was 
nevertheless important to gain insights into such areas.   
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Table 4-11 
 
 
Table 4-12 
 
Item
1.  What are the approximate annual sales of your firm?
!  Less than $500,000 !  Less than 25 employees
!  Between $500,000 and $999,999 !  Between 25 and 100 employees
!  Between 1 million and 10 million US Dollars !  Between 101 and 200 employees
!  Between 10 million and 50 million US Dollars !  Between 201 and 500 employees
!  Between 50 million and 100 million US Dollars !  Between 501 and 800 employees
!  Between 100 million and 500 million US Dollars !  Between 801 and 1000 employees
!  Between 500 million and 1 billion US Dollars !  Between 1001 and 5000 employees
!  Between 1 billion and 10 billion US Dollars !  Over 5000 employees
!  Between 10 billion and 50 billion US Dollars
!  Over 50 billion US Dollars
3
4
FIRM-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS MEASURES
Statement
2.  What is the approximate number of 
employees in your firm?
How long has your firm been in business?      ______ years
How long has your firm operated in this industry?    ______ years
Item Statement
1 How long have you been employed in this industry?                      _____ years  _____ months
2 How long have you been employed with your current firm?           _____ years  _____ months
3 How long have you been involved in innovation activities in your career?
 _____ years  _____ months
4 How long have you been involved in innovation activities with your firm?           
 _____ years  _____ months
5 How many new-product projects have you been involved in during you career?   
6 How many new-product projects have you been involved in during you time with your current 
firm?   
INDIVIDUAL MANAGER TRAIT MEASURES
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Measures of individual managerial traits and competency were adopted from 
Kumar, Stern and Anderson (1993).  All items were slightly modified to fit the 
innovation context.  The individual manager competency scale uses nine 7-point likert 
type items.  Table 4-12 and 4-13 provides an over view of both the trait and competency 
measures respectively. 
Table 4-13 
 
The final set of control variables adopted in this study pertains to environmental 
factors.  Four variables were considered including market turbulence, technological 
turbulence, and environmental uncertainty.  These measures were included in keeping 
with common practices adopted in the innovation literature (Slotegraaf and Atuahene-
Gima 2011).  All measures were adopted from well-tested scales used in the published 
literature.  Market turbulence and technological turbulence were adopted from Jaworski 
Item Statement
1 Experience with respect to managing innovation activities
2 Skills with respect to managing innovation activities
3 Capabilities with respect to managing innovation activities
4 Motivations with respect to managing innovation activities
5 Motivations with respect to profit goals for one or more products
6 Motivations with respect to reacting to the competition
7 Goals with respect to the future direction for product innovation activities
8 Motivations with respect to cost control goals for product innovation activities
9 Products' quality
Original Scale
I have adequate knowledge to assess this firm's:
INDIVIDUAL MANAGER COMPETENCY SCALE
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and Kohli (1993).  Environmental uncertainty was operationalized using four 7-point 
likert type items adapted from previous research (Atuahene-Gima and Murray 2004; 
Jaworski and Kohli 1993).  All scales employ 7-point likert type items (see Table 4-14). 
Table 4-14 
 
Item Statement
MARKET TURBULENCE
1 In our kind of business, customers' product preference change quite a bit over time
2 Our customers tend to look for new products all the time
3 We are witnessing demand for our products and services from customers who never bought them before
4 New customers tend to have product-related needs that are different from those of our existing customers
5 We cater to many of the same customers that we used to in the past (R) 
TECHNOLOGICAL TURBULENCE
1 The technology in our industry is changing rapidly
2 Technological changes provide big opportunities in our industry
3 A large number of new product ideas have been made possible through technological breakthroughs in our industry
4 Technological developments in our industry are rather minor (R) 
ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTY
1 Changes in the marketing practices of our competitors is easy to predict (R)
2 The actions of our competitors are easy to predict (R)
3 Demand and consumer preferences are easy to predict (R)
4 Changes in product technology within this industry are easy to predict (R)
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS SCALE
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4.3.5. Survey Development 
As mentioned earlier, my data collection plan for this dissertation was to use an 
online research panel.  This implies that the survey will be administered electronically.  
Even though this method does not rely on traditional paper and pencil surveys, there are 
certain recommendation applied to paper and pencil surveys that should be employed in 
designing the instrument. 
Based on the recommendations of Dillman (1978), and to improve response rates, 
several procedures were adopted in the development of the instrument.   For example, 
particular attention was given to ensure that questions did not appear vague or 
incomprehensible.  This was a particular issue in that multiple questions employ the word 
‘ambiguity’ which could potentially be interpreted in a number of ways. 
Another concern was overall questionnaire length.  This issue was largely 
subdued through the use of shorter scales where possible.  However, since the 
administration of the instrument is largely outside my control (due to the use of an online 
research panel, Dillman’s (1978) recommendations on maintaining a professional 
appearance could not be followed.   
The final instrument was pre-tested using a three-stage process.  First, a group of 
marketing scholars assessed the instrument to check for face validity, overall structure 
and content.  Their feedback was used to make changes to the instrument.  The second 
stage involved pre-testing the instrument with a convenience sample of MBA students at 
a large mid-western university.  This was done to ensure overall clarity of the questions 
and overall structure of the survey.  Following the pre-test, the respondents were asked to 
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rate the survey on 1)the extent to which the survey was well organized and easy to read, 
2) the length of the questionnaire and 3) the clarity of the instructions provided.  
Following this, the instrument was finally presented with a small group of industry 
professionals.  Dillman’s (1978) recommendations on professional questionnaire 
appearance were also assessed during this stage, although as mentioned earlier, this did 
not factor in the online version of the instrument.  Once again, the procedures were the 
same as those employed with the MBA students.  A copy of the instrument is attached in 
Appendix A. 
4.4. Data Analysis Plan 
The data analysis plan in this dissertation follows a number of important steps and 
procedures.  First analytical datasets were created from the raw data so as not to corrupt 
the raw data file.  The first step was to assess the descriptive statistics of the data 
followed by a test for non-response bias.  All scales were then examined to assess their 
psychometric properties.  This included exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis in 
order to assess inter-item correlations, coefficient alpha and discriminant validity.  
Verifying unidimensionality, based on the measurement model developed for the 
confirmatory factor analysis, assessed convergent validity. 
Finally all proposed hypotheses and relationships were examined using 
hierarchical regression using three stage least squares.  Using this approach has a number 
of advantages over the use of structural models.  Primarily, the three stage least squares 
approach in SAS affords the analyst flexibility when analyzing moderation through the 
use cross-product terms.  This can be accomplished while still maintaining simultaneous 
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estimation of the hierarchical regression parameters.  However, this method does not 
allow the integration of the measurement model into an overall structural model.  
4.5. Summary 
This chapter has provided a detailed overview of the research design and 
methodology employed in this dissertation.  This included discussions on the key 
respondents, measures, and proposed data analysis techniques.  The next chapter will 
provide a detailed account of the results of the data collection and how it relates to the 
conceptual model outlined in this dissertation.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter is organized into three major sections.  The first of these sections 
provides a detailed description of the sample.  This includes a discussion of key sample 
characteristics like type of firms sampled, level of managerial experience in relation to 
innovation activities, and other key demographics. 
The second section describes those aspects related to the measurement model.  
For instance, psychometric properties and other key indicators of the overall quality of 
the measurement model are discussed.  This is in addition to pointing out the results of all 
exploratory factor analyses (EFAs) and confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs).   
The final section is concerned with testing the hypotheses outlined in the previous 
chapter.  This includes (1) analyzing the relationship between ambiguity aversion and its 
proposed antecedents, (2) assessing the moderating role of innovation culture on the 
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relationship between ambiguity aversion and its antecedents, (3) determining the effect of 
ambiguity aversion on decision making comprehensiveness, and finally (4) examining the 
role of the aforementioned constructs on front-end of innovation performance as outlined 
in the conceptual model discussed previously.   As pointed out in Chapter IV, all 
hypothesis testing was performed via simultaneously estimated regression equations 
using 3SLS estimation technique. 
5.2. Sample Characteristics   
As mentioned previously, the data for the current study was collected via a panel 
provider by administering an online survey.  In addition to answering items related to the 
constructs of interest, respondents were also required to provide information about 
themselves.  In the following sections, I describe in detail the various sample 
characteristics of importance such as the makeup of firms where the respondents worked, 
their overall level of managerial competence, their experience with regards to innovation 
etc. 
5.2.1. Respondent Screening   
In order to ensure that survey respondents had adequate experience in regards to 
innovation, a screening question was employed.  This is important as it ensures the 
integrity and credibility of the data collected and aids in external validity (specifically 
population validity).  The screening question was presented to respondents immediately 
following the participant information sheet that described the study (a requirement as per 
IRB).  Table 5-1 shows the items included in the screening question.  The first three 
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options qualified participants to take the survey, while the last two options concluded the 
survey for those respondents that chose it. 
This approach was adopted instead of qualifying respondents based on their job 
title.  The justification for this decision is based upon the fact that there are numerous 
titles that individual mangers related to innovation might hold.  From firm-to-firm these 
may vary dramatically.  For example, in some firms a brand manager might be in charge 
of innovation related activities, while in another firms it might be the R&D manager.  
Due to these idiosyncrasies, I decided that the best way to ensure that we tap into the 
correct sample frame would be to employ a screening question that qualified participants 
based on their active role in innovation.  This approach also aided in screening out 
participants who have a limited role in innovation decision-making who might have 
otherwise qualified if they had a misleading job title. 
Table 5-1 
 
 
Question Frequency Percentage
I am the sole decision maker regarding innovation/ new product ideas 
[QUALIFY] 48 12.9
I make the final decision regarding innovation/ new product ideas with input 
from staff/management [QUALIFY] 46 12.3
I help reach the final decision regarding innovation/ new product ideas as part of 
a group/committee  [QUALIFY] 84 22.5
I provide input toward decisions regarding innovation/ new product ideas 
[TERMINATE] 124 33.2
I have no input into decisions regarding innovation/ new product ideas  
[TERMINATE] 70 18.8
BREAKDOWN BY SCREENING QUESTION
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A total of 373 participants were invited by Research Now® (the panel provider) 
to take the online survey which was administered on Qualtrics®.  Of these, 178 
respondents qualified based on the screening criteria and were presented with the 
questionnaire.  This resulted in a total qualifying rate of 47.7%.  Those that did not 
qualify were thanked for their participation and were not shown the survey instrument.   
5.2.2. Firm Characteristics   
The respondents in the current study come from a wide representation of firms 
based in the United States.  Questions meant to assess the characteristics of the firms 
included items related to firm size as measured by number of employees, annual sales 
generated, number of years the firm has been active etc.  The questions related to number 
of employees and annual sizes were adopted from the U.S. Economic Census.  This 
allows us to compare our sample with that of the wider population in terms of the makeup 
of firms represented in the study. 
From the total 178 responses received, 175 respondents provided information 
regarding their firm’s annual sales.  Approximately 60% reported annual sales of less 
than 10 million U.S. Dollars, with the largest category of firms reporting annual sales less 
the 500,000 U.S. Dollars (29.7% of the total sample).  This is represented in Table 5-2 
which shows a frequency distribution of firms in the sample broken down by annual sales 
per year.  When compared to the total population of U.S. companies (by comparing the 
sample to Economic Census data) it becomes clear that our sample contains firms that 
have higher annual sales.  In other words, the current sample is characterized by a larger 
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proportion of firms (χ2 = 42.58(1), p = .000, see Table 5-3) with higher annual sales 
when comparing the distribution to Economic Census data. 
Table 5-2 
 
 
Table 5-3 
 
Breakdown Frequency Percentage
Less than $500,000 52 29.7
Between $500,000 and $999,999 15 8.6
Between 1 million and 10 million US Dollars 33 18.9
Between 10 million and 50 million US Dollars 24 13.7
Between 50 million and 100 million US Dollars 7 4
Between 100 million and 500 million US Dollars 21 12
Between 500 million and 1 billion US Dollars 4 2.3
Between 1 billion and 10 billion US Dollars 8 4.6
Between 10 billion and 50 billion US Dollars 9 5.1
Over 50 billion US Dollars 2 1.1
BREAKDOWN BY APPROXIMATE ANNUAL SALES
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
Breakdown Less than $500,000 p.a. Less the $10,000,000 p.a.
Overall population of U.S. firms* 3,699,401 (61.15%) 5,852,200 (96.73%)
Firms represented in the sample 52 (29.71%) 44 (57.14%)
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
ANNUAL SALES ANALYSIS
*Source: 2007 Economic Census - U.S. Census Bureau
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I also analyzed firm size based on the data collected (N=177).  Size was measured 
by way of the number of employees that a firm had on payroll.  As can be seen from 
Table 5-4 below, the current sample has a spread of firms ranging from small to large 
size.  According to the frequency distribution, firms with less than 25 employees 
represented the largest category in the sample with 43.5% of the total firms falling within 
this group.  Nevertheless, the sample also included firms of both medium and large sizes.   
Table 5-4 
 
It is important to point out that the current sample differs from the population of 
all firms in terms of size.  While 99.7% of all U.S. companies report less than 500 
employees (2007 U.S. Economic Census), only 75.14% of the firms included in this 
study have less than 500 employees.  In other words, there is a bigger proportion of large 
firms (χ2 = 20731.26(1), p = .000, see Table 5-5) that have been included in the current 
study. 
Breakdown Frequency Percentage
Less than 25 employees 77 43.5
Between 25 and 100 employees 30 16.9
Between 101 and 200 employees 10 5.6
Between 201 and 500 employees 16 9
Between 501 and 800 employees 6 3.4
Between 801 and 1000 employees 8 4.5
Between 1001 and 5000 employees 14 7.9
Over 5000 employees 16 9
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
BREAKDOWN BY NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
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Table 5-5 
 
Ultimately, the discrepancies in terms of firm characteristics when comparing the 
current sample to census data can be explained based on the selection and screening 
criteria employed for determining the sample of managers.  It is likely that the narrowly 
defined criteria for selecting and qualifying managers may have eliminated a large 
proportion of the smaller firms.  Nevertheless, the data shows acceptable overall 
standards in terms of firm characteristics to proceed with further analysis. 
5.2.3. Respondent Characteristics 
Within the survey instrument, multiple questions were incorporated to assess 
respondent characteristics.  These included items related to work experience, managerial 
competence, experience with regards to innovation, tenure at firm, etc.  In addition to the 
screening question that was employed, these items play a pivotal role in determining the 
quality of the sample with respect to the current study.  Especially of interest here is 
obtaining the correct key informants to participate in the study; since ensuring that study 
participants are indeed managers with a key role in innovation decision-making is crucial. 
Breakdown Less than 500 employees 500 employees or greater
Overall population of U.S. firms* 6,031,344 (99.69%) 18,311 (0.31%)
Firms represented in the sample 133 (75.14%) 44 (24.86%)
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES ANALYSIS
*Source: 2007 Economic Census - U.S. Census Bureau
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Table 5-6 provides an analysis of the nine 7-point likert type items that assess 
managerial competence with respect to innovation activities.  These included items such 
as having adequate knowledge of the firm’s experience with innovation activities, 
knowledge with regards to the firm’s capabilities in regards to innovation, and having 
adequate knowledge with respect to competitive reactions etc.  The reported results are 
definitely positive.  An overwhelming majority of participants reported extensive 
experience in the innovation domain.  For example, over 65% of all participants chose 
either agree (6) or strongly agree (7) on every single item.  A very small proportion of 
respondents chose below neutral (4) on each of these items. 
Another way to assess the data is to analyze the reported means of each item.  
Once again looking at Table 5-6, the mean for each item is 5.78 or greater (t-tests for 
mean greater than 4 was performed with results reported in Table 5-6).  This suggests that 
on average our sample had a high level of overall competence or adequate knowledge 
when it comes to their firm’s innovation activities and overall objectives and goals.  One 
explanation for the overall high quality of the sample in regards to managerial 
competence is the use of the screening question.  It is likely that it helped to eliminate 
those potential respondents that might have been ancillary to overall decision-making 
related to innovation activities, and only qualifying managers with in depth experience 
and knowledge of their firms innovation activities. 
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Apart from the questions related to overall competence, respondents were also 
asked how long they have been involved in innovation related activities.  Respondent’s 
years of experience ranged from less than one year up to 50 years of experience in 
innovation.  Taken together, participants in the study reported a total of 2,435 years of 
experience in innovation related activities.  This averaged out to approximately 14 years 
of experience per respondent.   
The questionnaire also asked participants to report how many new-product 
projects they had participated in during their career.   The data shows that 98% of all 
respondents had experience in new-product projects ranging from a minimum of 1 to a 
maximum of 1200.  The average number of new-product projects that participants had 
been involved in was 53.46 projects.  Based on the preceding analysis, it is clear that the 
sample has adequate experience and knowledge with regards to innovation activities.   
5.3. Data Cleaning and Univariate Analysis   
The following section discusses the procedures employed to clean the data set.  
This included missing value analysis and univariate analysis to determine outliers and 
assess the normality of data.   
5.3.1. Missing Value Analysis 
While a total of 178 responses were collected, due to incomplete responses, 2 
cases were dropped from further analysis.  The dropped cases (reference # 43 and 80) had 
greater than 15% of their total values missing within them.  This left a total of 176 usable 
cases for further analysis. 
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There were a further 4 cases with missing values (reference # 8, 67, 104, and 
123).  These cases had between 2.4% and 7.1% of their total values missing.  Since this 
was a rather small amount and restricted to secondary variables of interest, the decision 
was employed to impute the missing values via mean substitution. 
5.3.2. Outlier Analysis 
An outlier is an observation that is significantly different from the other 
observations in the data set.  This is usually apparent as an ‘extreme’ case on one or more 
of the measured variables.  Outlier analysis was performed by analyzing box and whisker 
plots.  At a later stage I briefly examined scatter plots of studentized residuals for each 
variable using a +/- 3 standard deviation cut off point to further look for outliers.   
The outlier analysis revealed a number of cases that warranted further attention.  
Specifically, 4 cases (reference # 27, 63, 125, and 177) exhibited extreme values that 
would have proven detrimental during further stages of analysis like hypothesis testing.  
Therefore the decision was made to drop these cases entirely from further analysis.  
Ultimately, this left N=172 cases in the analytical data set.   
5.3.3. Other Univariate Tests and Testing Basic Assumptions 
The next step involved a thorough examination of univariate statistics for each 
variable of interest.  Measures of central tendency for each item, including histograms 
were examined.  I also examined frequency distributions for each item.  This was an 
elementary step undertaken to ensure that all statistics were at acceptable level and to 
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ensure that there weren’t any basic underlying anomalies in the data set.  It was also at 
this stage that all items that need to be reversed were managed. 
The measures of central tendency (mean, median, and mode) exhibited nothing 
out of the ordinary.  Histograms for each item were used to determine the distribution of 
the data.  The results were again as expected.  Skewness and kurtosis for each item’s 
distribution was also examined and once again were within reasonable expectations for 
the data.   
5.4. Psychometric Properties and Measurement Quality Assessment 
Of key importance to any study based on the survey method and statistical 
inference is the psychometric assessment of each construct.  This includes an in depth 
analysis of the measurement model.  The following sections discuss in detail these 
aspects with individual attention provided to each variable of interest.  For each variable, 
I detail the various issues related to construct validation and reliability, dimension 
reduction via exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).  
Issues related to convergent validity and discriminant validity are also discussed. 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the variables of interest are fear of 
negative evaluation, perceived competence, ambiguity aversion, decision-making 
comprehensiveness, innovation culture, capacity to innovate, and front-end of innovation 
performance.  Each measure is reflective and was measured using multiple 7-point likert 
type items. 
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5.4.1. EFA and Reliability Analysis 
All variables were subject to an EFA.  Unless otherwise specified, all EFAs were 
run using principal component analysis method with no rotation in SPSS 21.  Upon 
performing the EFA, I examined the principal components to examine each item’s factor 
loading.  A minimum factor loading of 0.5 was deemed acceptable at this early stage of 
measurement building  The Eigen value greater than 1 cut-off was employed to determine 
the number of principal components extracted and the total variance explained by the 
principal component was assessed.  Performing the EFA helps to evaluate construct 
validity for each variable of interest.   
Additionally, I also examined Cronbach’s (coefficient) alpha (α) and item-to-total 
correlation to determine reliability (also known as internal consistency reliability).  Based 
on Voss, Stem and Fotopolous (2000) scales were considered reliable based on the 
observed level of alpha given the distribution of the responses, the length of the scale, 
and response patterns in the data.  In order to establish reliability, scholars will often look 
for at least a 0.70 coefficient alpha in order to deem a scale reliable.  This is as per the 
recommendations of Nunnally (1978).  Below I present EFA results and reliabilities for 
each of the variables included in the conceptual model.  
Perceived Competence (PCOMP).  Upon conducting an EFA for this construct, 
one principal component was extracted with an Eigen value of 4.21 that explained 
84.22% of the total variance.  All 5 items loaded onto the principal component at above 
0.9 (see Table 5-7).  Internal consistency reliability was also determined to be excellent 
based on the high coefficient alpha and item-to-total correlations. 
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Table 5-7 
 
Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE).  As can be seen in Table 5-8, the EFA 
performed on the items for fear of negative evaluation extracted one principal component 
with an Eigen value of 3.24.  This principal component explained 81.18% of the total 
variance.  FNE1,2, and 3 had factor loadings above 0.91 while FNE4 loaded at 0.839.  
This scale also exhibited high reliability based on the reported coefficient alpha and item-
to-total correlations. 
A secondary scale was proposed in the previous chapter to measure fear of 
negative evaluation.  However, this secondary scale did not exhibit acceptable 
psychometric properties based on the EFA and reliability analysis.  For instance, 
coefficient alpha was considerable lower (0.68) for the alternative scale compared to the 
primary scale discussed here and shown in Table 5-8 below.  Additionally, the factor 
loadings were low and the total variance explained by the extracted factor was only 52%.  
Scale Items Factor Loadings Item-Total Correlation
Manager's Perceived Competence
PCOMP1 0.914 0.863
PCOMP2 0.945 0.911
PCOMP3 0.908 0.854
PCOMP4 0.916 0.867
PCOMP5 0.906 0.853
Eigen Value 4.21
Variance Explained 84.22%
Cronbach's Alpha 0.953
EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
PERCEIVED COMPETENCE
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As a result of these findings, this alternative scale was dropped from further analysis and 
only the primary scale was used to represent the fear of negative evaluation construct.   
Table 5-8 
 
Innovation Culture (ICL).  As mentioned in the previous chapter, innovation 
culture was measured using 4 items adopted from Dobni (2008).  These items when 
subject to an EFA resulted in a one principal component solution with an Eigen value of 
3.01 that explained 75.46% of the variance.  All factor loadings were above 0.91 except 
for ICL4 which loaded at 0.839.  Cronbach’s alpha was 0.92 while item-to-total 
correlations were all above 0.73.  This suggest good internal consistency reliability.  
Table 5-9 provides a through overview of the psychometric properties of this variable.  
The results reported here are comparable to the results obtained by Dobni (2008) if not 
better. 
 
Scale Items Factor Loadings Item-Total Correlation
Fear of Negative Evaluation
FNE1 0.911 0.837
FNE2 0.925 0.856
FNE3 0.926 0.860
FNE4 0.839 0.731
Eigen Value 3.24
Variance Explained 81.18%
Cronbach's Alpha 0.922
EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
FEAR OF NEGATIVE EVALUATION
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Table 5-9 
 
Capacity to Innovate (CAPI).  The capacity to innovate construct was measured 
using a 4-item scale.  As discussed in the previous chapter, this scale was newly 
developed for the purposes of this dissertation.  The EFA provided a one principal 
component solution with an Eigen value of 2.98 that explained 74.62% of the total 
variance.  Factor loadings for each item were above 0.86.  The scale had good reliability 
as exhibited by an alpha of 0.88 and high item-to-total correlations (see Table 5-10 
below).  
 
 
 
 
Scale Items Factor Loadings Item-Total Correlation
Innovation Culture
ICL1 0.850 0.731
ICL2 0.798 0.663
ICL3 0.919 0.837
ICL4 0.903 0.811
Eigen Value 3.01
Variance Explained 75.46%
Cronbach's Alpha 0.890
EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
INNOVATION CULTURE
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Table 5-10 
 
Decision-Making Comprehensiveness (DMC).  A four item measure of decision-
making comprehensiveness was adopted from the work of Slotegraaf and Atuahene-Gima 
(2011).  The results reported here by way of the EFA and reliability analysis confirm the 
overall quality of the psychometric properties of this scale.  One principal component was 
extracted with an Eigen value of 2.65 that explained 66.36% of the total variance.  All 
factor loadings were above 0.75.  Additionally, the scale had a coefficient alpha of 0.82 
and good item-to-total correlations thereby confirming good reliability.  Table 5-11 
outlines the psychometric properties of the scale. 
 
 
 
 
Scale Items Factor Loadings Item-Total Correlation
Capacity to Innovate
CAPI1 0.871 0.765
CAPI2 0.865 0.757
CAPI3 0.900 0.805
CAPI4 0.819 0.680
Eigen Value 2.98
Variance Explained 74.62%
Cronbach's Alpha 0.883
EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
CAPACITY TO INNOVATE
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Table 5-11 
 
Front-End of Innovation Performance (FPS and FPA).  In Chapter IV I discussed 
the critical limitation of not having any extant scales that could be employed to measure 
the dependent variable of concern to this study.  As a result, I proposed three different 
measures to ensure that I had the best possible chance to measure front-end of innovation 
performance.  A 5-item subjective scale was developed in addition to a 5-item attribute 
based scale and a quantitative measure that is formative in nature and captures nominal 
type data.  In terms of building the measurement model I focused on the two reflective 
measures, the subjective scale (FPS) and the attribute based scale (FPA). 
The FPS scale showed extremely good psychometric properties and measurement 
quality as shown in Table 5-12.  Upon running the EFA a one principal component 
solution was extracted with an Eigen value of 3.93 which explained 78.6% of the overall 
variance in the data.  Each of the five items had factor loadings above 0.85 which is again 
first-rate.  Reliability was also high based on Cronbach’s alpha of 0.93 and item-to-total 
Scale Items Factor Loadings Item-Total Correlation
Decision-Making Comprehensiveness
DMC1 0.763 0.591
DMC2 0.820 0.672
DMC3 0.832 0.676
DMC4 0.841 0.691
Eigen Value 2.65
Variance Explained 66.36%
Cronbach's Alpha 0.829
EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
DECISION-MAKING COMPREHENSIVENESS
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correlations above 0.77.  The findings here make a strong case for the further assessment 
of the subject front-end of innovation performance scale via CFA and ultimately in 
hypothesis testing. 
Table 5-12 
 
Nevertheless, the same tests and analysis were run on FPA, the attribute based 
scale.  Once again, as shown in Table 5-13, the results were promising.  The EFA 
extracted one principal component with an Eigen value of 3.61 which explained 72.26% 
of the total variance.  All five items had loadings above 0.72.  Cronbach’s alpha was 0.9 
and item-to-total correlations were all acceptable.   
 
 
 
Scale Items Factor Loadings Item-Total Correlation
Front-End of Innovation Performance (Subjective Version)
FPS1 0.853 0.773
FPS2 0.899 0.837
FPS3 0.870 0.797
FPS4 0.919 0.867
FPS5 0.890 0.823
Eigen Value 3.93
Variance Explained 78.60%
Cronbach's Alpha 0.932
FRONT-END OF INNOVATION PERFORMANCE (SUBJECTIVE)
EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
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Table 5-13 
 
Based on the results, there was a small likelihood that the results could be 
improved if FPA4 was dropped from the analysis.  A second EFA and reliability analysis 
was performed on the FPA scale without FPA4.  The EFA extracted one principal 
component with an Eigen value of 3.17 that explained 79.32% of the total variance.  All 
factor loadings were above 0.85 this go around, and item-to-total correlations were 0.75 
and above.  A Cronbach’s alpha of .913 was also an improvement over the previous run. 
The results were good enough to suggest that the FPA scale could be used in subsequent 
analysis if necessary.  Section 5.4.3. discusses the dependent measure in more depth. 
Ambiguity Aversion (AA).  Ambiguity aversion was measured using a newly 
developed 5 item scale.  As discussed previously in Chapter IV, there were no existing 
scales that I felt could adequately tap into the construct as defined in this dissertation.  Of 
the five items, one of them was reverse coded.  An initial EFA and reliability analysis 
showed a number of issues that needed to be resolved (Table 5-14).  For instance, the 
Scale Items Factor Loadings Item-Total Correlation
Front-End of Innovation Performance (Attribute Version)
FPA1 0.881 0.796
FPA2 0.863 0.773
FPA3 0.870 0.788
FPA4 0.722 0.602
FPA5 0.902 0.830
Eigen Value 3.61
Variance Explained 72.26%
Cronbach's Alpha 0.902
EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
FRONT-END OF INNOVATION PERFORMANCE (ATTRIBUTE)
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reverse coded item (AA3R) seemed to be creating considerable problems with the overall 
scale.  Internal consistency reliability as examined by way of alpha was only 0.53, and 
the item-to-total correlation for AA3R was negative.  Probably as a result of this, two 
principle components with Eigen values greater than 1were obtained when the EFA was 
run.  The first principal component explained 41% of the variance while the second only 
explained 26% of the variance.  At this point it was clear that the quality of the scale was 
below acceptable standards and had to be remedied. 
Table 5-14 
 
In order to obtain a better measure of ambiguity aversion, the reverse coded item 
was dropped to ascertain whether it would result in better scale properties.  As shown in 
Table 5-15, doing this had a positive impact on the results of the EFA and the reliability 
analysis.  While a two principal component solution was still obtained, a clearer picture 
emerged as to why this might be the case.  It was apparent that AA2 and AA5 held 
Scale Items Item-Total Correlation
Manager's Level of Ambiguity Aversion - Initial Solution
(1) (2)
AA1 0.751 -0.428 0.389
AA2 0.696 0.572 0.484
AA3 (Reversed) -0.239 0.444 -0.115
AA4 0.711 -0.519 0.327
AA5 0.690 0.577 0.470
(1) (2)
Eigen Value 2.08 1.30
Variance Explained 41.75% 26.17%
Cronbach's Alpha 0.532
EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
AMBIGUITY AVERSION
Factor Loadings
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together to form one principal component while AA1 and AA4 represented the other 
principle component.   
The first principle component (AA2 and AA5) explained 51.4% of the variance 
and had an Eigen value of 2.05, while the second principle component (AA1 and AA4) 
explained 31.15% of the total variance and had an Eigen value of 1.24.  Upon analyzing 
the wording of the items, it made further sense as to why these results were obtained.  
The first principle component seemed to capture the extent to which managers felt 
threatened by ambiguity while the second component was tapping into a manager’s 
preference for having odds to rely on.  The EFA was rerun once again by employing 
Varimax rotation and this confirmed the observation (Table 5-15 reports these results).  
Upon assessing the bivariate correlation between AA14 and AA25, the two factors 
showed little in common (Pearson’s r = 0.206, p = 0.007). 
In order to proceed, the determination was made to adopt the first principle 
component (AA2 and AA5) to represent a manager’s aversion to ambiguity.  This 
decision was ultimately based on the fact that the two items that represent this principle 
component actually measured a manager’s tendency to avoid having to deal with 
ambiguity.  This is how the construct was conceptualized in the study.  Nevertheless the 
second component was retained for further analysis to determine how it fit within a CFA 
and subsequently its impact on hypothesis testing. 
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Table 5-15 
 
In conclusion, the EFA and reliability analysis results ranged from reasonable to 
excellent.  All reported Cronbach’s alphas (except for ambiguity aversion) were above 
the 0.80 level, which meets the criteria set forth in prior literature for internal consistency 
reliability.  The factor loadings reported in each of the EFAs were also high.  Taken 
together, the results are strong enough to warrant moving towards building a full 
measurement model using CFA.  The ambiguity aversion measure is further refined in 
this stage. 
 
Scale Items Item-Total Correlation
Manager's Level of Ambiguity Aversion - dropped AA3 (Reversed)
(1) (2)
AA1 0.739 0.524 0.462
AA2 0.722 -0.553 0.506
AA4 0.691 0.596 0.413
AA5 0.716 -0.558 0.490
Manager's Level of Ambiguity Aversion - with Varimax Rotation*
(1) (2)
AA1 0.156 0.893
AA2 0.901 0.116
AA4 0.071 0.909
AA5 0.902 0.108
(1) (2)
Eigen Value 2.05 1.24
Variance Explained 51.44% 31.15%
Cronbach's Alpha
*Rotation converged          
in 3 iterations
Factor Loadings
0.683
RERUN OF EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
AMBIGUITY AVERSION
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5.4.2. CFA and Construct Validity 
The next step in assessing measurement quality was to run confirmatory factor 
analysis.  As recommended by Churchill (1979) and Gerbing and Anderson (1988), a 
crucial step in assessing measurement quality is to determine unidimensionality, 
convergent validity, and discriminant validity.  Unidimensionality is defined as “the 
existence of a single trait or construct underlying a set of measures,” (Gerbing and 
Anderson 1988, p. 186).  Churchill (1979, p.70) suggests that “evidence of the 
convergent validity of a measure is provided by the extent to which it correlates highly 
with other methods designed to measure the same construct.”  Discriminant validity is 
defined as “the extent to which the measure is indeed novel and not simply a reflection of 
some other variable,” (Churchill 1979, p.70).  In this dissertation, all CFA models were 
run in LISREL 8.80 (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996).   
As per the recommendation of multiple scholars, there are commonly accepted 
approached to tests for convergent validity and discriminant validity (cf. Hair, Black, 
Babin, and Anderson 2010; Fornell and Larcker 1981).  The assessment of convergent 
validity is performed via a number of steps.  First, all factor loadings should be above 0.5 
and be statistically significant.  Second, average variance extracted (AVE) should be 
greater than 0.5 for each variable.  Following this, one should examine composite 
reliability (CR) and ensure that it is 0.7 or greater for each variable.  Finally, CR should 
be greater than AVE to confirm convergent validity.   
There are a number of ways to assess discriminant validity.  In this dissertation, 
discriminant validity is determined by comparing AVE of any two constructs to the 
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squared multiple correlations between the two constructs.  As suggested by Fornell and 
Larcker (1981), evidence of discriminant validity is obtained if the AVE for each factor is 
greater than the squared multiple correlation between those factors.  One could also check 
to ensure that there aren’t any significant cross-loadings, and/or also perform a χ2 
difference test between a two-factor model where the correlation between the factors is 
freely estimated and one where the correlation is constrained.   
A sequence of CFAs was used to assess the quality of the measurement model.  
First a CFA model with just two factors was run.  Then sequentially additional factors 
were added one at a time.  As each factor was added, the fit statistics for the CFA model 
was assessed along with factor loadings before adding the next factor to the model.  
Ultimately, all seven factors of interest were included in the CFA and a reasonable 
measurement model was obtained.  Below I discuss these steps in more detail.   
The first two-factor CFA model included perceived competence (PCOMP) and 
fear of negative evaluation (FNE).  Based on the EFAs that were run earlier, all 5-items 
for PCOMP and the 4-items for FNE were included.  The model exhibited reasonable fit 
statistics with all indicators showing standardized loadings greater than 0.73 that were 
significant.  Examining the modification indices suggested that model fit could be 
improved by allowing some of the error terms to correlate, however this is not 
theoretically justifiable.  Therefore we proceeded with adding the next factor to the CFA. 
Innovation Culture (ICL) was the next factor added to the model.  Once again all 
factor loadings were above 0.71 and remained significant.  Model fit statistics also 
improved marginally.  Next I added capacity to innovate to the model.  Again results 
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were good enough to continue building the measurement model.  The next factor added 
was decision-making comprehensiveness (DMC).  Certain issues emerged with the CFA 
at this stage.  The first indicator for DMC exhibited a comparatively low standardized 
factor loading of 0.60.  However model fit statistics showed some improvement 
compared to the previous CFA without the DMC factor.  To ensure that there weren’t any 
significant underlying problems before proceeding, I also checked the results of the EFA 
and item-to-total correlations from the previous sub-section for the DMC factor.  The first 
indicator showed good item-to-total correlation in the previous stages of analysis.  Based 
on this, I continued with the building of the measurement model.   
Next I added the AA factor to the model.  Recall that the EFA suggested major 
problem with the reverse coded 3rd item of AA. This item was subsequently dropped. 
Therefore in the CFA model, only four items belonging to the AA factor were included 
(AA1, AA2, AA4 and AA5).  I also achieved a two-factor solution in the EFA which 
suggested that  AA1 and AA4 held together while AA2 and AA5 formed the other factor.  
These issues required that I carefully run a series of CFAs to understand exactly how to 
proceed with the ambiguity aversion construct.   
First I added the AA factor with all 4 indicators.  This CFA model exhibited a 
number of critical issues.  Primarily, the overall model fit statistics were extremely poor 
(χ2 = 650.33, p = 0.00, df 260; GFI = 0.77; AGFI = 0.71; NFI = 0.89; NNFI = 0.92; CFI = 
0.93;  RMSEA = 0.094).  As expected the factor loadings were problematic with AA1 
and AA4 loading above 0.70 while AA2 and AA5 loading at 0.27 and 0.26 respectively 
on to the latent variable.  Additionally the error term for AA1 was non significant (t (260) 
= 1.45, p = 0.14).  It is clear that the measure need to be refined.   
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Looking back at the results of the EFA that was run earlier on the ambiguity 
aversion measure; while a two component solution was extracted, one component 
explained more than 50% of the total variance.  This component comprised of AA2 and 
AA5.  The second component which contained the other two AA items explained only 
31% of the variance.  Therefore I decided to rerun the CFA using only two indicators for 
the ambiguity aversion measure, AA2 and AA5.  The ensuing results were noticeably 
better.  The standardized loadings were significant and above 0.78.  Model fit as 
examined via the fit indices were also better.  Nevertheless, I also ran the CFA with AA1 
and AA4 as the only indicators for ambiguity aversion.  This model still had issues, for 
example the error term for AA4 was not significant (t (215) = 1.43, p = 0.15).  As a 
result, the decision was made to proceed with AA2 and AA5 for now as the primary 
indicators for ambiguity aversion. 
The final step in building measurement model was to include the dependent 
variable.  Therefore the subjective front-end of innovation performance factor was added 
to the CFA.  All five indicators were added.  The resulting model showed good fit 
statistics (χ2 = 680.59, p = 0.00, df 329; GFI = 0.78; AGFI = 0.73; NFI = 0.93; NNFI = 
0.95; CFI = 0.96;  RMSEA = 0.07; SRMR = 0.058).  All factor loadings were above 0.71 
(except for DMC1 on DMC which as mentioned previously had a low standardized 
loading of 0.61) and significant at p = 0.01, Table 5-16 below provides a thorough 
overview of the results from the final CFA model. 
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Table 5-16 
  
Construct
Standardized 
Loading t-value*
Composite 
Reliability (CR)
Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE)
Perceived Competence (PCOMP) 0.943 0.768
PCOMP1 0.87 14.19
PCOMP2 0.93 15.89
PCOMP3 0.86 13.93
PCOMP4 0.87 14.33
PCOMP5 0.86 13.83
Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE) 0.923 0.753
FNE1 0.85 13.76
FNE2 0.93 15.70
FNE3 0.94 16.01
FNE4 0.74 11.18
Ambiguity Aversion (AA) 0.782 0.643
AA2 0.80 9.14
AA5 0.80 9.15
Innovation Culture (ICL) 0.897 0.688
ICL1 0.77 11.74
ICL2 0.74 11.12
ICL3 0.90 14.97
ICL4 0.89 14.63
Capacity to Innovate (CAPI) 0.886 0.660
CAPI1 0.79 12.00
CAPI2 0.80 12.32
CAPI3 0.87 14.07
CAPI4 0.79 12.05
Decision-Making Comprehensiveness (DMC) 0.800 0.502
DMC1 0.61 8.16
DMC2 0.71 9.90
DMC3 0.74 10.34
DMC4 0.76 10.78
Front-End Performance (FPS) 0.927 0.713
FPS1 0.79 12.13
FPS2 0.85 13.53
FPS3 0.83 13.17
FPS4 0.90 15.10
FPS5 0.86 13.83
FULL MEASUREMENT MODEL (WITH FPS)
* all values significant at .01
Model Fit: χ2 = 680.59; df = 329; p = 0.00; GFI = 0.78; NFI = 0.93; CFI = 0.96; RMSEA = 0.079; SRMR = 0.058
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Once the final measurement model was obtained, I calculated composite 
reliability (CR) and AVE for each of the variables.  As mentioned earlier, CR and AVE 
aids us in determining if we have convergent and discriminant validity.  CR also provides 
support for the reliability of the measures.  All the calculated CRs are above 0.78 which 
are high enough according to the recommended standards put forward by Fornell and 
Larcker (1981).  AVE captures the extent of variance to measurement error in the scale.  
The AVE that was calculated for each factor is above 0.50 which meets the minimum 
acceptable standards put forth in the literature.  Table 5-16 shows CR and AVE for each 
factor along with the results of the CFA. 
Based on the criteria established earlier, the measurement model exhibits good 
convergent validity.  All factor loadings are high and significant.  For each factor CR is 
above 0.7 and AVE is above 0.5.  Finally, CR is greater than AVE for each factor.  Based 
on these results we can claim our measures have convergent validity. 
The discriminant validity of a measure is examined with respect to any other scale 
in the model.  Keep in mind that all calculated AVEs are above 0.50, which is good for 
discriminant validity to begin with.  However discriminant validity was further examined 
by comparing AVE and squared multiple correlations for pairs of constructs. As 
mentioned earlier, if AVE is larger than the squared multiple correlations then we have 
evidence of discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). A pairwise analysis of the 
measures shows that in all cases the AVE exceeded the square multiple correlations.   
An additional test for discriminant validity is to perform a chi-square difference 
test between an iterative series of two-factor and one-factor models.  Discriminant 
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validity is supported if the two-factor model is better than the corresponding one-factor 
model.  This was the case when pairs of scales were put to this test thus providing further 
support for discriminant validity.  Finally, based on the recommendations of Anderson 
and Gerbing (1988) and Bagozzi, Yi, and Phillips (1991), correlations lower the 1.0 test 
was performed between pairs of constructs.  This is performed by comparing two two-
factor models in LISREL; one model in which the correlation between latent variables is 
set to 1, and another in which the correlation is freely estimated.  Since all correlations 
between pairs of constructs was less than 1, we find additional support for discriminant 
validity.  Table 5-17 below outlines all the results of the discriminate tests that were 
performed. 
Table 5-17 
 
 
 
Construct Pairs AVE SMC χ2 p value χ2 p value
0.768
0.753
0.502
0.643
0.660
0.713
0.502
0.688
Decision-Making Comprehensiveness (DMC)
0.028 77.8(1) 0.000
0.562 187.24(1) 0.000
DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY ASSESSMENT
AVE > SMC rxy < 1 test 2F vs. 1F test
Perceived Competence (PCOMP)
0.025 536.46(1) 0.000 536.46(1) 0.000
Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE)
0.000237.83(1)
0.000
Innovation Culture (ICL)
Ambiguity Aversion (AA)
Capacity to Innovate (CAPI)
187.24(1) 0.000
Decision-Making Comprehensiveness (DMC)
0.280 157.71(1) 0.000 157.71(1)
Front-End Performance (FPS)
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5.4.3. Dependent Variable  
An important concern at this stage of the data analysis concerns the dependent 
variable.  Prior to hypothesis testing, I had to choose between one of two scales employed 
to measure front-end of innovation performance.  As discussed in Chapter IV, both scales 
were newly developed for the current study.  The first was a subjective type of 
measurement based on the project manager’s assessment of overall front-end results.  We 
have referred to this scale as the subjective version (FPS).  All the results presented 
hereto have included the FPS scale.  The results of the EFA and consequent CFA suggest 
that we have a good measure of front-end performance in the FPS scale. 
    The second scale employed to measure front-end of innovation performance 
was based on a manager’s evaluation of various activities (attributes) related to the front-
end of innovation.  This included subjective assessments of the sharpness of product 
definitions that emerged from the front-end, the percentage of ideas from the front-end 
that get funded etc.  Due to the focus on various activities in the front-end of innovation, 
this scale is referred to as the attribute version (FPA).  So far, the results of an EFA 
suggested that the FPA scale is a viable alternative to the FPS scale in terms of scale 
quality and could be used in subsequent analysis if necessary. 
In order to further determine the measurement quality of the FPA scale, I built a 
measurement model including the 5-item FPA scale and performed a CFA.  The 
procedures employed were exactly the same as with the CFA model that was presented in 
Table 5-16.  The only difference, instead of entering the FPS scale as the last variable, I 
included FPA.  Therefore just as with the previous CFA model, FPA was included once a 
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series of CFAs were conducted in building the measurement model via the sequential 
addition of other key variables in the study.   
The initial results were problematic.  Item 4 (FPA4) of the FPA scale had a low 
loading.  The standardized coefficient for the FPA4 was below 0.50.  As a result of this, 
the item was dropped and the CFA was rerun.  Dropping the item with the low loading 
resulted in a much improved measurement model.  The fit statistics were acceptable (χ2 = 
618.33, p = 0.00, df = 303; GFI = 0.79; AGFI = 0.74; NFI = 0.92; NNFI = 0.95; CFI = 
0.96; RMSEA = 0.07; SRMR = 0.057).  The four remaining items belonging to FPA all 
had standardized loadings of 0.78 and above.  Table 5-18 on the next page provides the 
full results of the measurement model that includes the FPA measure 
I also calculated AVE for the FPA scale and this was 0.715, well above the 0.50 
threshold.  Construct reliability for FPA was calculated to be 0.90 which is also well 
above acceptable levels.  Based on the criteria explained earlier, the FPA measure 
exhibits good convergent validity.  Discriminant validity was also examined.  Once again 
I employed the three separate techniques employed earlier.  All the analysis implied that 
the FPA scale exhibited good discriminant validity (see Table 5-19).   
Table 5-19 
 
Construct Pairs AVE SMC χ2 p value χ2 p value
0.660
0.715
0.000
Front-End Performance (FPA)
DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY ASSESSMENT FOR FPA
AVE > SMC rxy < 1 test 2F vs. 1F test
Capacity to Innovate (CAPI)
0.435 276.15(1) 0.000 276.15(1)
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Table 5-18 
 
Construct
Standardized 
Loading t-value*
Composite 
Reliability (CR)
Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE)
Perceived Competence (PCOMP) 0.943 0.768
PCOMP1 0.87 14.17
PCOMP2 0.93 15.91
PCOMP3 0.86 13.90
PCOMP4 0.87 14.32
PCOMP5 0.86 13.88
Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE) 0.923 0.751
FNE1 0.85 13.77
FNE2 0.92 15.69
FNE3 0.94 16.00
FNE4 0.74 11.19
Ambiguity Aversion (AA) 0.785 0.646
AA2 0.75 8.15
AA5 0.85 8.84
Innovation Culture (ICL) 0.896 0.685
ICL1 0.77 11.69
ICL2 0.74 11.01
ICL3 0.90 14.96
ICL4 0.90 14.76
Capacity to Innovate (CAPI) 0.886 0.662
CAPI1 0.77 11.70
CAPI2 0.80 12.21
CAPI3 0.89 14.41
CAPI4 0.79 12.00
Decision-Making Comprehensiveness (DMC) 0.800 0.502
DMC1 0.60 7.91
DMC2 0.70 9.67
DMC3 0.74 10.46
DMC4 0.78 11.23
Front-End Performance (FPA) 0.909 0.715
FPA1 0.87 13.95
FPA2 0.83 13.06
FPA3 0.78 11.91
FPA5 0.90 14.79
FULL MEASUREMENT MODEL (WITH FPA)
* all values significant at .01
Model Fit: χ2 = 618.33; df = 303; p = 0.00; GFI = 0.77; NFI = 0.92; CFI = 0.96; RMSEA = 0.078; SRMR = 0.057
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In terms of the measurement model and fit statistics for the CFAs for FPS and 
FPA (see Tables 5-16 and 5-18), there is hardly any difference that would warrant the 
selection of one measure over the other.   Both exhibit almost identical values in terms of 
measurement.   
The next step in assessing the dependent measures involved correlating them with 
other performance measures that were included in the study.  As suggested in both 
Chapters II and III, innovation being a sequential process, it is certain that success at the 
front end would correlate with success during later stages of innovation.  Therefore, it is 
imperative to examine both newly created measures (FPS and FPA) against other latter 
stage performance measures.  A number of established multi-item scales were used to 
measure success/performance in the latter stages of innovation.  This included two 3-item 
scales that tapped into subjective evaluations of overall NPD success with regards to the 
firm’s goals and overall NPD success with regards to the firm’s goal but relative to its 
major competitors.  In addition, two 2-item scales that evaluated the respondent’s 
assessment of (i) the degree to which NPD (front-end of innovation) creates future 
opportunities and (ii) overall success of NPD (front-end of innovation) in management’s 
opinion was also included.   
Table 5-20 provides a correlation matrix of FPS and FPA respective to the other 
measures.  The correlation with other performance measures is very similar between FPS 
and FPA.  However, a closer look at the numbers reveals that FPS exhibits slightly higher 
correlations.  Therefore, at this juncture, the dissertation adopts the FPS measure as the 
dependent variable for hypothesis testing.  Nevertheless, a section on the results obtained 
using FPA as the dependent measure is provided later. 
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5.4.4. Potential Measurement Issues 
A concern with the measurement techniques used in the current study is common 
method variance.  Common method variance arises from the use of perceptual measures, 
common raters, item context effects etc. (Podsakoff et al. 2003).  The current study is 
comprised primarily of such measures.  There have been a number of recommendations 
that have been put forth in order to reduce the potential impact of common method 
variance.  A commonly followed strategy is to measure the dependent variable following 
the measurement of other variables of interest (Salancik and Pfeffer 1977).  The items in 
the current study were organized with this recommendation in mind.  The dependent 
variable FPS is measured after other variables like FNE, PCOMP, AA, ICL, CAPI, and 
DMC.   
In order to test the extent to which the data has been corrupted due to common 
method variance, an empirical test can be conducted.  This test involves subjecting all the 
items related to the key variables in the model to a factor analysis.  If the results of the 
factor analysis suggest a significantly lower number of factors then the theoretical 
framework suggests, then this may suggest a common method variance problem (Harman 
1967; Podsakoff and Organ 1986).  An exploratory factor analysis was run which 
included all 28 items that reflected the 7 latent variables.  The results of the EFA showed 
a five-factor solution that explained 73.08% of the total variance.  When an additional 
sixth factor with an Eigen value of 0.988 was included, the total variance explained was 
76.6%.  While the theoretical framework suggests there should be 7 factors, the 
exploratory factor solution obtained 5/6 factors, which is not significantly lower than 
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what is theorized.  Therefore we have empirical evidence that suggests that we do not 
have a common method variance problem. 
5.4.5. Summated Scale Descriptives 
Based on the results obtained in the previous stages of analysis, the items for each 
variable were finalized.  Summated scales for each construct were then constructed.  
Since this dissertation employs only reflective measures, the procedure was 
straightforward.  For each construct, the selected items were summated and the score was 
then divided by the number of items.  In other words, for each construct I averaged the 
scores of the underlying items to arrive at the summated scale.  All hypothesis testing 
employed the use of these summated scales.   
Table 5-21 below provides the correlation matrix for the variables employed in 
hypothesis testing.  The diagonal represents Cronbach’s alpha that was obtained during 
the EFA stage.  A review of the correlations shows that a majority of the variables 
correlate with others at significant levels.  Exceptions to this are the FNE and AA 
constructs.  Both constructs show a limited degree of correlation with other study 
variables as shown by the low and non-significant correlation values.  Nevertheless, the 
correlation matrix does not include any unexpected values either in terms of magnitude or 
polarity. 
Finally, the Table also includes all means and standard deviations for each of the 
seven study variables.  There are no formative variables employed in hypothesis testing.   
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5.5. Hypothesis Testing 
The following section presents and discusses the results of the hypothesis testing 
that was employed in the study.  Hypothesis testing was performed by fitting 
simultaneous multiple regression equations in a hierarchical manner.  Appendix B 
outlines each of the relevant regression equations.  These equations were constructed 
based on the conceptual model that was presented earlier.  The only endogenous variable 
in the study is FPS, while all other remaining variables are exogenous.  All hypothesis 
testing was performed in SAS 9.3 using the PROC SYSLIN procedure.  This allows us to 
employ three stage least squares (3SLS) estimation which allows simultaneous estimation 
of equations.   
This section also outlines various mediation tests that were performed to further 
analyze the relationships posited by the conceptual model.  I also present a detailed 
discussion on the role of control variables in the study and accordingly present alternative 
models that help explain the data.  Finally, I review the testing of basic regression 
assumptions as outlined by Hair et al. (2010).   
5.5.1. Results of Initial Hypothesis Testing 
Since the conceptual model in the current study is not overly complicated, 
hypothesis testing was done in two stages.  First I ran a main effects model and then I 
added the interaction effects and ran a second model that then included all the 
relationships of interest.  However, at a latter stage I will offer alternative models that 
could potentially have import.   
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The main effects model included all the direct effects suggested by the conceptual 
model.  In other words, the interaction terms that represent the suggested moderation 
were not included.   As such, four equations were specified in the PROC SYSLIN 
procedure.  The first equation regressed the dependent variable FPS on to CAPI and 
DMC.  The second equation regressed CAPI with ICL as the predictor, while the third 
equation regressed DMC on to AA.  The final equation modeled the effect of FNE and 
PCOMP on AA.  As stated previously, since we are employing 3SLS, all estimations are 
performed simultaneously.   
Table 5-22 
 
Equation β
Std. 
Coefficient t-value p value Hypothesis
Dependent Variable: FPS
Intercept 0.786 0.0 2.44 0.015
DMC 0.205 0.183 3.13 0.002 H6
CAPI 0.605 0.693 11.77 <.0001 H8
Dependent Variable: CAPI
Intercept 1.493 0.0 6.2 <.0001
ICL 0.707 0.721 14.95 <.0001 H7
Dependent Variable: DMC
Intercept 5.555 0.0 33.66 <.0001
AA -0.119 -0.192 -2.57 0.011 H5
Dependent Variable: AA
Intercept 3.187 0.0 5.71 <.0001
PCOMP -0.179 -0.143 -2.04 0.043 H2
FNE 0.399 0.381 5.42 <.0001 H1
3SLS RESULTS FOR MAIN EFFECTS MODEL
System Weighted MSE = 0.91
Degrees of Freedom = 666
System Weighted R-Square = 0.476
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As shown in Table 5-22 above, the results of the main effects model are 
promising.  All the hypothesized main effects were significant and in the specified 
direction.  Both DMC and CAPI had a strong and significant impact on FPS.  ICL was a 
significant predictor of CAPI.  Earlier we had hypothesized a significant negative effect 
of ambiguity aversion on decision-making comprehensiveness, the main effects model 
supported this.  Finally, both PCOMP and FNE had a significant effect on AA in the 
direction hypothesized.   
Nonetheless, while the results from this model support all the direct effect 
hypotheses that were proposed, a more robust examination would be to include the 
proposed interactions as well. This was done in the second model and the subsequent 
results are interesting. 
Before adding the interaction terms to build the full model, an analysis was 
performed to assess the degree of multi-collinearity.  Multi-collinearity is a concern when 
assessing moderation in regression using cross-product terms.  Examining the correlation 
between a cross-product term and the variables used to make that cross product term can 
be used to easily identify multi-collinearity.  Cross-product terms were created by 
multiplying the scores for PCOMP and ICL (PXI), and FNE and ICL (FXI).  As 
expected, the correlations between the cross-product term (PXI and FXI) and underlying 
variables (PCOMP and ICL; FNE and ICL respectively) were rather high.  For example 
PXI was correlated with PCOMP at .775 (p = .000) and ICL at .864 (p = .000).  This 
suggested that multi-collinearity was indeed a problem.   
156	  
	  
This can be remedied by mean-centering the variables before creating the cross-
product terms.  As such, PCOMP, FNE, and ICL were mean-centered by subtracting the 
grand mean from each score.  These mean centered scores were then used to create the 
new cross-product terms PXIc and FXIc.  Once again correlations between PXIc (FXIc) 
and PCOMP (FNE) and ICL were examined.  The correlations were much lower as a 
result of the mean-centering procedure employed, suggesting that multi-collinearity was 
no longer an issue (for comparison: PXIc was correlated to PCOMP at -.217, p = .000 
and ICL at .042, p = .000).  It should be noted that Echambadi and Hess (2007) show that 
a mean-centering approach is not always advantageous in alleviating collinearity issues in 
moderated multiple regression.  However, we adopted the mean-centered variables due to 
the reported reduction in the correlations between the variables. 
Table 5-23 below outlines the results from subjecting the full model to 3SLS 
estimation.  This model differs from the previous run in that the interaction terms are now 
included in the final equation.  This full model gives us the required information to make 
a decision in regards to the eight hypotheses that were outlined in the previous chapter.  I 
discuss whether or not they receive support starting with H1. 
Hypothesis 1 and 2.  The first two hypotheses dealt with the main effect of FNE 
and PCOMP on ambiguity aversion.  Specifically, H1 suggested that FNE would have a 
positive effect on AA, while H2 proposed that PCOMP would have a significant negative 
effect on AA.  The results provide support for H1.  FNE is a significant predictor of 
ambiguity aversion such that when a manger experiences high fear of negative 
evaluation, her/his aversion to ambiguity is higher (β = 0.392, p < 0.0001).  However, I 
do not find support for H2.  The results show a non-significant effect of perceived 
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competence on ambiguity aversion (β = -0.092, p = 0.344).  Nevertheless, the direction of 
the relationship is as conceptualized, suggesting that a manager with higher perceived 
competence may be utilizing that advantage to mitigate his aversion to ambiguity rather 
than enhancing it.  This conclusion is further strengthened based on the results provided 
by the main effects model where the relationship is both negative and significant.   
Table 5-23 
 
Hypothesis 3 and 4.  The moderation hypotheses suggested that innovation culture 
would moderate the relationship between PCOMP and AA, and between FNE and AA.  
Equation β
Std. 
Coefficient t-value p value Hypothesis
Dependent Variable: FPS
Intercept 0.815 0.0 2.51 0.012
DMC 0.206 0.184 3.13 0.002 H6
CAPI 0.598 0.684 11.52 <.0001 H8
Dependent Variable: CAPI
Intercept 1.507 0.0 6.3 <.0001
ICL 0.704 0.718 14.87 <.0001 H7
Dependent Variable: DMC
Intercept 5.512 0.0 33.36 <.0001
AA -0.106 -0.171 -2.28 0.023 H5
Dependent Variable: AA
Intercept 3.159 0.0 29.10 <.0001
PCOMP -0.092 -0.074 -0.95 0.344 H2
FNE 0.392 0.375 5.23 <.0001 H1
ICL -0.090 -0.073 -0.95 0.342
PCOMP x ICL (PXIc) 0.133 0.139 1.92 0.056 H4
FNE x ICL (FXIc) 0.052 0.056 0.77 0.440 H3
Degrees of Freedom = 663
System Weighted R-Square = 0.472
System Weighted MSE = 0.992
3SLS RESULTS FOR FULL MODEL
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Hypothesis 3 states “when innovation culture is weak, there is no clear relationship 
between fear of negative evaluation and ambiguity aversion (although ambiguity aversion 
should be high), on the other hand when innovation culture is strong, there is strong 
positive relationship between fear of negative evaluation and ambiguity aversion.”  The 
results outlined in Table 5-23 provide no support for H3.  Assessing the coefficients 
associated with the interaction term between FNE and ICL (FXIc) helps determine if we 
have support for H3.  The effect of FXIc on ambiguity aversion is not significant (β = 
0.052, p = 0.440).   
Hypothesis 4 states, “when innovation culture is weak, there is no clear 
relationship between sense of competence and ambiguity aversion (although ambiguity 
aversion should be high). On the other hand when innovation culture is strong, there is a 
strong negative relationship between sense of competence and ambiguity aversion.”  The 
results provide partial support for H4.  Looking at the coefficients reported in Table 5-23, 
the interaction term between perceived competence and innovation culture (PXIc) has a 
marginally significant effect on ambiguity aversion (β = 0.133, p = 0.056).  I refer to this 
as being a marginally significant effect because p value is barely above 0.05.  Some 
researchers may choose to consider this result marginally significant.  However, as will 
be discussed later, the inclusion of covariates in the model has serves to drastically 
improve this relationship. 
Hypothesis 5.  In the conceptual model, I suggested that ambiguity aversion has a 
negative effect on front-end of innovation performance due to the suppression effect of 
decision-making comprehensiveness.  As such, H5 suggested a negative effect of AA on 
DMC such that when ambiguity aversion is high it serves to reduce decision-making 
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comprehensiveness.  The results outlined in Table 5-23 provide support for this 
hypothesis.  Ambiguity aversion has a significant negative effect on DMC (β = -0.106, p 
= 0.023).  This might suggest that project teams do pick up on whether or not their 
project leaders are averse to ambiguity.  Specifically supporting the notion that decision-
making comprehensiveness reduces if a project manger is averse to ambiguity.  Thus 
implying that concepts or ideas with merit, but associated with ambiguous probabilities, 
might be discarded since teams have little confidence that their managers will give such 
concepts and ideas a fair chance.   
Hypothesis 7.  The conceptual model suggests a previously widely tested and 
supported relationship between innovation culture and a firm’s capacity to innovate.  
Specifically, H7 suggests that ICL has a positive effect on CAPI.  The results, in keeping 
with prior research, provide support for H7.  Innovation culture has a positive and 
significant effect on capacity to innovate (β = 0.704, p < 0.0001). 
Hypothesis 6 and 8.  Front-end of innovation performance is the dependent 
variable in the current study as measured via the FPS scale.  The conceptual model 
outlines two separate predictors of FPS, decision-making comprehensiveness and 
capacity to innovate.  Hypothesis 6 proposes a positive relationship between DMC and 
FPS.  The results reported in Table 5-23 provide support for this Hypothesis.  Decision-
making comprehensiveness has a positive significant impact on front-end of innovation 
performance (β = 0.206, p = 0.002). 
Extant literature has shown that capacity to innovate has a positive effect on firm 
performance.  However, no previous study has examined whether this relationship would 
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hold with performance at the front-end of innovation.  Hypothesis 8 proposes a positive 
relationship between capacity to innovate and front-end of innovation performance.  The 
data and subsequent analysis provide strong support for this hypothesis.  The results 
reported in Table 5-23 shows that CAPI has a significant positive effect on FPS (β = 
0.598, p < 0.0001).  Based on the reported parameter coefficients obtained via 
hierarchical regression using 3SLS, we have two significant predictors of FPS.   
5.5.2. Control Variables and Alternative Models 
While the results of the full model are so far promising, there remains the 
possibility that the reported relationships might vary based on the inclusion of control 
variables in the 3SLS estimation model.  As pointed out in Chapter IV, a number of 
control variables were included in the study design.  This was done to control for 
unplanned extraneous effects that could potentially have an impact on hypothesis testing.  
Apart from firm characteristic measures and items intended to tap managerial experience 
and competence, the other key control variables included those used to measure 
environmental factors.  This included scales for market turbulence, technological 
turbulence and environmental uncertainty.  The justification for the inclusion of these 
measures is provided in the previous chapter.  To determine if the control variables had 
any impact on the study, I first examined the correlations between study variables and 
control variables.  Table 5-24 below shows these correlations.   
Generally, a significant correlation between a study variable and a control 
variable suggests that it might have to be controlled for in any regression equation that 
includes the correlated study variable.   
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A couple of things stand out when looking at Table 5-24.  First, it is apparent that 
the environmental conditions measures are significantly correlated with the dependent 
variable (both FPS and FPA).  These environmental factors include market turbulence, 
technological turbulence, and environmental uncertainty.  These well-established scales 
were purposely included in the study, as previous studies have frequently found that they 
play an explanatory role in models that examine firm performance, innovation, and other 
general models in marketing strategy (e.g. Marketing Orientation etc.).  Understandably, 
the same three scales also are significantly correlated with CAPI, ICL, and DMC.  
Therefore any alternative models will have to examine the role of these three variables. 
The next set of control variables that warrant further examination include 
measures related to a manager’s experience.  Both in terms of overall experience and 
experience specifically related to innovation activities.  These two measures are 
significantly correlated with PCOMP, FNE, and AA.  This is a logical finding.  As 
managers become more experienced, they are likely to perceive more competence in their 
decision-making abilities compared to an individual with limited years of experience.  
Similarly, managers might experience less fear of negative evaluation and aversion to 
ambiguity as they gain more experience.  Including these two measures as covariates may 
have an impact on the results of the prior hypothesis testing. 
To further examine these relationships (including others that were flagged 
significant) I included these control variables in relevant regression equations both 
together and separately.  Several models were examined, some that treated the control 
variables as covariates and others that examined them as moderators.  I also examined the 
impact of entering the control variables in various sequences.  At all stages I examined 
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the impact on R-square and whether there was a significant increase in R-square.  This 
was done to determine if the new model explained the data better than previous models. 
This approach is a useful method of examining the veracity of the regression model 
because R-square is essentially the percent of variance in the dependent variable that is 
explained by the all the independent variables in the model.   
Ultimately, after running a series of hierarchical regression models using 3SLS 
estimation, I arrived at one model that had a positive impact on the previous full model 
outlined in the initial hypothesis testing section.  The inclusion of ‘years of innovation 
experience (during one’s whole career)’ measure (YT3) as a covariate on ambiguity 
aversion served to have a positive impact on H4.  Hypothesis 4 proposed an interaction 
effect between ICL and PCOMP on ambiguity aversion.  The earlier results were deemed 
marginally significant since the p value was slightly above 0.05.  As can be seen from 
Table 5-25, adding the significant YT3 control variable serves to strengthen the 
significance of the PXIc interaction term (p = 0.028).  Inclusion of this control variable 
also had a small positive impact on system weighted R-square.  I tested to see if the 
control variable moderated the relationship between FNE and AA, and PCOMP and AA 
rather than having a direct effect on AA.  The results clearly showed no moderation effect 
of YT3 on the main effect of FNE and PCOMP on AA.  As such, YT3 was included in 
the model as a direct covariate on AA. 
As for other covariates, none served to have a significant impact that warranted 
their ultimate inclusion in the final model.  For example, while market turbulence, 
technological turbulence, and environmental uncertainty show significant correlations 
with other variables, their inclusion in various combinations into regression models 
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yielded no change in the previous results of hypotheses testing.  Therefore, in an effort to 
retain a parsimonious model, these variables were not included.  So in summary, only one 
control variable was added to the full model discussed previously.   
Table 5-25 
 
Based on these results, the conceptual model can be presented with the 
appropriate path coefficients as well as demonstrating significant and non significant 
paths.  This is shown in Figure 5-1 below.  
Equation β
Std. 
Coefficient t-value p value Hypothesis
Dependent Variable: FPS
Intercept 0.816 0.0 2.52 0.012
DMC 0.206 0.183 3.12 0.002 H6
CAPI 0.598 0.685 11.52 <.0001 H8
Dependent Variable: CAPI
Intercept 1.507 0.0 6.26 <.0001
ICL 0.704 0.718 14.87 <.0001 H7
Dependent Variable: DMC
Intercept 5.511 0.0 33.35 <.0001
AA -0.105 -0.170 -2.27 0.024 H5
Dependent Variable: AA
Intercept 3.460 0.0 18.97 <.0001
PCOMP -0.025 -0.020 -0.25 0.804 H2
FNE 0.350 0.334 4.54 <.0001 H1
ICL -0.097 -0.079 -1.03 0.302
PCOMP x ICL (PXIc) 0.153 0.160 2.22 0.028 H4
FNE x ICL (FXIc) 0.051 0.055 0.77 0.442 H3
Covariate: YT3 -0.001 0.156 2.05 0.042
System Weighted MSE = 0.992
Degrees of Freedom = 662
System Weighted R-Square = 0.474
NOTE: The covariate YT3 refers to the number of years of innovation experience during whole career.
3SLS RESULTS FOR FULL MODEL WITH COVARIATES ADDED
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5.5.3. Moderation Tests and Simple Slopes 
Since we have two hypotheses that suggested moderation effects, it is often useful 
to examine the simple slopes to gain a better understanding of the relationships (Cohen 
and Cohen 1983).  As shown in Figure 5-2, the interaction of FNE and ICL on AA (H3) 
is not significant, while the interaction of  PCOMP and ICL on AA is significant.   
Figure 5-2 – Simple Slope Analysis of H3 
 
Figure 5-2 above shows the simple slope that graphically depicts the interaction of 
FNE and ICL on AA.  It suggests that the level of innovation culture has very limited 
bearing on the relationship between FNE and AA.  This unexpected result might be 
explained due to the strong main effect of fear of negative evaluation on ambiguity 
aversion.  Originally, the conceptualization suggested the degree of innovation culture, 
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especially when low would have no bearing on ambiguity aversion (see Figure 3-2, p. 
80).  Even with the inclusion of the additional covariate in the final model, the 
relationship between fear of negative evaluation and ambiguity aversion remains very 
strong, and this shows up in the simple slope diagram.   
Figure 5-3 – Simple Slope Analysis of H4 
 
Examining the simple slope diagrams also provides further insight into the 
relationship between the interaction of innovation culture and perceived competence on 
ambiguity aversion.  Figure 5-3 above graphically shows the simple slope for the 
respective interaction effect.  The diagram is quite different from that proposed in Figure 
3-3 in Chapter III.  The low innovation culture line shows a negative slope while the high 
innovation culture line suggests a positive relationship between PCOMP and AA.  Even 
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though the interaction is significant, the slopes suggest an almost opposite relationship 
from that hypothesized.   
A further effort to test for moderation was performed in SAS 9.3 using the 
PROCESS macro and the guidelines provided by Preacher and Hayes (2012).  This 
macro employs the use of either ordinary least squares or logistic regression to provide 
parameter estimates in path analytic frameworks that include various types of mediation 
and/or moderation.  This process also employs bootstrapping methods to provide 
estimates for indirect effects.   
According to the specified guidelines, I ran a Preacher and Hayes Model 7 (see 
Appendix D, p. 237) to test for the moderation effects suggested in H3 and H4.  Model 7 
tests the interaction of ICL on the relationship between FNE (PCOMP) and AA while 
also accounting for the mediation relationship of FNE (PCOMP) to AA to DMC.  
Appendix C provides further details on how PROCESS was used in this dissertation to 
test for moderation.  The results were somewhat mixed, the analysis using the Preacher 
and Hayes method found no support for the proposed moderation effect of ICL on the 
relationship between FNE and AA.  Surprisingly, it also did not find a significant 
moderation of ICL on the PCOMP to AA path.  Overall the results of the Preacher and 
Hayes test for moderation are somewhat contradictory to the results of the hierarchical 
regression analysis using 3SLS reported above. 
Based on the three moderation tests, all three soundly reject H3.  There is no 
interaction between ICL and FNE on ambiguity aversion.  However, in regards to H4, the 
results of the hierarchical regression provide support for the interaction term, the simple 
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slope analysis is opposite from what was proposed, and the Preacher and Hayes test for 
moderation provided no support for the moderation.  The results here clearly necessitate 
further examination. 
Table 5-26 
 
A summary of the results of the hypothesis testing is provided in Table 5-26 
below.  These results are based on the hierarchical regressions performed on the final 
model (including the covariates) using 3SLS estimation.  Overall I found support for H1, 
Hypothesis Statement Result
H1 When fear of negative evaluation is high, the project leader experiences a 
significantly higher level of ambiguity aversion compared to when fear of 
negative evaluation is low.
Supported
H2 A project leader’s perceived competence over the decision domain is 
significantly related to his/her level of ambiguity aversion, such that when 
perceived competence is high, ambiguity aversion is low and vice versa.
Supported in 
main effect 
model
H3 When innovation culture is weak, there is no clear relationship between 
fear of negative evaluation and ambiguity aversion (although ambiguity 
aversion should be high), on the other hand when innovation culture is 
strong, there is strong positive relationship between fear of negative 
evaluation and ambiguity aversion.
Not Supported
H4 When innovation culture is weak, there is no clear relationship between 
sense of competence and ambiguity aversion (although ambiguity aversion 
should be high. On the other hand when innovation culture is strong, there 
is a strong negative relationship between sense of competence and 
ambiguity aversion
Uncertain, but 
interaction term 
is significant
H5 The relationship between ambiguity aversion and decision making 
comprehensiveness is negative.
Supported
H6 The relationship between decision making comprehensiveness and front-
end of innovation performance is positive
Supported
H7 The relationship between Innovation Culture and Capacity to Innovate is 
positive
Supported
H8 The relationship between Capacity to Innovate and Front-End of 
Innovation Performance is positive
Supported
RESULTS OF HYPOTHESIS TESTING
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H2, H5, H6, H7, and H8.  Hypothesis 3 is rejected while the support for H4 is 
inconclusive. 
5.5.4. Mediation Tests 
The conceptual model proposed in this dissertation consists of a number of 
relationships that are mediated.  For example, the effect of ambiguity aversion on front-
end of innovation performance is mediated by decision-making comprehensiveness.  
There are three other instance where mediation is present, (a) ICL à CAPI à FPS, (b) 
PCOMP à AA à DMC, and (c) FNE à AA à DMC.  
Mediation was assessed using two approaches.  First all mediation tests were 
performed using the procedures outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986).  According to 
Baron and Kenny (1986), to test for mediation one needs to run three separate regression 
equations. This is done to determine (a) that the independent variable has an effect on the 
dependent variable, (b) to show that the independent variable has an effect on the 
mediator, (c) to determine the effect of the mediator on the dependent variable, and (d) to 
determine the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable while 
controlling for the mediator.  This is then followed by a Sobel test (to assess the 
significance of the indirect path of the independent variable on the dependent variable).  
Using the Baron and Kenny steps I found support for only one mediation path, that from 
ICL to FPS through CAPI.  None of the other three possible mediations were supported.   
The second approach for analyzing mediation is based on the recommendations of 
Zhao, Lynch, and Chen (2010) who recommend testing for mediation using 
bootstrapping methods proposed by Preacher and Hayes (2004).  This procedure involves 
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running either the INDIRECT macro (also known as the Preacher and Hayes script) or 
the PROCESS macro in either SPSS or SAS.  The bootstrapping method employs non-
parametric tests to provide 95% confidence intervals for the significance of the indirect 
path (ab) from the independent variable to the dependent variable through the mediator.  
If the 95% confidence intervals obtained from the bootstrap results do not include zero 
then we have evidence of mediation.  Zhao, Lynch, and Chen (2010) also provide a 
decision tree to further evaluate the relationship that is obtained based on the results.  The 
decision tree includes three types of mediation (complementary, competitive, and 
indirect-only) and two types of non mediation (direct-only and no-effect) to help classify 
the type or relationship (Zhao, Lynch, and Chen 2010). 
I executed and ran the INDIRECT computational macro in SPSS 21 for Mac to 
obtain the results of the mediation test based on the bootstrapping method.  The results 
support a complementary mediation for ICL à CAPI à FPS.  A no-effect, non 
mediation was the results for the test on the AA à DMC à FPS path.  The final two 
tests of the mediation of AA between PCOMP and DMC as well as FNE and DMC were 
classified as direct-only, non mediation based on the decision tree.  All mediation test 
results are reported in Table 5-27.   
There are a number of problematic takeaways based on the mediation tests. For 
example, the no-effect, non mediation suggested for the AA à DMC à FPS path is an 
issue.  On further examination, it is abundantly clear that ambiguity aversion was not 
having the intended effect on mediation as suggested in the conceptual model.  All 
mediation paths that included the AA variable were classified as non mediations.   
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Due to the problems associated with ambiguity aversion, I decided to test the 
relevant mediation paths without AA in the model.  The results were startling.  Omitting 
AA from the model resulted in strong support for mediation between FNE (and PCOMP) 
to FPS through DMC.  These results are also reported in Table 5-27.  This outcome 
required that I suggest revisions to the conceptual model based on the mediation analysis. 
5.5.5. Suggested Revisions to the Model 
It is clear from the mediation tests that ambiguity aversion plays a very limited, if 
not irrelevant role, in the conceptual model.  Looking back at the correlations amongst 
study variables in Table 5-21 (p. 152), the AA variable is not significantly correlated with 
any other key variable in the study.  At this point it is clear that the ambiguity aversion is 
not a good fit in the model.  There existed other cues on the issues regarding ambiguity 
aversion.  For example, the simple slopes for the proposed interactions discussed 
previously were puzzling due to their unexpected slopes, and the Preacher and Hayes 
moderation tests were all non significant.  I also examined regressing DMC on not just 
AA, but also on PCOMP, FNE, ICL, PXIc and FXIc.  The subsequent results clearly 
indicate that AA is not a good predictor of DMC as the associated parameter was both 
non significant and negligible.  On the other hand, the newly added terms were all 
significantly related to DMC. 
Therefore, I decided to rerun all relevant analysis without ambiguity aversion in 
the model.  The expectation now was that, based on the data at hand, a better model could 
be offered.  A model that is not muddled due to the inclusion of the ambiguity aversion 
construct.  All the new analysis followed the exact same procedures used heretofore.  To 
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reiterate, the only difference is the exclusion of ambiguity aversion, all other relationships 
remain the same.  The results of the hierarchical regression are provided in Table 5-28. 
Table 5-28 
 
Using 3SLS estimation, the regression parameter estimates for the revised model 
are much improved.  The R-square reported is 0.57, which is significantly higher 
compared to the (old) full model with covariates.  The parameter estimates are all 
significant and in the expected direction.  Interestingly, the relationship between PCOMP 
and DMC was moderated by innovation culture.  The same was the case in regards to the 
relationship between FNE and DMC.   
Equation β
Standardized 
Coefficient t-value p value
Dependent Variable: FPS
Intercept 0.365 0.0 1.12 0.265
DMC 0.333 0.297 5.00 <.0001
CAPI 0.557 0.638 10.67 <.0001
Dependent Variable: CAPI
Intercept 1.240 0.0 5.05 <.0001
ICL 0.758 0.773 15.66 <.0001
Dependent Variable: DMC
Intercept 5.136 0.0 83.96 <.0001
PCOMP 0.195 0.252 3.54 0.001
FNE -0.104 -0.161 -2.48 0.014
ICL 0.295 0.386 5.49 <.0001
PCOMP x ICL (PXIc) 0.101 0.170 2.60 0.010
FNE x ICL (FXIc) 0.116 0.202 3.06 0.003
3SLS RESULTS FOR REVISED MODEL
System Weighted MSE = 0.991
Degrees of Freedom = 496
System Weighted R-Square = 0.567
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I further examined the interaction both using simple slope analysis.  Figure 5-4 
shows a graphical representation of how the relationship between perceived competence 
and decision-making comprehensiveness is moderated by innovation culture. 
Figure 5-4 – Simple Slope Analysis of PXIc on DMC 
 
The slopes clearly show that while a low innovation culture has limited bearing 
on the relationship between PCOMP and DMC, when innovation culture is high, it serves 
to enhance the relationship between PCOMP and DMC in a positive manner.  In other 
words, when managers with high perceived competence are in a firm culture high on 
innovation, this serves to increase their decision-making comprehensiveness. 
Figure 5-5 below shows the slope analysis for the interaction of fear of negative 
evaluation and innovation culture on DMC.  Once again, the slopes concur with the 
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significant interaction term from the hierarchical regression.  The diagram suggests that a 
low innovation culture tends to accentuate the negative relationship between fear of 
negative evaluation and decision-making comprehensiveness.   
Figure 5-5 – Simple Slope Analysis of FXIc on DMC 
 
I further examined the moderations by subjecting them to Preacher and Hayes 
Model 1 test.  The results again found that both moderations were in fact significant.  
Therefore, based three different types of analysis, I found strong support for the 
moderations pointed out in the revised model. 
As previously discussed, I also examined the mediation relationships in the 
revised model.  The results suggest that the effect of FNE on FPS is mediated by DMC, 
same with PCOMP on FPS, and the effect of ICL on FPS is mediated by CAPI.  The 
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results of the mediation test are reported in Table 5-27 (p. 172).  Figure 5-6 shows the 
suggested revised model.  I provide a through discussion on this model in Chapter VI 
where I also examine why ambiguity aversion did not fit in well within the current 
framework. 
Figure 5-6 – Revised Model with Path Coefficients 
 
5.5.6. Tests of Regression Model Assumptions 
As discussed, this dissertation employs hierarchical regression using 3SLS 
estimation to test proposed hypotheses.  In general, this technique is fairly robust to 
violations of the basic assumption of regression.  Nevertheless, all the four major 
assumptions of regression were examined as recommended by Hair et al. (2010).  This 
β = .76 
p = .00   
β = .33 
p = .00   
β = .56 
p = .00   
β = .20 
p = .00 
   
β = -.10 
p = .01   
β = .12 
p = .00   
β = .10 
p = .01   
Note: Coefficients have been rounded to two decimal points 
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included testing for normality, linearity, independence, and heteroscedasticity.  I tested 
these assumptions against a series of multiple regression equations that represent the 
main effects proposed in the model. 
Normality can be judged by examining histograms with normal distributions, 
checking for degree of kurtosis and skewness, analyzing Q-Q plots, and looking at the 
Kolmogrov-Smirnov statistic.  An examination of the relevant histograms indicated that 
the normality assumption is met because I obtained normal looking plots.  Secondly, I 
made a probability plot and found the standardized residuals to fall along the line.  This 
again suggests normality.  Based on these assessments of the histograms and probability 
plots for each of the multiple regression that were run, it is clear that we can assume 
normality in the data. 
Linearity is the assumption that the model possesses the properties of both 
additivity and homogeneity.  Testing for linearity can be done using standardized or 
studentized residual plots. When using the plots, one needs to look for any consistent 
curvilinear pattern in the residuals.  If such a pattern is found then corrective action, like 
transforming the values, is warranted.  I examined standardized plots to get an accurate 
estimate of linearity, and based on the lack of pattern in the plots, the linearity 
assumption was met. 
Uncorrelated error requires the predicted value to not be related to any other 
prediction.  The Durbin-Watson D statistic was examined to check for uncorrelated errors 
(i.e. independence of the error terms).  An ideal range for the Durbin-Watson D Statistic 
is between 1.15 and 2.25.  After running the series of multiple regressions in SPSS, all 
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the Durbin-Watson D Statistics fall within the recommended range (they ranged between 
1.77 and 2.11).  One can also examine the standardized residual plots to look for patterns 
(an indicator of correlated errors).  Based on the Durbin-Watson D Statistic and an 
examination of the residual plots, we can safely assume that we have met the 
independence assumption. 
Unequal variances, or heteroscedasticity, is a common and serious problem in 
regression analysis.  Regression assumes that we do not have heteroscedasticity.  To test 
for heteroscedasticity, residual plots or simple statistical tests can be used. Residual plots 
with a consistent pattern are considered heteroscedastic.  An examination of the 
standardized residual plots showed no discernable patterns, therefore we can assume that 
we have not violated this assumption of regression by having heteroscedastic data.   
Additionally, multicollinearity was also examined.  One can easily detect 
collinearity issues if there are variance inflation factors that exceed the recommended 
threshold of 10.  All variance inflation factors obtained from the series of multiple 
regressions were below 2, suggesting that there is no concern in regards to 
multicollinearity.  Overall the diagnosis of the data suggests that there is little concern 
regarding any violations of the basic assumption of regression. 
5.6. Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided a detailed review of the various data analysis steps taken to 
posit the data to the conceptual model.  Initially all sample characteristics were examined, 
including firm and respondent characteristics.  This was succeeded by a thorough effort 
to build an acceptable measurement model.  This included running a number of EFAs and 
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CFAs to ensure that we have adequate measurement quality.  Once this was achieved, I 
proceed to hypothesis testing.  I utilized hierarchical regression using 3SLS estimation to 
arrive at parameter coefficients in order to determine if there was enough support for the 
proposed hypotheses.  I also performed detailed assessments of moderation and 
mediation.  Based on the results, I proposed a revised model as shown in Figure 5-6 (p. 
177).  The next chapter provides a detailed discussion of the results and their implications 
for theory and practice. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter is organized into five sections.  The first and second sections provide 
an overview of the dissertation and a discussion of the research findings respectively.  
This includes a detailed overview of the proposed revised model, and why ambiguity 
aversion did not work within the current framework. 
The third section provides an overview of the relevant implications of the current 
study.  In addition to pointing out various theoretical contributions, I also go over various 
suggestions for managers.  The next section discusses the limitations encountered in the 
dissertation.  This is mostly centered around research limitations and its impact on the 
takeaways of the study. 
The final section outlines various directions for future research.  In conducting the 
current study, it is clear that there are multiple avenues of further inquiry that are of both 
theoretical and practical significance.   
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6.2. Overview of the Dissertation 
The main goal of this dissertation was to examine the role of managerial aversion 
to ambiguity in innovation related decision-making.  In doing so, there was a concerted 
effort to investigate the impact of ambiguity aversion on front-end of innovation 
performance.  To be more specific, the dissertation outlined three specific research 
questions in Chapter I: 
4. What leads to a situation where a decision-maker exhibits ambiguity aversion? 
5. Does a decision-maker’s ambiguity aversion impact front-end innovation 
performance?  If so, 
6. Under what circumstances can the impact of ambiguity aversion on the front-end 
of innovation be managed? 
In order to address these pertinent questions, a conceptual framework, based on 
extant academic literature, was developed (see Figure 1-1, p. 7).  Fear of negative 
evaluation and perceived competence are antecedents to ambiguity aversion.  These two 
relationships are moderated by the firm’s innovation culture; a never before studied 
conceptualization.  I suggested that ambiguity aversion has a negative impact on 
decision-making comprehensiveness.  Here, decision-making comprehensiveness is 
defined as “the degree to which the team is exhaustive as it considers multiple 
approaches, courses of action, and decision criteria in its strategic decision making” 
(Slotegraaf and Atuahene-Gima 2011, p. 97).  Subsequently, decision-making 
comprehensiveness is positively related to front-end of innovation performance.  The 
basic contention in the framework suggests that ambiguity aversion impacts front-end of 
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innovation performance because of the suppression effect it has on decision-making 
comprehensiveness.  An ancillary relationship, one that has been previously studied, 
innovation culture to capacity to innovate leading to front-end of innovation performance 
is suggested.   
A research design was crafted in order to test the conceptual model against actual 
data.  Data was collected via the use of an online panel that consisted of managers 
involved in innovation related decision-making.  After cleaning the data, there were a 
total of one hundred and seventy two usable responses.  Appropriate steps were taken to 
assess the measurement quality of all constructs and based on accepted criteria summated 
variables for hypothesis testing were created.  Support for hypotheses was based on the 
results of a series of regression equations that were a representation of the paths 
suggested in the conceptual model.  All regression equations were estimated using three 
stage least squares estimation technique which allows for simultaneous estimation of 
regression equations.  To gain further insights, various control variables were added to 
the regression equation as covariates.  Further tests of mediation and moderation were 
also performed in order to correctly find support for some of the proposed hypotheses.   
Based on the analysis of the data, certain additions by way of covariates were 
proposed to the original conceptual model.  In addition, a revised conceptual model is 
also offered given the overall pattern of results obtained.  As will be discussed in the next 
section, the revised model excludes ambiguity aversion from the conceptual model.  This 
revised model is a noticeably better fit for the data. Taken either way, the results and 
overall insights gained suggest important implications for both theory and practice.   
184	  
	  
6.3. Discussion of Research Findings 
As hinted in the previous chapter, there are two models that warrant a thorough 
discussion of their respective results.  The first model more closely resembles the original 
conceptual model proposed in this dissertation.  In addition to all of the originally 
proposed relationships, it adds one more in the form of a covariate on ambiguity aversion.  
This specific covariate represents the manager’s years of experience in innovation related 
activities.  A number of other control variables were examined, but none of them seemed 
to provide adequate justification that would merit their inclusion in the model.  Figure 5-1 
(p. 165) gives a thorough overview of this newer model along with the relevant path 
coefficients.   
The overall system weighted R-square for this model is 47.4%, suggesting that 
explanatory power of the model with the added covariate is very good.  As explained in 
Chapter V, adding the covariate serves to strengthen some of the hypothesized 
relationships.  The overall pattern of results that emerged was inline with the 
conceptualized model barring one of the proposed moderations. 
Both capacity to innovate and decision-making comprehensiveness were shown to 
have a strong and positive relationship with the dependent variable, front-end of 
innovation of performance.  Extant literature has suggested that capacity to innovate is a 
key antecedent to firm competitive advantage and performance (Hurley and Hult 1998).  
It stands to reason that a similar relationship would exist between capacity to innovate 
and front-end of innovation, a relationship that has not been explored in the past.  
Therefore the results provide strong support for H8.  Similarly, prior research has 
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established that decision-making comprehensiveness positively impacts new product 
advantage (Slotegraaf and Atuahene-Gima 2011).  The conceptual model in this 
dissertation suggests that this team-level construct should have a similar positive impact 
on front-end of innovation performance.  The results provide support for this 
conceptualization (H6).   
As explored by Hurley and Hult (1998), the results replicate their finding of 
innovation culture having a positive relationship with capacity to innovate.  In other 
words, the dissertation finds strong support for H7.  To remind the reader, capacity to 
innovate was primarily included in the model, as without it, it is conceptually problematic 
to suggest that a culture would have a direct impact on a performance variable.  
Therefore, inherent in this argument is that capacity to innovate mediates the relationship 
between innovation culture and front-end of innovation performance.  This relationship 
was testing using both the tried and tested procedures outlined by Baron and Kenny 
(1986) and the newer bootstrapping methods proposed by Preacher and Hayes (2004).  
The results of both procedures clearly provide support for complete mediation.  This 
provides strong support for the inclusion of capacity to innovate in the model. 
The remaining relationships in the conceptual model include the ambiguity 
aversion construct in one way or another.  Hypothesis 5 suggested that ambiguity 
aversion has a significant negative relationship with decision-making comprehensiveness, 
suggesting that teams would exhibit lower decision-making comprehensiveness if the 
perceived their project leader to have a high level of ambiguity aversion.  The cognitive 
miser theory was used to further explain this relationship.  The results of hypothesis 
testing do in fact offer support for this hypothesis.  The coefficient is negative and the p 
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value is below the .05 threshold.  This relationship is another key part of the conceptual 
model.  Taken along with H6, the result provides support to that the idea that ambiguity 
aversion is harmful in terms of performance.   
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were concerned with antecedents of ambiguity aversion, fear 
of negative evaluation and perceived competence respectively.  In other words they both 
suggest direct main effects, H1 being negative, while H2 proposing a positive 
relationship.  However, the conceptual model also posits two moderation hypotheses.  
Innovation culture is hypothesized to moderate the relationship between fear of negative 
evaluation and ambiguity aversion (H3), and the relationship between perceived 
competence and ambiguity aversion (H4).  The presence of the moderation hypotheses 
serves to supersede the direct effect hypotheses. 
The results of hypothesis testing here provide some interesting findings.  The 
moderation of innovation culture on the fear of negative evaluation – ambiguity aversion 
relationship is not supported (H3).  The conceptual model had originally argued that 
under a weak innovation culture, a project leader with low FNE would exhibit a higher 
level of ambiguity aversion. This conceptualization was justified based on the premise 
that in a low/weak innovation culture there is no incentive to embrace ambiguity. In other 
words, regardless of whether a project leader experiences high or low FNE, he/she would 
always show high aversion to ambiguity in a low/weak innovation culture.  The strong 
positive relationship between fear of negative evaluation and ambiguity aversion was 
expected in the strong innovation culture.  Given the moderation, the main effect 
however remains strong and significant (H1).  This implies that the effect of fear of 
negative evaluation on ambiguity aversion cannot be attenuated in the presence of either 
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a strong or weak innovation culture.  The simple analysis confirms this result (see Figure 
5-2, p. 166). 
The results are less straightforward when examining H2 and H4, hypotheses 
dealing with perceived competence, ambiguity aversion, and innovation culture as a 
moderator.  The hypothesis test for (H4) the moderation of innovation culture on the 
relationship between perceived competence and ambiguity aversion obtained significant 
coefficients.  In other words, the results of the regression suggested that the innovation 
culture and perceived competence did have a significant interaction effect on ambiguity 
aversion.  However, upon analyzing this relationship using simple slope analysis (see 
Figure 5-3, p. 167), the relationship is contradictory to that specified in H4.   
Therefore while the interaction is significant, the data actually suggests that in a 
low innovation culture, there exists a negative relationship between perceived 
competence and ambiguity aversion, while in a high innovation culture that relationship 
is positive.  This outcome is slightly problematic, and rather than providing answers, it 
only leads to further questions regarding the conceptual theorizing employed to come up 
with the hypothesis.  It is especially difficult to rationalize why a manager would exhibit 
high ambiguity aversion when s/he is in a firm that is high on innovation culture while 
they experience high (low) perceived competence.  This was conceptualized to be a 
circumstance when ambiguity aversion is at its lowest (highest).   
Similarly, in a low innovation culture, ambiguity aversion is conceptualized to be 
high regardless of the level of perceived competence because there is no incentive in such 
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a culture to embrace ambiguity.  Again, the finding of a negative relationship outlined in 
the simple slop diagram is highly counter-intuitive and difficult to explain. 
In order to further understand these results, the moderation hypotheses were 
examined using Preacher and Hayes’ method.  Using the PROCESS macro in SAS 9.3, 
the variables were specified according to Preacher and Hayes’ Model 7 which tests the 
interaction of ICL on the relationship between FNE (PCOMP) and AA while also 
accounting for the mediation relationship of FNE (PCOMP) to AA to DMC.  The results 
indicated that neither moderation were significant.  Furthermore, I performed mediation 
tests on the FNE (PCOMP) à AA à DMC relationships.  The results here suggested 
that there was no presence of mediation.  A further examination of the mediation test 
results suggested that there existed a strong direct effect of FNE (PCOMP) on DMC even 
when accounting for ambiguity aversion.  
Given the overall pattern of results and the findings of the moderation and 
mediation tests, there is concern that ambiguity aversion is a poor fit in the current model.  
Accordingly, all the relevant analysis was rerun for a revised model that excluded 
ambiguity aversion.  As pointed out in the previous chapter, procedures employed for 
hypotheses testing and other required tests followed the exact same procedures as 
previously employed.  The revised model shows great promise (see Figure 5-6, p. 177).  
The system weighted R-square increased to 56.7%, suggesting that the explanatory power 
of the revised model is greatly enhanced.   
Hypotheses 6, 7, and 8 are identical to the previous model and the results of 
hypotheses testing remained the same as before.  Of more interest are the results relating 
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to the relationships between PCOMP, FNE, ICL, and DMC given the exclusion of 
ambiguity aversion in the revised model.  The results of the relevant regression analyses 
provide support for the moderation effect of innovation culture on the relationship 
between FNE (PCOMP) and DMC.  The results are further supported based on the 
outcome of the Preacher and Hayes tests for moderation.  Since, the interaction terms are 
significant, further assessment of the moderations were examined via simple slopes 
analyses.    
The simple slope analysis of the interaction of innovation culture on the 
relationship between fear of negative evaluation and decision-making comprehensiveness 
suggests a straightforward interpretation (See Figure 5-3, p. 174).  Given a high 
innovation culture, the relationship between fear of negative evaluation and decision-
making comprehensiveness is unclear (although DMC remains high throughout).  This 
would suggest that a firm that exhibits a strong innovation culture is going to be high on 
decision-making comprehensiveness regardless of the manager’s fear of negative 
evaluation as they don’t have the option not to be comprehensive, or ignore being 
comprehensive.  On the other hand, given a low innovation culture, there exists a 
negative relationship between fear of negative evaluation and decision-making 
comprehensiveness.  The observed pattern of results might be explained by the freeze 
response to fear or even atychiphobia - the fear of failure.  Since these concepts in 
psychology are closely related to motivations, it may be a theoretical lens that could be 
applied to explain the relationships discussed here.   
Looking at Figure 5-4 (p. 175), the simple slopes representing the interaction of 
innovation culture and perceived competence on decision-making comprehensiveness 
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make reasonable sense.  While a low or weak innovation culture has no bearing on the 
relationship between perceived competence and decision-making comprehensiveness, a 
high or strong innovation culture leads to a positive relationship.  Therefore we can say 
that in an environment characterized by strong innovation culture, a manager is likely to 
observe higher decision-making comprehensiveness when s/he has high perceived 
competence over the decision scenario or context, as opposed to when s/he is on low 
perceived competence.   
So in other words, if a manager feels highly competent, it is likely that they will 
push their project teams to consider all appropriate courses of action and strategies 
related to decisions involved with new product concepts or ideas obtained in the front-
end of innovation.  This behavior could be explained by an individual’s need to see 
his/her decision being proven right.  A manager who perceives high competence is 
unlikely to want their decisions (based on their high perceived competence) shown to be 
wrong.  This conceptualization fits in well within the broad realm of rational choice 
theory and concepts of bounded rationality.  A manager, being a rational actor, is going to 
be interested in making decisions that provide the greatest self-benefit or self-interest.  
Therefore, an individual with high perceived competence is going to want to ensure that 
his or her decisions are in fact right by ensuring that decision-making comprehensiveness 
is high.  This would especially be the case in a high innovation culture due to the greater 
emphasis placed on both positive and negative outcomes associated with innovation 
related decisions. 
Mediation tests were also performed.  The results strongly support the mediation 
role of decision-making comprehensiveness on the path from FNE (PCOMP) to front-end 
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of innovation performance.  This finding is key as it is theoretically improbable to 
suggest that perceived competence and fear of negative evaluation directly impact a 
performance variable. 
6.3.1. Discussion on Ambiguity Aversion 
A troubling outcome of the revised model is the non-inclusion of the ambiguity 
aversion construct.  The inclusion of ambiguity aversion in the original conceptual model 
was based on an extensive review of the literature and a solid theoretical foundation.  
Needless to say, it is a key variable within the proposed conceptual model.  Given this, it 
is imperative to further examine the subsequent lack of adequate findings in relation to 
the various hypothesized paths directly related to the ambiguity aversion construct.   
The failure to find strong support for ambiguity aversion in the model could be 
attributed to a number of reasons.  One key area is to examine are any violations of the 
basic assumptions of the regression model.  As outlined in Chapter V, I have previously 
assessed these assumptions and found no major violations.  However, in order to make 
absolutely certain, I retested these assumptions with a specific focus on the ambiguity 
aversion measure.  While the results show that the assumptions of independence and 
homoscedasticity are more or less met, there appears to be issues with normality and to a 
greater extent, linearity.  Normality was examined by looking at a histogram of the 
residuals with a normal distribution curve added.  Examining the Q-Q plot performed an 
additional test of normality (see Appendix E).  Both charts indicate that apart from minor 
deviations, the distributions are more or less normal.  However, on examining statistical 
tests for normality (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the Shapiro-Wilk test), the null 
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hypothesis that the distribution is normal is rejected.  As such, the tests for the 
assumption of normality are somewhat inconclusive, but due to the various limitations 
surrounding both statistical tests, we can assume that the AA variable is normally 
distributed. 
Of more concern is the failure to meet the linearity assumption.  The linearity 
assumption in regression assumes that there exists a linear relationship among variables. 
Regression is highly susceptible to bad, poor, and/or misleading results if the variables do 
not exhibit a linear relationship.  The linearity assumption was examined by assessing 
scatter plots of ambiguity aversion against perceived competence, fear of negative 
evaluation, and decision-making comprehensiveness.  The presence of a linear pattern in 
the scatter plot suggests that there exists a linear relationship.  The scatter plots revealed 
no discernible pattern that would suggest linearity.  Linearity can also be examined by 
way of looking at Pearson’s correlations.  High and significant correlations are a 
stepping-stone towards establishing linear relationships.  However, again this was not the 
case, correlations were low and insignificant.  Prescribed remedies to counter non 
linearity often advocate the transformation of the variables involved.  A number of 
transformations were performed on ambiguity aversion (including log, inverse, square 
root, and square).  However, as shown in Appendix E, none resulted in a scatter plot that 
would allow us to satisfy the linearity assumption.  Therefore, one conclusion for the 
problems related to ambiguity aversion in the model could be its inability to meet all the 
basic assumptions of regression.  (Appendix E outlines the various tests and charts used 
to ascertain whether the ambiguity aversion measure meets the four assumptions).   
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In performing various transformations and tests to ascertain linearity, I also 
examined whether or not ambiguity aversion had a curvilinear relationship with its 
related variables.  Curvilinear relationships were examined by performing a curve 
estimation analysis in SPSS.  The results were clear in that there was no evidence to 
suggest a curvilinear relationship with either of the antecedents (PCOMP and FNE) or 
with decision-making comprehensiveness.  Therefore, the failure to detect a strong reason 
to include ambiguity aversion in the model cannot be explained due to the presence of 
curvilinear type relationships. 
Another important issue that needs to be addressed is the measurement of the 
ambiguity aversion construct.  As pointed out in the previous chapter, a number of issues 
arose when ambiguity aversion was examined via exploratory factor analysis, reliability 
analysis, and confirmatory factor analysis.  The decision at that stage was to use just two 
items (AA2 and AA5) to represent the ambiguity aversion construct.  This was based on 
the fact that the reverse coded AA3 item did not correlate well with any of the other 
items, and two items AA1 and AA4 seemed to represent a completely different factor 
from AA2 and AA5.   
This outcome might suggest that the newly developed scale has been poorly 
developed given the definition adopted in the dissertation.  As will be discussed later, this 
is a promising area of future research as there is no existing scale that does a good job of 
measuring managerial aversion to ambiguity.  Finally, one could point at sample related 
issues or even theoretical problems in causing the lack of support for ambiguity aversion.  
However, these issues can be dismissed on a number of grounds.  For example, additional 
variables measured (that are not reported in the dissertation) like risk aversion was used 
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to examine their relationship to ambiguity aversion.  Theory suggests that ambiguity 
aversion and risk aversion are different.  A t-test for mean separation between risk 
aversion and ambiguity aversion confirmed that they are indeed different.  In addition, 
the variables exhibit low and non-significant bivariate correlations (Pearson’s r = 0.115, p 
= 0.132).  Similarly, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion exhibit good discriminant 
validity when compared with each other.  While there is yet more to be done to examine 
these findings, it is safe to discard problems with theoretical development or sample 
related issues as being the cause for a lack of significant findings related to ambiguity 
aversion. 
In summary, it is likely that a number of reasons have contributed to the pattern of 
results that are not in favor of ambiguity aversion.  This includes the inability to meet the 
basic assumptions of regression and the concerns arising from the measurement of the 
construct. 
6.4. Research Implications 
The following section describes the key implications of the dissertation.  There 
are a number of key takeaways from this research.  I first focus on the theoretical 
implications of the current framework.  This is followed by the practical or managerial 
implications of the findings.  Taken together, it is clear that the dissertation has allowed 
us to make major strides in both theory and practice. 
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6.4.1. Theoretical Implications 
There are a number of propositions that the dissertation provides in regards to 
theory.  First, the current study extends our current understanding of the front-end of 
innovation.  As pointed out earlier, the front-end of innovation is generally underexplored 
especially in terms of managerial attributes like decision-making.  They key focus of 
extant research in this area has been to make process related recommendations.  The 
study presented here is the first of its kind to examine how managers can directly 
influence front-end of innovation performance.  The key here is how competent a 
manager perceives himself to be, and his/her fear of negative evaluations post-decision.  
The findings suggest that both impact front-end of innovation performance through their 
impact on decision-making comprehensiveness.  This conceptualization capture both the 
individual and team level attributes that could impact performance at the front-end which 
is another key theoretical contribution. 
In terms of past research, many have advocated the role of innovation culture on 
innovation related performance (via capacity to innovate).  However, few have examined 
how innovation culture moderates individual managerial factors like perceived 
competence and fear of negative evaluation, factors that could have an impact on 
innovation related decision-making.  The findings of the dissertation suggest that 
innovation culture does moderate the relationship between perceived competence and 
decision-making comprehensiveness.  The same goes for the relationship between fear of 
negative evaluation and decision-making comprehensiveness.  This finding is a key 
theoretical contribution.  What we have is support for the long-standing conceptualization 
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that organizational or firm culture does indeed play a role in decision-making amongst 
managers.   
An equally important contribution is the finding in support of the role of 
innovation culture within a framework dealing with the front-end of innovation.  Extant 
research has not adequately examined how innovation culture may impact activities, 
decisions, and performance at the front-end of innovation.  This dissertation shows one 
possible framework in which this may be the case.  Finally, another contribution here is 
the measurement of innovation culture.  We have replicated the findings of Dobni (2008) 
in regards to measuring innovation culture via a multi-item subjective scale.  The 
measure’s strong relationship to front-end of innovation performance via capacity to 
innovate (a newly developed scale) is exactly as theorized.  This bodes well for further 
studies in the area.   
Continuing on the discussion about scales and measures, this dissertation 
develops a number of new multiple item scales to measure constructs.  Barring the 
ambiguity aversion measure, all other scales performed remarkable well.  While the scale 
development efforts undertaken here are by no means exhaustive, the current results 
provide great promise in terms of the new measures and serves as another contribution to 
future research in these areas. 
Finally, I contend that the results help to further expand our knowledge of the 
front-end of innovation, and the wider innovation domain.  To the best of my knowledge, 
this is the first attempt to bring concepts from both normative decision theory and 
behavioral decision theory into the innovation context.  This helps to expand the 
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generalizability of these theoretical domains. In addition, it also suggests that managerial 
decision making in the front-end of innovation, and other aspects related to innovation 
can be adequately studied through these theoretical perspectives in a manner that brings 
about key conclusions and findings.  Overall, these theoretical contributions taken 
together help further our current state of knowledge while also opening up various 
avenues for further inquiry.   
6.4.2. Managerial Implications 
There are a number of key recommendations and implications for managers that 
arise from the findings in this dissertation.  Managers (and firms) are constantly exploring 
various ways to improve their innovation performance or innovativeness in general.  This 
could include efforts to bring in a culture with high regard for innovation, or adopting 
processes that increase the ability to be innovative. Either way, there is increasing 
demand on how to be better at innovation.  This phenomenon can be explained due to the 
increasing evidence in support of the key role of innovation in overall firm performance 
and developing competitive advantages.   
A key finding is that decision-making comprehensiveness is positively linked to 
front-end of innovation performance.  Team work is part and parcel of innovation related 
activities.  These teams are responsible for multiple activities and provide input on 
innovation related decisions. The role of project teams has been discussed prominently 
within the new-product development literature.  However, there has been less effort 
devoted to understanding the role of teams in the front-end of innovation.  We already 
know that the front-end of innovation is often characterized as being associated with 
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activities and decisions that are difficult to explain, describe, explain etc.  In other words, 
the inherent nature of early concepts and ideas being vague and uncertain makes it 
difficult to predict success at this early stage.  The findings in this dissertation strongly 
contend that team decision-making comprehensiveness helps improve the performance at 
the front-end of innovation. 
How comprehensive project teams are in assessing various alternative strategies, 
options, decision criteria etc. have direct effect of front-end of innovation performance.  
Being high on decision-making comprehensiveness serves to reduce the inherent 
fuzziness or vagueness associated with the activities and outcomes at the front-end of 
innovation.  This is because project teams are more exhaustive in considering multiple 
strategies, differing courses of action, decision criteria etc.  This would include being 
thorough in establishing probabilities for attributes, outcomes, or specifics that are 
ambiguous.  This allows concepts and ideas emerging from the front-end to have been 
subject to a more extensive screening process, be better defined, and be associated with 
well-established probabilities.  This essentially serves to improve the overall quality of 
the outcome of the front-end of innovation, thus leading to a domino effect on 
performance at latter stages of innovation. 
Another finding that serves to improve front-end of innovation performance is 
through that of the role played by a firm’s capacity to innovate.  As pointed out by Hurley 
and Hult (1998), innovative capacity refers to a firm’s ability to adopt new ideas, 
processes, and/or innovations in a successful manner.  It is in some ways the tangible 
manifestation of a strong innovation culture.  Capacity to innovate has been shown to be 
a strong predictor of innovation performance.  This dissertation further teases out the key 
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role of this construct on improving performance at the front-end of innovation, a 
relationship that hasn’t been explored previously.  This dissertation finds that innovation 
culture has a significant impact on front-end of innovation performance through its role 
on capacity to innovate.  This would suggest that in order for firms to find success during 
the early stages of innovation, it is key that they have the underlying capacity to innovate.  
In other words, a firm needs to have a strong and successful ability to adopt and advance 
new ideas in order to find success at the front-end of innovation.   
Another key implication directly pertains to various recommendations that could 
help enhance front-end of innovation performance through various managerially relevant 
traits.  The revised model suggests that high perceived competence has a positive effect 
on decision-making comprehensiveness which in turn results in increased front-end of 
innovation performance.  In other words, a manager that perceives high competence over 
the decision context might be beneficial in terms of innovation performance.  Perceived 
competence here refers to skills, expertise, knowledge etc. over the decision context.  
Therefore, managers should be afforded every opportunity to expand on their 
competencies.  This could be in the form of additional training or further education, 
access to key information etc.  It could also be that perceived competence is linked to 
overall experience. 
Similarly, the revised model suggests that fear of negative evaluation can be 
detrimental to front-end of innovation performance.  However, as discussed below, this 
relationship is moderated by the firm’s innovation culture. 
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 Most important is the role innovation culture plays in moderating the relationship 
between perceived competence and decision-making comprehensiveness and fear of 
negative evaluation on decision-making comprehensiveness.  Innovation culture 
attenuates the effect of fear of negative evaluation, while enhancing the effect of 
perceived competence on decision-making comprehensiveness.  In other words, having a 
culture that places a strong emphasis on innovation is key to improving decision-making 
comprehensiveness.  This is a key finding because as I have explained earlier, there is 
little we currently know in regards to how firms can do better in terms of front-end of 
innovation performance.   
In summary, the results of the revised model serves to provide a valuable 
framework through which firms and managers can improve front-end of innovation 
performance.   
6.5. Research Limitations 
Here I discuss a number of research limitations that warrant a more in depth 
discussion.  One limitation of the current study is the overall generalizability of the 
results.  This limitation arises from the disproportionate number of large firms in the 
current sample.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the greater proportion of large 
firms in the sample is significantly different from the distribution of firm size seen in the 
population of companies in the United States.  The lack of a large number of small to 
medium sized firms in the sample maybe due to the sampling procedures employed 
and/or due to the screening question that was incorporated.  Nevertheless, it doesn’t 
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necessarily discount the significance of the results here; it merely necessitates one to 
exercise caution in generalizing the results to smaller sized firms.   
The major concern in research such as the one presented here is the use of single-
respondent data, or in other words, the lack of multiple responses from each firm.  This 
limitation was unavoidable due to time and financial constraints beyond the control of the 
research team.  The negatives associated with single respondent data can be remedied 
based on the recommendations of Campbell (1955) who notes that it is acceptable if the 
single respondent is highly knowledgeable in the domain of study.  The use of various 
sampling and screening methods employed in this dissertation serves to ensure that 
respondents do indeed fit the description of key informants.  For example, the screening 
question employed at the start of the survey ensures that all respondents are deeply 
involved in innovation related activities and decision-making.   
However, there is still the issue of using one respondent’s evaluation for 
constructs like decision-making comprehensiveness and performance.  Ideally, members 
of a project team rather than a project leader should evaluate decision-making 
comprehensiveness.  Similarly, performance should ideally be captured using objective 
measures rather than relying on manager’s subjective evaluations.  Therefore, while 
every effort was made to reduce the reliance on single source data, it is a limitation that 
we have to accept here.  
Non-response bias is often a concern in survey type research.  It is often assessed 
by way of comparing early and late responses to the survey.  No differences between the 
two would indicate that there is no non-response bias.  However, the design of the current 
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study deviates in a number of ways from traditional survey based studies.  First, it 
employs the use of a research panel provider to provide participants for the study, and 
second, the survey is administered online.  These two points taken together constitute a 
non-traditional approach to survey design.  For example, this use of this research design 
is partly responsible for having collected all the required responses over the span of a few 
days.  Thus, examining difference between early and late responses is futile.  As a result 
of the quick turn around on data collection, we assume that non-response bias is not an 
issue here. 
Another limitation is the lack of control associated with correlational studies.  
Unlike experiments, survey based research has limitations in terms of its ability to control 
extraneous variables.  This introduces threats to internal validity.  Attempts to mitigate 
these issues included measuring additional variables that are known covariates to the key 
variables of interest.  And finally, there are serious measurement issues related to the 
ambiguity aversion measure which were discussed earlier.   
6.6. Directions for Future Research 
Ultimately, this dissertation is just one step in what is a never-ending process of 
research.  As we understand the current domain of study better, more questions inevitably 
arise.  The same is true here.  There are a number of different directions that could serve 
as fruitful areas of further inquiry.  Probably the most interesting area for further research 
is ambiguity aversion.  There remains a startling lack of research on ambiguity aversion 
in the marketing domain.  As discussed in Chapter II, the focus has mostly been on risk 
aversion.  Both behavioral decision theory and normative decision theory provide great 
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insight into ambiguity aversion.  Based on these two theoretical foundations, it is clear 
that ambiguity aversion should play a role in conceptual models similar to the one 
presented here.  The original conceptual model presented in this dissertation includes 
ambiguity aversion as a key variable.  However, as pointed out previously, there were a 
number of measurement issues that resulted in the exclusion of ambiguity aversion from 
the revised model.  Nevertheless, this should not preclude future researchers in this area 
from excluding ambiguity aversion in their models.  It is a phenomenon that is clearly 
different from risk aversion, and merits further inquiry in the field of marketing. 
Another interesting direction for future research is to examine differences in how 
managers and team members perceive decision-making comprehensiveness.  Obviously, 
it is a key component that describes performance at the front end of innovation.  The 
current dissertation examines decision-making comprehensiveness from the manager’s 
viewpoint.  It would be interesting to see if the results will vary if the measurement was 
done at the team level.  Also related to decision-making comprehensiveness, there is a 
need to further explain exactly how fear of negative evaluation and perceived competence 
play a role in decision-making comprehensiveness.  In other words we need a theoretical 
justification for these relationships that are found in the revised model.  This would be an 
area worthy of further inquiry. 
Though it wasn’t a central focus in this dissertation, researchers are strongly 
advised to look into the exact mechanisms through which managers perceive ambiguity 
aversion and risk aversion.  There is room to suggest that ambiguity aversion supersedes 
risk aversion.  This is based on the fact that ambiguity aversion deals with the lack of 
probabilities, while risk version is concerned with differences in given probabilities.  An 
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interesting area of further inquiry would be to examine when a manager crosses over 
from being averse to ambiguity onto a situation where he or she is exhibiting risk 
aversion.  In other words, would the appearance of probabilities automatically eliminate 
ambiguity aversion and lead to a situation more in line with risk aversion. 
Future research in this area is encouraged to examine other antecedents of the 
front-end of innovation performance.  This dissertation only examines capacity to 
innovate and decision-making comprehensiveness.  It is likely that many more variables 
could play an important role in determining front-end of innovation performance.  For 
example, how does reacting to competition impact activities at the front of an innovation?  
Many firms these days are forced to innovate purely because they need to stay abreast 
with their competition.  It is possible, that speed and strength of competitive reactions 
could play a role in terms of how managers deal with decision-making at the front-end of 
innovation.   
Another area of future inquiry remains in explaining the impact of innovation 
culture on various activities and decisions made in relation to innovation.  While this 
dissertation has examined one mechanism through which innovation culture helps 
improve innovativeness and or innovation performance, there remain multiple other 
explanations that need to be examined.  Innovation culture is admittedly a complex 
construct.  Gaining a better understanding of it is key if we are to advance our 
understanding in the innovation domain.  There is also a further need to examine how 
innovation culture can be effectively implemented within an organization.  This is surely 
not easy, but the theoretical and managerial implications of such a study would be 
immense. 
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In closing, this dissertation set out to examine an interesting area of research, one 
with both theoretical and managerial implications.  The results provide support for the 
general notion that there are multiple ways through which firms can improve 
performance of the front-end of innovation.  While there are certain limitations to the 
study, the theoretical and managerial implications are noteworthy.  Scholars conducting 
work in this area are strongly urged to continue their pursuit towards better explaining the 
issues discussed in this dissertation. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
Administered online via Qualtrics®  
 
 
 
SCREENING QUESTION 
 
The question below will help us ascertain whether or not you are a good fit for the current survey.  
Depending on your answer you will either be asked to complete the survey or presented with a statement 
thanking you for your participation. 
 
How would you best describe your level of involvement in your company’s decisions regarding innovation/ new product 
ideas? 
 
o I"am"the"sole"decision"maker"regarding"innovation/(new(product(ideas([QUALIFY]"
o I"make"the"final"decision"regarding"innovation/(new(product(ideas"with"input"from"staff/management"
[QUALIFY]"
o I"help"reach"the"final"decision"regarding"innovation/(new(product(ideas"as"part"of"a"group/committee""[QUALIFY]"
o I"provide"input"toward"decisions"regarding"innovation/(new(product!ideas([TERMINATE]"
o I"have"no"input"into"decisions"regarding"innovation/(new(product!ideas!![TERMINATE]"
 
 
 
 
 
 
SURVEY ON FRONT-END OF INNOVATION  
 
This research is being conducted by researchers at a major state university in the United States. The 
research is designed strictly to improve our understanding and ability to explain new product 
development processes at private companies.  Your participation is part of large study that will have 
important impact on the business community.  Your responses will help us better understand 
performance in innovation activities.  A specific goal is to help improve the outcomes and processes of 
the front-end of innovation. 
 
This survey concerns your experiences at your current or most recent job.  Please think of the company 
that you currently work for (or most recently worked at) and keep this specific company in mind as you 
answer the questions in this survey.  When you respond please respond only considering your actual 
experience at this current or most recent employer. 
 
Of particular interest is your experience in specific innovation related experiences. 
 
Thanks again for your participation in this important survey. 
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MANAGERIAL INFORMATION 
 
I have adequate knowledge to assess this firm's:  Strongly Disagree 
 Strongly  
Agree 
Experience with respect to managing innovation activities. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Skills with respect to managing innovation activities. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Capabilities with respect to managing innovation activities. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Motivations with respect to managing innovation activities. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Motivations with respect to profit goals for one or more products. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Motivations with respect to reacting to the competition. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Goals with respect to the future direction for product innovation activities. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Motivations with respect to cost control goals for product innovation activities. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Products' quality. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
On the following questions please select your level of expertise, knowledge, or 
experience.  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Strongly  
Agree 
I have many years of experience in innovation. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I very knowledgeable about new product development 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I consider innovation an area in which I know what I am doing. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I have developed expertise in managing innovation. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I have developed expertise in managing product development. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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MANAGERIAL EVALUATION 
 
When I make decisions on new products ideas:  Strongly Disagree 
 Strongly  
Agree 
I am afraid that others will criticize decisions I have made 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I worry a lot about what my supervisors would think of my decision. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I worry a lot about what my co-workers would think of my decision. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
These decisions are open to criticism by others. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I worry that the innovation related decisions I make might lead to ridicule within 
the company. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In our innovation process, out-of-the-box decisions may be negatively received 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
To gain positive feedback, innovation decisions must be based on accepted criteria. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
To avoid negative feedback by other in the firm, I usually approve the most 
defensible innovation ideas. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
MANAGING UNCERTAINTY 
 
In relation to innovation activities:  Strongly Disagree 
 Strongly  
Agree 
I believe that higher risks are worth taking for higher rewards.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I accept occasional failures as being normal.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
To earn greater rewards, I am willing to take higher risks. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I like to "play it safe." 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I like to implement a plan only if it is very certain that the plan will work.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I encourage the development of marketing strategies, knowing well that some will 
fail. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
In relation to innovation activities:  Strongly Disagree 
 Strongly  
Agree 
When it comes to uncertain outcomes, I need to know the odds for and against. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Problems that must be considered from multiple viewpoints are a little threatening. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I enjoy tackling problems that are ambiguous. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Before I can make a decision, understanding the probable outcomes must come 
first. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would rather avoid solving a problem that must be viewed from several different 
perspectives. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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UNCERTAINTY PREFERENCE 
 
Within the context of your firm’s innovation activities, how comfortable are you 
with: 
Very 
Uncomfortable 
 Very 
Comfortable 
Uncertain Situations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Uncertain Decisions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Uncertain Outcomes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Within the context of your firm’s innovation activities, how comfortable are you 
with: 
Very 
Uncomfortable 
 Very 
Comfortable 
Situations That Involve Risk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Decisions That Involve Risk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Outcomes That Involve Risk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 Sure Bets  Long Shots 
Which do you prefer when it comes to innovation related decisions:  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
Please read the following two statements carefully and then select the one that you feel best represents your approach 
in regards to your firm’s innovation activities. 
 
! I am comfortable making a choice between various options where the probability or odds associated with each option is 
clearly specified. 
 
! I am comfortable making a choice between various options regardless of whether or not the probability or odds 
associated with each option is clearly specified. 
 
 
Please read the following two decision scenarios carefully and then select the one that you feel most comfortable with. 
 
! We have chosen to go with Concept # 1 and advance it to formal new-product development immediately.  Our decision 
was based on extensive research which shows that Concept # 1 has a 76% chance of success compared to just 45% for 
Concept # 2. 
 
! We have chosen to go with Concept # 1 and advance it to formal new-product development immediately. Our decision 
was based on extensive research which shows that Concept # 1 has a higher likelihood of success compared to Concept # 
2. 
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RISK AVERSION VS. AMBIGUITY AVERSION 
 
The front-end of innovation is often described as comprising a lot of uncertainty. 
 
Conceptually, uncertainty can be divided into two dimensions; measurable and unmeasurable uncertainty. 
 
In business, measurable uncertainty is often characterized as situations where we have access to clear and specific 
probabilities or odds.  These probabilities or odds may be associated with decision choices, outcomes, etc.  In other words 
measurable uncertainty is observable and quantifiable.  
  
Measurable uncertainty is also referred to as risk. 
 
Note that risk only refers to the presence of probabilities or odds not what those probabilities or odds may be. 
 
 Very Uncomfortable 
 Very 
Comfortable 
How do you feel about risk in innovation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
In business, unmeasurable uncertainty is often characterized as situations where we do not have access to clear and specific 
probabilities or odds.  These vague probabilities or odds may be associated with decision choices, outcomes, etc.  In other 
words unmeasurable uncertainty is unobservable and not quantifiable. 
 
Unmeasurable uncertainty is also referred to as ambiguity. 
 
Note that ambiguity only refers to the lack of clear probabilities or odds, not the confidence we have in available 
probabilities or odds. 
 
 Very Uncomfortable 
 Very 
Comfortable 
How do you feel about ambiguity in innovation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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INNOVATION CULTURE 
 
In my company:  Strongly Disagree 
 Strongly  
Agree 
Innovation is an underlying culture and not just a word. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our senior managers are able to effectively cascade the innovation message 
throughout the organization. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Innovation is a core value. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We have an innovation vision that is aligned with current projects, platforms, or 
initiatives. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
In my company:  Strongly Disagree 
 Strongly  
Agree 
We find it easy to adopt new processes. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We definitely work at creating new ways to work. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our skills translate into new innovations that benefit customers. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Innovation requires dynamic capabilities that we possess. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
DECISION-MAKING COMPREHENSIVENESS 
 
When I've been the decision maker of a new-product development team, we: Strongly Disagree 
 Strongly  
Agree 
Develop many alternative courses of action. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Use multiple criteria for eliminating possible courses of action. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Engage in extensive and in-depth analysis of all available strategic options 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Thoroughly examine multiple explanations for problems and opportunities. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
How many members usually make up a new-product development team at your firm:    
 
________________________ 
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INNOVATION PERFORMANCE 
 
Please select the appropriate response in the context of your innovation activities 
especially its early stages (also referred to as the front-end of innovation). 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Strongly  
Agree 
The front-end results of new product projects I’ve led have been really good. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Front-end idea screening is considered a strength at my firm. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Front-end concept development processes are considered a strength at my firm. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When I think about our new-product development (NPD) processes, the front-end 
activities are excellent. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In our front-end process, we excel at producing solid product concepts for future 
development. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Product strategies that result from our front-end process are clear. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our front-end idea screening produces sharp product definitions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Product concepts that we recommend for further development are financially 
feasible. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A high percentage of our recommended concepts get funded for product 
development. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In our front-end process, we excel at producing clear product definitions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
How many new ideas were generated in your front-end 
of innovation process during the last: 
 
3 Months ________________________ 
6 Months ________________________ 
12 Months ________________________ 
18 Months ________________________ 
 
 
How many new ideas emerged from your front-end of 
innovation process ready for development during the 
last: 
 
3 Months ________________________ 
6 Months ________________________ 
12 Months ________________________ 
18 Months ________________________ 
 
What percentage of product concepts produced by your 
front-end of innovation process received funding during 
the last: 
 
3 Months ________________________ 
6 Months ________________________ 
12 Months ________________________ 
18 Months ________________________ 
 
What percentage of your product concepts were 
abandoned or discarded during the last: 
 
3 Months ________________________ 
6 Months ________________________ 
12 Months ________________________ 
18 Months ________________________ 
 
 
What percentage of product concepts produced by your 
front-end of innovation process were sent back for 
further analysis during the last: 
 
3 Months ________________________ 
6 Months ________________________ 
12 Months ________________________ 
18 Months ________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
233	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS 
 
In our business: Strongly Disagree 
 Strongly  
Agree 
Customers' product preference change quite a bit over time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our customers tend to look for new products all the time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We are witnessing demand for our products and services from customers who 
never bought them before. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
New customers tend to have product-related needs that are different from those of 
our existing customers. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We cater to many of the same customers that we used to in the past. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
In our industry: Strongly Disagree 
 Strongly  
Agree 
The technology in our industry is changing rapidly. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Technological changes provide big opportunities in our industry. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A large number of new product ideas have been made possible through 
technological breakthroughs in our industry. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Technological developments in our industry are rather minor. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Strongly  
Agree 
Changes in the marketing practices of our competitors are easy to predict. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The actions of our competitors are easy to predict. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Demand and consumer preferences are easy to predict. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Changes in product technology within this industry are easy to predict. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
For new-product development (NPD) projects your business unit worked on during the past three years, what is the: 
 
Approximate Return on Investment (ROI - for the new product development program) __________________ 
Approximate percentage of business unit's profits from new products   __________________ 
Approximate percentage of business unit’s sales from new products   __________________ 
Approximate percentage of NPD projects the business unit considers as success  __________________ 
 
 Never  All the time 
What is the degree to which NPD projects lead to future opportunities? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 Very Unsuccessful 
 Very 
Successful 
What is the overall success of the NPD program, in management's opinion: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 Never  All the time 
What is the degree to which front-end of innovation activities lead to future 
opportunities? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 Very Unsuccessful 
 Very 
Successful 
What is the overall success of front-end of innovation activities, in management's 
opinion: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please respond to the following questions for NPD projects your business unit 
worked on during the past three years: 
A Great  
Failure 
 A Great 
Success 
Relative to your business unit's objectives, how successful has the NPD program 
been in terms of profits. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Relative to your business unit's objectives, how successful has the NPD program 
been in terms of sales. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Relative to your business unit's objectives, how successful has the NPD program 
been in terms of market share. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Please respond to the following questions for NPD projects your business unit 
worked on during the past three years: 
A Great  
Failure 
 A Great 
Success 
Relative to your major competitors, how successful has the NPD program been in 
terms of profits. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Relative to your major competitors, how successful has the NPD program been in 
terms of sales. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Relative to your major competitors, how successful has the NPD program been in 
terms of market share. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS 
 
How long have you been employed in your current industry? _____ years  _____ months 
How long have you been employed with your current firm? _____ years  _____ months 
How long have you been involved in innovation activities in your career? _____ years  _____ months 
How long have you been involved in innovation activities with your firm? _____ years  _____ months 
 
Approximately how many new-product projects have you been involved in: 
 
During your career?   ________________________ 
During your time with your current firm? ________________________ 
 
What are the approximate annual sales of your firm? 
 
! Less than $500,000 
! Between $500,000 and $999,999 
! Between 1 million and 10 million US Dollars 
! Between 10 million and 50 million US Dollars 
! Between 50 million and 100 million US Dollars 
! Between 100 million and 500 million US Dollars 
! Between 500 million and 1 billion US Dollars 
! Between 1 billion and 10 billion US Dollars 
! Between 10 billion and 50 billion US Dollars 
! Over 50 billion US Dollars 
 
What is the approximate number of employees in your 
firm? 
! Less than 25 employees 
! Between 25 and 100 employees 
! Between 101 and 200 employees 
! Between 201 and 500 employees 
! Between 501 and 800 employees 
! Between 801 and 1000 employees 
! Between 1001 and 5000 employees 
! Over 5000 employees 
 
 
 
How long has your firm been in business? _____ years   
For how many years has your firm operated in the current industry? _____ years   
 
Just one last thing.  
 
In order to assist the researchers in their analysis of this research study, it would be helpful if you would kindly type the name 
of the company you work for in the space below.   
 
Company Name ________________ 
 
You may click next if you wish not to divulge this information. 
 
Thank You!  
 
 
CONCLUSION STATEMENT 
 
 
WE THANK YOUR FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION AND GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR 
SUPPORT OF OUR RESEARCH. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
REGRESSION EQUATIONS 
 
 
Regression Equations Main Effects Model 
 
 (1) FPS = 𝛼 + 𝛽!DMC +   𝛽!CAPI +   ϵ 
 (2) CAPI = 𝛼 + 𝛽!ICL +   ϵ 
 (3) DMC = 𝛼 + 𝛽!AA +   ϵ 
 (4) AA = 𝛼 + 𝛽!PCOMP +   𝛽!FNE +   ϵ 
 
 
Regression Equations for Full Model 
 
 (1) FPS = 𝛼 + 𝛽!DMC +   𝛽!CAPI +   ϵ   
 (2) CAPI = 𝛼 + 𝛽!ICL +   ϵ 
 (3) DMC = 𝛼 + 𝛽!AA +   ϵ 
 (4) AA = 𝛼 + 𝛽!PCOMP +   𝛽!FNE +   𝛽!ICL + 𝛽!(PCOMP×ICL) + 𝛽!(FNE×ICL) + ϵ 
 
 
Regression Equations for Full Model with Covariate Added 
 
 (1) FPS = 𝛼 + 𝛽!DMC +   𝛽!CAPI +   ϵ   
 (2) CAPI = 𝛼 + 𝛽!ICL +   ϵ 
 (3) DMC = 𝛼 + 𝛽!AA +   ϵ 
 (4) AA = 𝛼 + 𝛽!PCOMP +   𝛽!FNE +   𝛽!ICL + 𝛽!(PCOMP×ICL) + 𝛽!(FNE×ICL) + 𝛽!YT3 + ϵ 
 
 
Regression Equations for Revised Model 
 
 (1) FPS = 𝛼 + 𝛽!DMC +   𝛽!CAPI +   ϵ   
 (2) CAPI = 𝛼 + 𝛽!ICL +   ϵ 
 (3) DMC = 𝛼 + 𝛽!PCOMP +   𝛽!FNE +   𝛽!ICL + 𝛽!(PCOMP×ICL) + 𝛽!(FNE×ICL) + ϵ 
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APPENDIX D 
 
PREACHER AND HAYES MEDIATION AND MODERATION TESTS 
 
 
 
Relevant cites: 
 
Hayes, Andrew F. (2013), Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional 
Process Analysis: A Regression-Based Approach. New York, NY: Guilford Publication. 
 
Hayes, Andrew F., "Process: A Versatile Computational Tool for Observed Variable 
Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process Modeling." Manuscript submitted for 
publication (2012). 
 
Zhao, Xinshu, John G Lynch, and Qimei Chen (2010), "Reconsidering Baron and Kenny: 
Myths and Truths About Mediation Analysis," Journal of Consumer Research, 37 (2), 
197-206. 
 
Preacher, KristopherJ and AndrewF Hayes (2004), "Spss and Sas Procedures for 
Estimating Indirect Effects in Simple Mediation Models," Behavior Research Methods, 
Instruments, & Computers, 36 (4), 717-31. 
 
 
 
Preacher and Hayes Model 4. 
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Indirect effect of X on Y through Mj = a1jb1j  
Total indirect effect of X on Y through all M = Σj (a1jb1j) 
Direct effect of X on Y = c'1 
 
 
 
Preacher and Hayes Model 1. 
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Conditional effect of X on Y = b1 + b3M 
 
 
 
 
Preacher and Hayes Model 7. 
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Conditional indirect effect of X on Y through Mi = (a1i + a3iW)bi 
Direct effect of X on Y = c’ 
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APPENDIX E 
 
REGRESSION ASSUMPTION TESTS (OUTPUT) 
 
 
 
Tests of Normality for Ambiguity Aversion Measure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tests of Normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
Unstandardized 
Residual .076 172 .016 .972 172 .002
Lilliefors Significance Correctiona. 
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Tests of Hetersocedasticity for Ambiguity Aversion Measure 
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Tests of Collinearity for Ambiguity Aversion Measure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tests of Linearity for Ambiguity Aversion Measure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa
Model
Unstandardized Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant)
PCOMP
FNE
ICL
2.992 .624 4.791 .000
-.092 .097 -.074 -.956 .341 .832 1.203
.402 .075 .382 5.350 .000 .969 1.032
-.061 .093 -.050 -.658 .511 .855 1.169
Dependent Variable: AA25a. 
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R2 Linear = 0.026
Page 1
244	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
PCOMP
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R2 Quadratic =0.027
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R2 Cubic =0.027
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Linearity for Ambiguity Aversion Measure after various transformations 
 
 
 
 
 
AA25 – Ambiguity Aversion 
LGAA25 – Log transformation of ambiguity aversion 
SQTAA25 – Square root transformation of ambiguity aversion 
INAA25 – Inverse transformation of ambiguity aversion 
S2AA25 – Squared transformation of ambiguity aversion 
 
PCOMP – Perceived Competence 
FNE – Fear of Negative Evaluation 
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